A recalled arrest warrant stayed in a police database.
A man was arrested on it.
Personal cost. United States, 2009. Source: US Supreme Court opinion, read 18 Nov 2026.
Drag to turn. Tap a country to see its events.
Data that was meant to be gone was still there. At stake:
The cost is incalculable.
Papers naming Afghan staff and job applicants were left in the abandoned embassy in Kabul.
The Taliban held the city. Staff and their families had to be taken to safety.
Personal cost. Afghanistan, 2021. Source: news agency report, read 18 Nov 2026.
A recalled arrest warrant stayed in a police database.
A man was arrested on it.
Personal cost. United States, 2009. Source: US Supreme Court opinion, read 18 Nov 2026.
Peacekeepers' logs were reported as deleted. They were still there.
The defence minister resigned.
Professional cost. Japan, 2017. Source: The Japan Times, read 18 Nov 2026.
Military fingerprint scanners were sold at an online auction with their data still on them.
It gave the GPS coordinates of past deployments.
National cost. Afghanistan, found in 2022. Source: Chaos Computer Club, read 18 Nov 2026.
The crew were still destroying the secret code material when the ship was taken.
Most of it was compromised.
National cost. USS Pueblo, 1968. Source: National Security Agency damage assessment, read 18 Nov 2026.
Find yourself here414 real events. 16 sectors. 134 countries.
18 put people's lives at risk.
194 of the 414 events are from 2023 or later.
39 times the data came back.
77 came to light through an audit, a test or an inquiry.
Each block is one event, in the year of its source. Red is 2023 or later. Tap a block to read it.
Pick the cost or the country. Then open the place where you work. Each square is one event.
414 events. Open a sector to read them.
Ministry of Defence v Global Media and Entertainment Ltd and others [2025] EWHC 1806 (Admin). 2025-07-15.
Discharge of the super-injunction (a secret court order) over the February 2022 Afghan relocation dataset leak (33,000 lines, c.18,800 principal applicants). Part of the dataset appeared on Facebook in August 2023.
What this does not show. The judgment is about the court order. It records no harm to a named person.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: life and safety; allies and partners. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
2nd Regional Logistics Base (2RBLog), Polish Armed Forces. 15 Oct 2025 (Onet); 16 Oct 2025 (LIGA.net).
Sources gave Onet hundreds of pages found at a landfill near a 2RBLog explosives store. Some bags held shredded papers; many held uncut ones, some marked secret. The unit reported a possible crime on 8 October.
What this does not show. A news report. A Ministry source called it a possible provocation. Facts are disputed and the investigation was open at publication.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Bundeswehr (Ozelot air-defence system laptop). 16 Mar 2020.
G DATA researchers bought a used Bundeswehr laptop on eBay for 90 euros (about USD 100). Its hard drive was neither removed nor wiped. It booted unencrypted without a password and held VS-NfD (restricted) Ozelot plans and a guide to disabling the system.
What this does not show. A news report. VS-NfD is the lowest German classification level.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
RSE Koldau (liquidated Ministry of Defence affiliate). 10 Jun 2020.
A waste firm clearing an illegal Nur-Sultan dump found papers with an MoD seal and servicemen personnel files. The MoD said they belonged to Koldau, liquidated in 2016. Former officials left them behind instead of destroying them.
What this does not show. The MoD says the papers were unclassified and unrelated to MoD business. A news report.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: national security; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Bundeswehr (German armed forces) and VEBEG (federal surplus sales platform). Jul 2019.
The German armed forces sold old laptops through VEBEG, the federal platform for surplus equipment. The hard drives of federal computers that are sold should be removed and destroyed first. This did not happen, because the devices were labelled wrongly. In 2018 a forester from Bavaria bought four of these laptops. He got past the login screen by typing the last user's name as the password. One laptop held the operating manual of the Mars rocket launcher, marked classified for official use only, and personal data of soldiers. He told the authorities. The Bundeswehr said it would check how it disposes of IT hardware. It also said that a computer with sensitive data had been sold in 2016.
What this does not show. This is a news report based on the Sueddeutsche Zeitung; we found no official document. The ministry said the manual held no critical findings, and the page gives no exact publication date (map row 425 gives 6 Jul 2019).
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of National Defense (Political Warfare Bureau, Military Police Command). 2017 (issue date not printed; text cites a 5 Jan 2017 impeachment vote).
Three 1960s to 1970s military documents appeared on Yahoo Kimo auction in October 2015. Records showed two had been destroyed decades earlier by a retired major handling a shredding batch. A dealer said 2,000 to 3,000 more were held outside.
What this does not show. Paper files, not electronic media. The external hoard figure comes from a dealer statement, not a count by the Control Yuan.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Lockheed Martin (THAAD missile defence documents on a resold hard drive). 7 May 2009.
Researchers bought over 300 used hard drives in the UK, US, Germany, France and Australia. About 34% held harmful data. One eBay drive held Lockheed Martin THAAD test documents, defence policy papers, facility plans and staff rosters.
What this does not show. A news report. The article does not say whose computer the drive came from or confirm the documents were classified.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Northrop Grumman (drive owner) and its asset-disposal vendor; found by journalism students working with PBS Frontline/World. 25 Jun 2009.
Journalism students working with PBS Frontline/World bought used hard drives in Ghana, at markets near Accra and in the port of Tema. One drive came from Northrop Grumman, a US military contractor. It was not encrypted and held files on its contracts with the Pentagon; the documentary also reports contracts with the Defense Intelligence Agency, NASA and Homeland Security. Other drives held intimate personal details and bank data of their former owners. An FBI data security expert warned that exposed hiring details for Transportation Security Administration security jobs could help someone get a person inside. Northrop Grumman said the drive broke its disposal procedures, may have been stolen after its disposal vendor took it, and that it would investigate.
What this does not show. The sources do not show that anyone used the data, or exactly how the drive left the vendor. This is journalism, not an official finding.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of Defence (TAFMIS recruitment database and laptops). 25 Jun 2008.
The Defence Secretary accepted all 51 recommendations of Sir Edmund Burton's review into stolen recruitment laptops. Encryption on 55 TAFMIS laptops was reported as not working in August 2006, but users believed it worked. Burton found no robust business reason for recruiting officers to carry so much personal data. The database held about 600,000 recruits or potential recruits, about 1,000 dating back to 1977.
What this does not show. The statement does not say any data was, or should have been, deleted.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: national security; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 24 Oct 2026.
Cyprus Defence Ministry and Communications Ministry; papers seized by military intelligence. 14 Jan 2004.
A tow-truck driver found National Guard papers at the Tersefanou landfill near Larnaca. They gave building specifications for bunkers, machine-gun nests and anti-tank weapon launch sites. Military intelligence officers seized them. The Defence Ministry said the papers came from the Communications Ministry, which works with the military on such projects. The Defence Minister said papers sent to other ministries should be handled in the proper way at once after use, and that dumping them was wrong. The government ordered a new investigation. This came six months after the July 2003 find of cabinet papers in bin bags.
What this does not show. News report only. The minister said the papers were not classified and did not give the locations of the sites. The source does not show any misuse.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Cyprus government (Defence Ministry inquiry); report first published by Phileleftheros. 22 Jul 2003.
Top secret and classified papers sat in black bin bags outside a government ministry building, waiting for a rubbish truck. They stayed there for several weeks in full public view. They covered cabinet decisions, arms purchases, faulty weapons systems, military cooperation accords with Greece and Russia, payments for special services, and intelligence reports on Larnaca airport and illegal immigration. The papers should have been shredded. Police opened an investigation, and the Defence Minister started an internal inquiry into why the papers were not disposed of properly.
What this does not show. News report only; we found no official inquiry report. The building is not named; a later Cyprus Mail report says the papers were under a Health Ministry staircase. The source does not show any misuse.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; allies and partners; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
USS Pueblo, United States Navy (National Security Agency: museum account, and damage assessment of 28 July 1969). 23 Jan 1968.
North Korean forces attacked the US Navy ship USS Pueblo off the Korean coast. The crew were destroying cryptologic material, the papers and machines used for secret codes. One man was killed while he destroyed material, and three were wounded. The 82 crew who survived were held for 11 months. The agency's damage assessment of 1969 found that the destruction was ineffective and that most of the material was compromised. Keying material that was out of date, and four code machines with no use on the voyage, were still on board.
What this does not show. The assessment rates the threat to later US communications from the lost machines as zero to minimal. Its main concern is the loss of knowledge about US methods.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: national security; life and safety; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: damage assessment.
Ground SDF Signal and Cyber School; other MOD units. Jan 2025 (press release on 2024 incidents).
A specially designated secret document was wrongly destroyed. A staff member forged a receipt to hide this and was arrested in Sept 2024. Separately, secret electronic data was copied to a shared folder in 2021 and copied again in 2022. It stayed there until June 2024. The Act treats this as a leak.
What this does not show. An official press release. It does not say that the data reached a foreign party.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Robert L. Birchum (retired US Air Force officer). 1 Jun 2023.
A retired Air Force intelligence officer kept more than 300 classified files at his home, his overseas quarters and a storage pod in his driveway. None of these places was authorised for classified material. He was sentenced to three years in prison and a USD 25,000 fine for unlawfully keeping national defence information.
What this does not show. Criminal conviction. The prison term is shown but not counted.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
Ahmedelhadi Yassin Serageldin (former Raytheon systems engineer). 22 Jul 2020.
A Raytheon systems engineer, employed from 1997 until he was fired in 2017, kept over 3,100 electronic files and more than 110 paper documents belonging to Raytheon or the Defense Department, about 31,000 pages of it marked classified. Agents found he had been researching how to delete files from his computer. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison and a USD 10,000 fine for unlawfully keeping national defence information.
What this does not show. Criminal conviction on a guilty plea. The prison term is shown but not counted.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
US Army units and the equipment yard at Kandahar Airfield (Department of Defense Inspector General, DODIG-2021-111). 11 Aug 2021 (finding from a 2014 audit).
Units had to clear the data from equipment with storage drives before they handed it in as surplus. If they did not, the yard was to refuse it. A 2014 audit at Kandahar Airfield found that the yard accepted such items with no check that they were wiped. Units had not cleared the sensitive data from four navigation systems and a system that counters radio-controlled bombs. The Inspector General repeated the finding in August 2021, during the withdrawal: "there is a risk of theft and compromise of sensitive information".
What this does not show. The report records no theft and no use of the data.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministry of Defense and Ground Self-Defense Force (South Sudan peacekeeping logs). 28 Jul 2017.
In December 2016 the defence ministry refused a request for the daily logs of Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan. It said that the logs had been deleted. It later released some of the data, found on a computer in the Joint Staff Office. The logs recorded worsening security. On 28 July 2017 the Defence Minister resigned "to take responsibility" for the alleged cover-up.
What this does not show. A news report. The minister denied any part in the alleged cover-up, and the ministry's own inquiry said that she was not involved in the concealment.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Six DoD Components incl. NAWCAD Patuxent River, Schriever AFB, Dover AFB, USACE Louisville, West Point; DRMS. 2009-09-21.
Audit D-2009-104 checked surplus IT disposal. 10 of 543 sampled items held readable data (SSNs, emails, pictures). Drives went for destruction without overwrite first. Staff were untrained in degaussing (magnetic wiping).
What this does not show. A sample audit. It records no misuse of the data.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Unnamed state units, a classified-system maintenance contractor and a copier after-sales provider. 23 Oct 2025.
The ministry described three cases. An office director donated a classified computer to a village school, believing formatting the disk made it safe; it was recovered and the disk replaced. A contractor technician took a classified SSD home and fitted it to a personal computer. An after-sales technician took a classified copier disk away for repair unsupervised; it was later sent abroad. Responsible staff were dealt with under law and rules.
What this does not show. Units and people are not named and penalties are not stated. Government publicity account, not a court record.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD); Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Annual Report 2020-21. 2021 (IGIS Annual Report 2020-21).
Each year the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security checks that data ASIO says it deleted is really gone. In 2020-21 the inspectors found 9 cases where data reported as deleted was still available on ASIO systems. In 5 cases officers ran the deletion and received confirmation that it succeeded, but some data remained because of a technical fault. The other 4 cases came from failures of policy and procedure. The same report records that ASD kept intelligence about Australian persons that it meant to delete, again because of a technical issue. The Inspector-General aims these checks at activities that can affect the lives or rights of Australians.
What this does not show. The report does not say what the data was, how long it stayed, or whether anyone used it after the failed deletion. ASIO and ASD fixed the faults and the Inspector-General accepted the remedies.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; national security; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Federal state security service (DAP, now NDB), ISIS database; report of the parliamentary oversight delegation (GPDel). 21 Jun 2010.
Swiss law required the state security service to review entries in its ISIS database at set times and delete those no longer needed. In June 2010 the parliamentary oversight delegation found that the reviews were not done for most of about 200,000 registered people and third parties. Many entries were never relevant or were kept too long. A member of the Basel city parliament stayed registered until a Basel oversight committee intervened. A woman was flagged as a suspected Black Bloc member on weak grounds, and her husband was kept as a third party for eleven years, more than twice the allowed time. The delegation warned that innocent people could become security cases through international data exchange.
What this does not show. The report does not show that a registered person lost a job, a permit or entry to a country. A January 2020 finding that data on Basel politicians was still not deleted after 15 years comes from a news report; we did not open that oversight report.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
TET (Danish Intelligence Oversight Board), report 2025 on FE (Danish Defence Intelligence Service). May 2026.
Under the FE Act, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service must delete information on people living in Denmark when no new information on the matter has come in for 15 years. FE deleted such records in its production systems. Because of a process error, the same deletion was not made in a pre-production environment. TET found 28 documents there with data on people in Denmark that was older than 15 years. It also found such data kept unlawfully in a file share and an analysis tool. TET called the pre-production finding open to criticism. FE confirmed it deleted the 28 documents.
What this does not show. The report does not say who the people were, what the documents held, or whether anyone used the copies.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
CTIVD (Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services), supervisory report 84 on bulk datasets at the AIVD and MIVD. 1 Jul 2026.
Dutch law lets the AIVD and MIVD keep bulk datasets only while they are needed, with periodic reviews and an end date. The CTIVD found a number of datasets where the review of the need to delete them did not happen, or was late, and called this unlawful. Several MIVD datasets had no valid end date, and MIVD datasets were not removed and destroyed on time. Raw data from destroyed datasets was kept disproportionately long. Datasets can hold millions of lines of personal data, mostly about people who are not under investigation. In several cases staff who were not, or no longer, authorised had access, which the CTIVD also called unlawful.
What this does not show. The report gives no total count of datasets or cases and does not name them. It does not show that a person was harmed by the kept data.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; national security; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
EOS Committee (Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and Security Services), annual report 2025, on PST (Police Security Service). 18 Mar 2026.
PST, the Norwegian Police Security Service, collected data through communication control. The law bans seizure of, and requires deletion of, information about calls between a lawyer and a client. The EOS Committee found metadata linked to several hundred lawyer and client calls still held by PST. This put the confidentiality of legal advice at risk. The committee criticised PST for breaking the seizure ban and the duty to delete. PST said in December 2025 that it had deleted the data. In the same year PST had not reassessed over 6,500 registrations within the five-year limit.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how long the metadata was kept, whether PST used it, or who the people were.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
EOS Committee, special report to the Storting, November 2025, on the Norwegian Intelligence Service (E-tjenesten). Nov 2025.
The Norwegian Intelligence Service runs a system for collecting communication data, called TI. The service and the EOS Committee agree that email subject lines are content data, and the committee called their storage unlawful. The service turned off the function that stored subject lines, but the data was still stored after that. The committee sent a special report to the Storting in November 2025. It said the service should have acted faster against the unlawful storage. The service stopped the storage and deleted the data it had already stored.
What this does not show. The press release does not say whose data it was, how much there was, or how long it was kept.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
TET (Danish Intelligence Oversight Board), report 2024 on CFCS (Centre for Cyber Security). Dec 2024.
The Danish Centre for Cyber Security (CFCS), part of defence intelligence, collects data under the chapter of the CFCS Act on interception of communications. The law sets maximum retention times, for example 13 months for data not linked to a security incident. TET found that CFCS had kept a quantity of such data in one system about 12 months past the deletion limits. CFCS told TET itself when the check began. TET also found CFCS could not say how much of this data the system held, or whether it should already be deleted, because the data was not marked. TET saw a high risk of future breaches.
What this does not show. The report does not say what the data was, whose it was, or that it was misused.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS); National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), review of disclosures under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act in 2024. 2024 events; NSIRA review of 2024 disclosures (report date not shown in the copy we opened).
In early 2024 CSIS asked Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada for a foreign citizen's applications from the past five years. The disclosure was large: full visa and work permit applications, with family and financial information not blacked out. Soon after, CSIS assessed that the person in the file was not the subject of its request. The law says a receiving body must destroy or return personal information it does not need. CSIS kept the whole disclosure for reference purposes. When NSIRA asked, CSIS confirmed that it should not have kept the file in its totality and possibly at all. NSIRA recommended that CSIS destroy it.
What this does not show. NSIRA says CSIS may not have complied; this is a review finding, not a court ruling. The source does not say whether the wrong person was harmed or told.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Security Service (MI5) and the Home Secretary (Liberty and Privacy International v Security Service). 30 Jan 2023.
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found "serious failings" in MI5's compliance with its rules on retention, review and disposal of data from late 2014. MI5 admitted that it did not meet those rules for some data from 2016 to 2019. The Tribunal held that warrants issued from late 2014 until 5 April 2019 were unlawful, because the legal safeguards were not met.
What this does not show. The public judgment does not say what data was held or how much. This page does not state what relief the Tribunal granted.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Members of CAJAR v. Colombia (Serie C No. 506); files held by DAS, armed forces and National Police. Judgment 18 Oct 2023, notified 18 Mar 2024.
From the 1990s, Colombian state bodies ran arbitrary intelligence work on lawyers of the CAJAR human rights group and their families. They collected and kept personal data and built files and 'life sheets' on them. The lawyers asked many times for access to the files and for their purge. The State did not let them correct or erase the data. The Court found violations of the rights to life, personal integrity, private life and informational self-determination. It found that the State created a risk to the victims' lives, and some had to leave their homes or the country. The Court ordered the State to purge the intelligence files.
What this does not show. The source does not show which stored file led to which threat or attack. It does not show whether the purge has now been done.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: life and safety; liberty and justice; national security; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
AIVD and MIVD (military intelligence). 2020-09-23.
The services declared bulk datasets relevant to avoid the 18-month relevance deadline. This was unlawful. Passenger data on millions was held with no deletion since collection.
What this does not show. A news report of the oversight body's finding.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Harold T. Martin III (former government contractor). 19 Jul 2019.
A government contractor kept stolen classified documents at his home and in his car from the late 1990s to 31 August 2016. He was sentenced to nine years in prison for wilful retention of national defence information.
What this does not show. Criminal conviction. The prison term is shown but not counted.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
Nghia Hoang Pho (former NSA employee). 25 Sep 2018.
An NSA employee removed classified material and kept it at his Maryland home from 2010 to March 2015, knowing he was not authorised to. He was sentenced to 66 months in prison for wilful retention of national defence information.
What this does not show. Criminal conviction. The prison term is shown but not counted.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Federal Court decision of Justice Noel). 3 Nov 2016.
Under court warrants the service collected communications and the data attached to them. It kept the attached data about third parties even where it was not related to a threat, because it read the law as allowing that. The Federal Court disagreed. The Director said: "CSIS fully accepts the Court's decision, and has taken immediate actions to respond." The service stopped access to the data and analysis of it.
What this does not show. Read in the Director's statement, not in the judgment. The statement does not say how long the data was kept or how much there was. It records no harm to a named person.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI); European Court of Human Rights, Rotaru v. Romania, no. 28341/95. 4 May 2000.
Aurel Rotaru claimed rights under Decree-Law 118/1990 for people persecuted by the communist regime. The Ministry of the Interior answered with a letter from the Romanian Intelligence Service. It listed information collected by the state security services and the Securitate, some over 50 years old, including a false claim that he had been a member of a legionnaire movement. In 1997 a Romanian court declared the false details null and void. But the information was still recorded in the service's files, with no note of that judgment. Romanian law gave him no way to challenge or destroy it. The Court found violations of Articles 8 and 13.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show what further harm the file caused after 1990. It does not say whether the file was later corrected or destroyed.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Unnamed Chinese units with retired classified equipment. 23 Aug 2026.
One unit wiped hard drives superficially and sold them as scrap. Refurbished drives still held internal files of party bodies and universities. Another unit recycled toner cartridges; buyers recovered classified prints and sold them abroad. A third left a retired server online; foreign spies used it.
What this does not show. Units, dates and penalties are not named. The cases are illustrative warnings, not court or audit findings.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, memorandum 24-093). 21 Aug 2024.
The FBI tracks its computers but not the hard drives taken out of them, or loose thumb drives. The Justice Department's inspector general found that pallets of unsanitised media sat unsecured at the destruction facility for days or weeks, some for up to 21 months, with torn wrapping and no barrier from other staff. It saw hard drives marked Secret in an open container, and drives with no classification label. It warned that the media were "at risk of loss or theft without the possibility of detection".
What this does not show. The memo reports no data lost or read. It says a loss might not be detected.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
US Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Inspector General report DOE/IG-0852). 1 Jul 2011.
Counterintelligence officers write short reports on events. The rules let them keep information on US persons for up to one year, to see if it had a foreign link, and called for a yearly purge. The Inspector General examined 28 reports; 12 held information on US persons. Some were kept past the one-year limit. Reports stayed on servers and backup tapes after the purge, and officials retrieved reports that they said the purge had deleted. Staff also kept copies in email folders, spreadsheets and local databases. The report warns of a higher risk that the department keeps information on US persons that it should not.
What this does not show. A small sample. The report records no misuse of the reports. Management agreed to delete them from all electronic media and paper files.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Mozaffar Khazaee, former employee of three US defence contractors (US Department of Justice). 23 Oct 2015.
An engineer worked for three defence contractors between 2001 and 2013. He kept their documents on military jet engines, among them the engines of the F-35 and F-22 fighters: about 50,000 pages, with some 1,500 trade-secret documents and 600 on highly sensitive defence technology. In November 2013 he sent them toward Iran in a shipping container, which was stopped. The Department says that he emailed a person in Iran, to whom he "attempted to send and in some cases did send documents". He was sentenced to 97 months in prison.
What this does not show. The release does not say when he took each document, or what the person in Iran did with those that arrived.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
NASA (Kennedy, Johnson, Ames and Langley centres; Space Shuttle programme). 7 Dec 2010.
Kennedy tested 730 computers; 14 failed sanitisation checks. Kennedy still released 10 of them to the public. The OIG seized four others; one held ITAR-controlled data (US arms export rules).
What this does not show. The report does not say that ITAR data reached a foreign person or that a violation was disclosed. The 10 released computers held NASA data, not shown to be ITAR data.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Swiss Federal Council and the federal prosecutor's office (files of the Tinner criminal case). 26 Mar 2013.
In 2007 the Swiss government had the original files of the Tinner criminal case destroyed. At the end of 2008 the federal prosecutor's office found copies in its own archive. They included 58 pages of information on how to build nuclear weapons, and papers on uranium enrichment. The government put off their destruction until the judgments in the case were final, and gave the prosecutors stand-in pages in place of the 58. In 2013 the copies were destroyed in the presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
What this does not show. The government's statement does not say how the copies came to be in the archive. It records no leak from them.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Korea Institute of Science and Technology and three other state research institutes. 28 Jul 2026.
The national audit body found 690 hard disks moved out of five state research institutes without authorisation over about one year from October 2024. Twelve hard disks used by departing staff were missing or hard to trace. A former researcher, now a university associate professor, used two disks and took out more than 60,000 files with security project material without deleting them. Only about 300 of some 17,000 servers had antivirus software. The auditors told the supervising ministries to strengthen security.
What this does not show. A news report (YTN news report); the audit report itself was not read. The article names only two of the five institutes. A blog summary of the report (brunch.co.kr/@smha81/8, 14 Aug 2026) gives the report title and says one institute kept no record of removing or fitting disks.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; know-how and markets. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
High Court of Kenya, Patrick Kimathi v Inspector General of Police and 5 others (2026), Justice H.M. Nyaga; data held by the National Police Service. 25 Feb 2026 (judgment date in the Kenya Law link); reported 17 Mar 2026.
When Patrick Kimathi was a minor, police arrested him and took his fingerprints, name and other personal data. The case never ended in a conviction. The record stayed in the national criminal records register for 20 years. It stopped him getting a clean Certificate of Good Conduct, which most jobs and travel in Kenya need. The report says the police had no way to review or delete such data. The High Court held that keeping the data with no end date broke his rights to dignity, privacy and fair administrative action. It ordered the police to delete his data from the register at once and to give him a clean certificate.
What this does not show. We read a news report of the judgment, not the judgment itself, because Kenya Law refused our tools. The report does not say how the criminal case ended (acquittal or withdrawal) or which jobs or trips he lost.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) internal 'base de datos de perfilamiento'; Amnesty International report AMR 29/0967/2026. 15 Jul 2026.
From the early 2000s each PNC territorial station kept an internal list of people it linked to gangs, with names, addresses, police records, tattoos and family links. Officers told Amnesty International that the list had no checks and was never purged, so over the years it filled with people who had died, migrated or been rehabilitated. When the state of exception began in March 2022, the list became the first tool for mass arrests: to be on it, or to live at a listed address, was enough for an arrest order, with no investigation or warrant. When listed people could not be found, officers were told to arrest other residents. More than 90,000 people were detained by December 2025.
What this does not show. The account rests on testimony from active and retired officers; the report does not count how many arrests came from the list or name a person held only because of an old entry. The PNC did not answer the press about it.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Algerian Ministry of Justice; Human Rights Watch report on travel bans in Algeria. 3 Feb 2025.
A travel ban must end when a court lifts it. Human Rights Watch reported an Algerian activist who was banned from travel under judicial supervision. After the supervision ended, the ban was lifted, and in February 2024 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment and confirmed the lifting. In May 2024 he asked the Ministry of Justice, and officials told him he was still barred from travel. The same report says some people learned of a ban only when they tried to leave, and that one man's ban renewal period lapsed with no notice that it was lifted. The harm is to freedom of movement.
What this does not show. Human Rights Watch does not say that the ban stayed as an entry in a police or border database; the cause may be a choice by the authorities, not a failure to delete. The activist is not named.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Syrian Ministry of Interior and Immigration and Passports Department (Decision No. 20 of 2025); report by Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ). 25 Jun 2025.
In March 2025 the Interior Minister issued Decision No. 20, which cancelled more than five million travel ban notices, most issued by the former regime's security agencies. STJ collected testimonies from people who returned to Syria after the fall of the regime. Months later their names were still on the ban lists. A defected officer was stuck in Syria. A journalist said his file still held five travel bans and review notices from 2012 to 2020. Others found the bans only when they tried to leave or renew a passport. Some got only a one-time travel permit while their names stayed on the lists.
What this does not show. The report rests on a small number of testimonies and social media posts. It does not say how many cancelled notices are still in the systems.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Delegación del Gobierno en Madrid and the police reports it used (recommendation of the Defensor del Pueblo to the Secretaría de Estado de Migraciones, complaint 23037235). 23 Oct 2024.
The Spanish Ombudsman, Defensor del Pueblo, received complaints from foreign residents in Madrid. The government office in Madrid refused or did not renew their residence permits only because of negative police reports. The reports showed events from years before. Some of those events never reached a court. Others ended in acquittal or were closed, but the police records had not been cancelled. The law on police data says data is kept only as long as its purpose needs. The Ombudsman said this practice could breach the presumption of innocence in the Constitution. It recommended that the migration authority tell its offices to assess each police report, and that new immigration rules say a bare list of records is not enough.
What this does not show. The page does not give the number of people affected or name the police database. As we read it, it does not show whether the police later cancelled the records or whether the recommendation was accepted.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Policía Nacional de Honduras warrant system; case of Arnol Javier Alemán, one of the Guapinol defenders. 16 Aug 2023.
Arnol Javier Alemán was one of eight Guapinol river defenders held for about 29 months in detention that a UN working group called illegal and arbitrary. He was freed in February 2022 with release letters. In early April 2022 his lawyers had counter-orders sent so that the old warrants would be erased from the National Police system. In May 2022 police arrested him while he travelled with his family, saying the warrant still showed in the system. On 15 August 2023 police arrested him again in Tela for the same reason, held him overnight and moved him 94 km and then 298 km between courts. His lawyer said counter-orders are never removed and no protocol exists to erase warrants.
What this does not show. The sources are news reports based on his lawyers' accounts; we did not see a police or court record of the warrant entry. They do not say whether the entry was finally removed.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Jordan's Public Security records and provincial governors (Crime Prevention Law No. 7 of 1954); joint UN review submission by Isra University Faculty of Law and the King Hussein Foundation Information and Research Center. 2023.
A joint submission to Jordan's UN Universal Periodic Review says governors apply the Crime Prevention Law to people with 'security restrictions'. An accusation or a complaint is enough to create such a restriction. The restriction stays even after the court declares the person innocent. Governors can then hold the person in administrative detention with no charge or trial. The US State Department's 2023 report also says provincial authorities held some people in administrative detention or house arrest, often despite a finding of not guilty. The Interior Ministry put administrative detentions that year at about 37,000.
What this does not show. The sources name no single case and do not say how many detainees had been acquitted. They do not cite a rule that orders the restriction removed after acquittal.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Greek Ombudsman (Synigoros tou Politi), report to the Ministry of Citizen Protection and Hellenic Police HQ. 22 Oct 2019 (report); follow-up 29 Jul 2020; published 24 Feb 2022.
Police took a boy's fingerprints when he was 15. They kept the card for nearly thirty years under the 1997 retention rules. As an adult he went to a place for work. Later, police treated the place as a crime scene, matched his prints to the old card, and sent him to a criminal court as a defendant. The court acquitted him because he had no part in the case. The Ombudsman, citing the European Court of Human Rights, asked for shorter retention for prints taken from minors and for destruction of prints after acquittal. The Ministry did not reply. The 2021 police code repeated the old retention rules.
What this does not show. The page does not say why he was fingerprinted at 15 or the exact year of the match. The text is the Ombudsman's statement as reproduced by the legal publisher OENET; we did not reach the Ombudsman's own page.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; children; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Barangay anti-drug councils, Philippine National Police and PDEA drug watch lists (Amnesty International research 'They Just Kill'; Commission on Human Rights report). Jul 2019.
In the anti-drug campaign from 2016, barangay officials and police drew up drug watch lists. Police chose targets for arrest, and sometimes killing, mainly from these lists. Amnesty International interviewed officials, families and investigators in 2019. It found that names stayed on the lists with no way to be removed, even after people surrendered, went through community rehabilitation and stopped using drugs. Names went on to the provincial police and PDEA. In at least 15 of the 20 killings it examined, the dead were said to be on a list, and families said some had finished programmes. In 2022 the Commission on Human Rights found most victims of killings by unknown attackers were listed or had surrendered.
What this does not show. Amnesty's sample is 20 incidents in a few provinces, and the lists are not public. The sources do not show a written rule that required removal; the case rests on rehabilitation and the end of the list's purpose.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: life and safety; liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Iraqi Interior Ministry intelligence and Kurdistan Regional Government courts; Human Rights Watch report 'Iraq/Kurdistan Region: Risk of Double Trials for ISIS Ties'. 23 Dec 2018.
Kurdish forces held a boy, 'Karim', from a village near Mosul from March 2016. Court papers show a judge released him in April 2017 without charge, for lack of evidence. Ten days after he went home to Baghdad-controlled land, he asked for a new identity card. The Interior Ministry's local intelligence office said he was wanted for ISIS affiliation and arrested him. He was held for 45 days in a crowded cell, flown to Baghdad, and beaten during interrogation before he saw a judge in December 2017. Experts knew of at least five boys rearrested this way. HRW asked both sides to share release papers and remove names from wanted lists.
What this does not show. HRW relies on interviews and court papers the boy showed. It does not show the wanted list itself or say how many names stay on it after release.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; children; health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Tunisian Ministry of Interior, S17 border control list; Amnesty International report MDE 30/8848/2018. 24 Oct 2018.
Since 2013 the Ministry of Interior has put people on a secret S17 border list without a court order. On 14 February 2018 the Tunis Administrative Court ordered the ministry to suspend the travel restrictions on Mohamed Guerfel, flagged since 2014. He also sent the ministry a copy of the order by notary. A relative in the police checked his ID regularly and saw the flag was still in place. In three court cases Amnesty documented, the ministry never confirmed removal. An airport border officer said staff still stop S17 travellers who carry court orders. People lost jobs, trade and the right to travel to sick family.
What this does not show. Amnesty reports what the man and an officer said; it does not show the ministry database itself. The source does not say if the flag was later removed.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Baden-Wuerttemberg data protection commissioner (LfDI), review of state and INPOL police data; Federal Interior Ministry (BMI). 19 Sep 2018.
At the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017, federal authorities withdrew the press passes of journalists after police security warnings. The Baden-Wuerttemberg data protection commissioner checked the data on six journalists from his state who lost their passes. He found that a number of entries in INPOL, the federal police system, were unlawful. In some cases the police had ignored the deletion deadline. Suspects whose cases were dropped or ended in acquittal were kept without the required forecast of new offences. In August 2017 the Federal Interior Ministry admitted errors and said that in some cases data had wrongly not been deleted. The journalists lost access to report on the summit.
What this does not show. The commissioner found no proof that errors by his own state's authorities caused a wrongful withdrawal. The ministry's admission that undeleted data played a part comes from a news report, not from a ministry document we opened.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Tribunal de Justica de Minas Gerais (civil appeal against the State of Minas Gerais), Jurisprudencia Mineira. Published 11 Feb 2014.
A criminal court acquitted the man and, on 27 May 1996, issued a counter-warrant that cancelled his arrest warrant. Nobody entered the cancellation in the police information system of Minas Gerais. On 11 August 2010, about 14 years later, police arrested him on the dead warrant. He was set free only after the court sent new official letters. The Minas Gerais Court of Justice held that the arrest was illegal. It came from a failure of the State's administrative services, which did not withdraw the warrant or record its removal ('baixa') in the police system. The court held the State liable and upheld compensation for the loss of liberty.
What this does not show. The extract does not give the exact judgment date, the case number or how long he was held. It shows one case only, not how often this happens in Brazil.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Cuerpo de Investigaciones Cientificas, Penales y Criminalisticas (CICPC), SIPOL system; Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala Constitucional, decision 548/2012 (Exp. 12-0240), Darwin Martinez Manzano. 25 Apr 2012 (date in the TSJ file name).
A man was detained on 26 May 2010 and held for five months. He was freed when he proved that someone had stolen his identity. On 19 November 2010 a trial court in Calabozo, Guarico, sent an official order to CICPC to remove his name from the SIPOL police information system. CICPC did not do it. Because the record stayed, the National Guard detained him again on 29 August 2011 at the Calabozo toll checkpoint and handcuffed him. He told the court that he now fears to go out in public. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court did not decide the merits. It held that it was not the competent court for this habeas data claim.
What this does not show. The facts come from the claim as the trial court recorded them; the Supreme Court did not test them. The source does not show the final outcome. This is not the same case as map row 548.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Dale County Sheriff's Department, Alabama (Herring v. United States). 14 Jan 2009.
A court had recalled an arrest warrant months earlier, but the entry was never removed from the sheriff's database. Officers in the next county arrested the man on it and searched him. The Supreme Court ruled, 5 to 4, that the evidence found could still be used, because the error was negligent and isolated.
What this does not show. The Court did not find a systemic fault. The case decides a rule of evidence, not a duty to delete.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministry of Justice, Algeria (central director for the modernisation of justice), as reported by Echorouk. 5 Nov 2006.
An arrest warrant must stop working once it is cancelled. In November 2006 a senior official of Algeria's Ministry of Justice explained why the ministry built a national database of arrest warrants that also records cancelled ones. He said Algerians living abroad were often arrested when they landed at Houari Boumediene airport, at the port of Algiers or at a transit centre, although their warrants had been cancelled long before. Only when they were brought before the justice system did it become clear that the arrest was a mistake. The ministry gave the database to courts and security services across the country to stop these wrongful arrests.
What this does not show. The article gives no names, numbers or dates of arrests, and it does not say how long people were held. It is a press report of an official's words, not the ministry's own text.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Arizona v. Evans (US Supreme Court). 1 Mar 1995.
A court quashed an arrest warrant on 19 December 1990. There was no record that anyone told the Sheriff's Office, and the warrant stayed in its computer. About 17 days later a police officer stopped the man for a traffic offence, found the warrant in a computer check and arrested him. A search of his car followed. The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence could still be used, on the assumption that court staff, not the police, made the error.
What this does not show. The Court did not decide who made the error. The case decides a rule of evidence, not a duty to delete.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
State Comptroller of Israel, special audit report 'Execution of wiretaps', series 'Use of technological tools for enforcement' (audit of the Israel Police). Jan 2026.
The Wiretap Law says that wiretap material not needed to prevent or detect crime must be deleted or destroyed. The State Comptroller found that the police did not destroy wiretap material that built up in their computer systems over many years. A 2014 internal audit found no orderly destruction process. In 2016 only recording reels up to the year 2000 were destroyed. From 2018 the police did not map or destroy the material, and from 2019 no one checked. The police estimate about 50 terabytes and agree that most of it must go. The Comptroller said this harms privacy and suspects' rights and exposes sensitive databases to security risks. He asked for a destruction plan with a binding timetable.
What this does not show. The report does not say that the kept material was misused or leaked. The 50 terabyte figure is the police's own estimate. This is a separate finding from the 2022 phone intrusion tool report already on the page (M630).
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; national security; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Election Commission of Bangladesh (Election Commissioner Md Anwarul Islam Sarker; later Chief Election Commissioner A M M Nasir Uddin). 10 Feb 2025.
A dead person can no longer vote, so the name should leave the voter list. In February 2025 Election Commissioner Anwarul Islam Sarker said about 1.6 million dead voters were being removed from the list in the house-to-house update, which he described as the first time. He said the removal would leave no room for anyone to rig the vote. In September 2025 the Chief Election Commissioner said about 2.1 million dead voters had been cut from the list before the national election.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how long the names stayed on the list, and they show no vote cast in a dead person's name.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Australian Federal Police; Commonwealth Ombudsman, report to the Minister for Home Affairs on compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (inspections 1 Jan to 30 Jun 2025). Sep 2025.
Under section 46 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, police must destroy protected information from surveillance devices and computer access as soon as practicable once it is no longer needed. The Commonwealth Ombudsman calls this a key safeguard. In August 2024 the AFP told the Ombudsman that limits in its data management system stopped it finding the material, and it suspended destruction. At the March 2025 inspection the fault was still not fixed, and no protected information had been destroyed since July 2024. The AFP also disclosed 57 more delayed disposals. The Ombudsman has seen AFP destruction delays in 14 inspections since 2015.
What this does not show. The report does not say how much material is affected, whose it is, or that any of it was misused. It does not show whether the backlog was later cleared.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of the Interior and Security (minister Hermann Immongault), electoral list revision for the 2025 legislative and local elections. 22 Jul 2025.
Gabon's revised electoral code (organic law 001/2025, article 50) says the Interior Ministry must strike dead voters off the list, based on death certificates sent by the town halls. During the July 2025 list revision, a Gabonese news site reported that thousands of dead people, some dead for decades, were still on the lists. It said the administration could not cross the civil status records with the voter file. In December 2024 the minister had already asked families to tell the enrolment teams about their dead who were still on the lists. The site said the problem damaged the credibility of the 2025 elections.
What this does not show. No official count of dead voters is given; 'thousands' is the news site's word, and the article carries the site's advertising desk byline. It does not show that any dead person's name was used to vote.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Lebanese Army Intelligence (contact documents) and General Security (subjection lists); Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's memo of June 2025; Parliament's Defence and Interior Committee. 17 Jun 2025.
On 24 July 2014 the Cabinet cancelled all 'contact documents' and 'subjection lists', names put on watch lists by security agencies with no court order. The Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation then cancelled the search notices based on them. A 2025 press report said the Internal Security Forces obeyed but Army Intelligence and General Security did not. People on these lists could be arrested at checkpoints and borders, or refused a passport. In June 2025 the Prime Minister found some lists still in circulation and ordered them cancelled. The chair of Parliament's Defence Committee said some agencies kept issuing them to that day.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how many listed names remain or name people arrested after 2014 because of a cancelled document. General Security told the Prime Minister it does not enforce such documents.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Presidency of the Public Prosecution, Morocco, and the prosecutors' offices of all courts. 28 Nov 2025.
A search notice tells police across Morocco to arrest a named person. It must be cancelled when the case is closed, sent to an investigating judge, judged, or time-barred. A circular of 16 September 2025 from the head of the Public Prosecution said a live notice keeps the person under threat of arrest and harms personal, family and professional life. Prosecutors then reviewed 117,359 police reports and, by the end of October 2025, cancelled 70,948 notices. The reported grounds were closed cases, files sent to a judge, judgments already given and prescription. A circular of 12 April 2021 had already asked for the same clean-up, so many of these notices stayed live for years.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how many of the 70,948 notices were past their time on each ground, or how many people were stopped on them. We did not reach the official statement itself; the figures come from press reports of it.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Xplain AG (IT supplier to fedpol and BAZG). 25 Apr 2024.
A ransomware leak exposed federal police data Xplain had kept after support cases closed. It included a 2015 HOOGAN extract of 766 people. Retention was found disproportionate and in breach of purpose limitation (use only for stated purpose).
What this does not show. The finding is about what the supplier kept. It does not say who used the leaked data.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; allies and partners; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 22 Oct 2026.
South Australian Independent Commissioner Against Corruption and NSW Crime Commission; Commonwealth Ombudsman, Oversight of Covert Electronic Surveillance 2024-2025. 2024-25 report (amended copy online, early 2026).
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 lets agencies use stored communications, such as messages obtained under warrant, only for permitted purposes. When there is no permitted purpose, the material must be destroyed. The Commonwealth Ombudsman found that the SA Independent Commissioner Against Corruption had certified records from 7 stored communication warrants for destruction, but had not destroyed them. Some came from warrants issued in 2017. The NSW Crime Commission had destroyed no stored communications in 5 years and had not checked for about 4 years whether it could keep them. WA Police took up to 276 days to destroy approved material. The agencies accepted the Ombudsman's suggestions.
What this does not show. The report does not say whose communications were kept, how many, or that any were used after they should have been destroyed.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commission on Administrative Justice (Office of the Ombudsman), Kenya: complaint by Mr Yegon against the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI). Not stated (the complaint followed an application made in January 2023).
Police charged Mr Yegon with having fake currency. Investigations found he was not to blame, and the charges were withdrawn. In January 2023 he applied for a police clearance certificate (Certificate of Good Conduct) for a job. The certificate he got still carried the old charge, because the DCI had not corrected his record. The DCI was slow to fix it, so he asked the Commission on Administrative Justice for a review. The Commission used section 13(1) of the Access to Information Act, which says a public body must correct outdated or inaccurate personal information. After this, the DCI corrected the record and issued a new certificate.
What this does not show. The page is a short case summary with no decision date. It does not say whether he lost the job or how long the wrong entry stayed on his record.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT) adult citizens database (BDCM/FICM) and National Electoral Commission (CNE); Constitutional Court Acórdão 769/2022. 17 Oct 2022.
Angola's law on official voter registration (Lei 8/15, article 24) says that citizens in the adult voter database who die must be removed, using monthly death reports from the civil registry offices. Before the August 2022 general elections, the territory minister said that citizens who had died, and whose data the Ministry of Justice had not passed on, stay in the file. The opposition party UNITA said about 2.7 million dead people were on the rolls. A legal study from the Universidade Metodista de Angola calls the number of dead on the 2022 rolls abysmal and says it fed the claims of fraud. The Constitutional Court did not examine the claim because UNITA raised it too late.
What this does not show. There is no official count of dead voters; the figure of about 2.7 million is UNITA's claim, repeated in the study. The Constitutional Court (Acórdão 769/2022, tribunalconstitucional.ao) dismissed the point on procedure, not on the facts, and no source shows a dead person's name was used to vote.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Federal judicial police (DJSOC); Police Information Control Body (COC), control report DIO21006. 4 Feb 2022.
Federal judicial police officers used the Clearview AI face search tool on trial accounts, first in a Europol taskforce in October 2019. Clearview reported 78 searches, the last on 10 February 2020. The photos came from files of NCMEC, the US centre for missing and exploited children, and showed suspects and victims, who were often children. The COC found no legal basis and called the transfer to a private company outside the EU a data breach. It said the police no longer had any control over the biometric data, and could not tell which photos were used. Clearview, not the police, closed the accounts. The COC ordered the police to demand deletion from Clearview, with proof within two months.
What this does not show. The report does not confirm that Clearview still held the photos, and the COC did not check Clearview's own figures. It does not show harm to a named person.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Tian Yunhui, deputy director, First Procuratorial Department, Beijing Tongzhou District People's Procuratorate, writing in Procuratorial Daily. 6 Jan 2022.
Chinese law requires the criminal records of young offenders to be sealed. A Beijing prosecutor wrote in the national procuratorate newspaper that this did not always happen. A young offender finished his sentence and, as an adult, tried to work as a ride-hailing driver or courier. Work platforms told him many times that a criminal record existed and refused to hire him. Another young person, after his case ended, still got a page warning that he was an offender when he applied for an identity card or a bank card. The writer says the main cause was that the offender database did not seal each person's record in time.
What this does not show. The examples have no place, date or name, and the article does not say what any authority did about them. It is a prosecutor's article in the Supreme People's Procuratorate newspaper, not a decision.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; children; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Transport Police Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan (reported by Azattyq Rýhy). 20 Sep 2021.
Papers from a transport police unit in Kokshetau were found in a public rubbish container. They included a summary report, personnel files and character references for police employees, with their personal data. A photo of the papers spread on social media. The Transport Police Department said the papers had been thrown away because their retention period had ended. It opened an internal investigation and said a legal assessment would follow and those responsible would face disciplinary action. At the end of the retention period the files were due for destruction, but they were left whole in a place open to anyone.
What this does not show. The source is a news report quoting the police. It does not name the retention rule, say how many officers were affected, or show that anyone took or used the files.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Information Commissioner's Office, investigation report 'Mobile phone data extraction by police forces in England and Wales' (version 1.1). Jun 2020.
Police in England and Wales copy data from the phones of suspects, victims and witnesses. The law says data must not be kept longer than necessary, and the ICO said data not relevant to a case must be handled and deleted. The ICO found that forces took more data than was clearly relevant and kept the extracted material as a whole. It found no evidence that forces tried to separate and delete sensitive data that was not relevant. Data on every person found on a phone stayed together, and copies sat on systems that were not linked. The ICO warned that victims and witnesses may not come forward, and it was concerned for people not connected to the investigation.
What this does not show. The report gives no count of phones or people and no case where kept data caused harm. Police must keep some material under criminal disclosure law, which can stop deletion.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
UK police forces (Home Office minister's letter to the Biometrics Commissioner). 12 Sep 2016.
In England and Wales, the fingerprints and DNA of a person arrested but not charged must normally be destroyed when the investigation ends. The policing minister replied to the Biometrics Commissioner's reports. He confirmed the Commissioner's finding that some searches matched records which should have been deleted. Some forces passed those matches to investigating officers, marked as intelligence only. The Commissioner had said this went against the law that such material must not be used for an investigation. The letter also says that some national security material was not deleted promptly when its time ran out.
What this does not show. The letter gives no count of matches. It does not say that anyone was arrested or charged because of a match to a record that should have been gone.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
NSW Police and the Division of Analytical Laboratories (DAL); NSW Ombudsman, review of DNA sampling on suspects and volunteers under the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000. Oct 2006.
The Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 requires DNA and other forensic material from a suspect to be destroyed if the evidence is inadmissible, the suspect is acquitted, or no proceedings start within 12 months. The NSW Ombudsman found that NSW Police and the state DNA laboratory were not meeting these duties. Police did not identify all samples due for destruction, or told the laboratory only after the lawful period had ended. Volunteer samples were kept indefinitely unless the volunteer wrote to ask for destruction, even when the volunteer had been told the sample was for one case only. The Ombudsman said unlawful retention is unfair to the person and may be an offence.
What this does not show. The summary does not give the number of samples kept unlawfully or show that a kept sample led to an arrest. It describes NSW practice in 2006; later practice may differ.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Khánh Hòa Provincial Police, article on Law 107/2025/QH15 amending the Law on Criminal Records; Hà Tĩnh Department of Justice. 1 Jun 2026 (police article); law passed 5 Dec 2025, in force 1 Jul 2026.
In Vietnam a conviction is expunged (xóa án tích) after the sentence and a clean period, so that the person can rejoin society. Certificate No. 1 then says 'no criminal record'. Certificate No. 2 still lists every conviction, including expunged ones. The Hà Tĩnh Department of Justice wrote that most requests for No. 2 came from individuals who had to add it to files for other bodies, and that this was very disadvantageous to people with expunged convictions. The Khánh Hòa police said No. 2 was demanded without any control, against the purpose of expungement. Law 107/2025/QH15, in force from 1 July 2026, bans any body from asking a person for certificate No. 2.
What this does not show. The sources do not count people who lost work and do not name a case. The expunged convictions stay in the database; the new law limits who may ask for certificate No. 2, it does not remove the data.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, decision on Ministero dell'Interno, Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza (CED interforze), reg. n. 204, doc. web 10247832. 26 Mar 2026.
The national police database (CED) still held two records about a man: a 1997 military court decision that his offence was extinguished, and a 2002 order that closed (archived) a case. The law allows 8 years and 20 years for these records. He asked for deletion in December 2021. In January 2022 the Department refused and said the data were kept lawfully. The data stayed until November 2025, after the Garante opened an inquiry. The Garante found the data were kept beyond the legal limits. It said that limits on archive access did not remove the risk of misuse. It issued a formal warning and asked the Ministry to update the CED rules.
What this does not show. The decision does not describe a concrete effect on the man, such as a refused licence, job or arrest. The Garante gave a warning, not a fine.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
New Zealand Police; Office of the Privacy Commissioner (compliance notice CN/2021/02) after the IPCA and OPC joint inquiry. 30 Apr 2026.
A joint inquiry by the Privacy Commissioner and the Independent Police Conduct Authority found that officers took photos of members of the public, mostly young Māori, without a lawful purpose, and kept them on work phones and police systems. In December 2021 the Commissioner issued a compliance notice: stop the practice and delete the unlawful material. Police met most requirements but missed the deletion deadline, which was extended to June 2025. In April 2026 the Commissioner told Parliament that Police still could not find and delete all the unlawful images, because many have no labels and sit in many systems. Photos of children stay in police hands with no lawful reason.
What this does not show. The source does not say how many unlawful images remain, or that any remaining image was used against a person after the notice.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: children; liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Andmekaitse Inspektsioon (AKI), precept to Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet (PPA, Police and Border Guard Board); AKI yearbook 2025. 6 Aug 2025.
After questions about number plate cameras in spring 2025, the data protection inspectorate, AKI, checked the police information system POLIS. It found that the police did not follow the archive and deletion deadlines set by law. The case procedure part of POLIS still held data that should have been archived or deleted. AKI said it is not allowed to keep data when there is no basis for it. It issued a precept: the police had to archive and delete the overdue data and set up a working process so that this happens regularly. The yearbook says the police have now done this.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how much data was overdue, how long it was kept past its date, or whose cases it held. They do not show that any person was harmed by it.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Jamaica, Garren Braham v Minister of National Security and others [2025] JMSC Civ 116 (Wint-Blair J). 2025 (judgment file dated 6 Oct 2025).
Police arrested Garren Braham under a state of public emergency in June 2019. They took his fingerprints and photographs and held him for 154 days without a charge. A tribunal found the evidence against him not sufficient, and he was released in November 2019. Regulation 30(4) of the 2019 emergency regulations let the police keep a person's photograph and fingerprints after release. The court noted that the Finger Prints Act says photographs and fingerprints must be destroyed when there is no conviction, unless a court orders otherwise. Six years after his release, the Supreme Court declared his detention wrongful and ordered that all data, photographs and fingerprints collected during his detention be destroyed.
What this does not show. The judgment does not say how the police used or shared the stored data after his release. The parts we read do not give the exact date the judgment was delivered.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Komendant Glowny Policji (Chief of Police), KSIP police information system; NSA judgment of 17 Oct 2025 upholding a UODO deletion order. 17 Oct 2025.
In 2019 the police listed a man, JK, as a suspect in a traffic accident and put his data in the national police information system, KSIP. The case was discontinued in November 2019 and he did not break the law again. The data stayed in KSIP. In 2020 he wanted to join the uniformed services, and the KSIP entry blocked him. The data protection office, UODO, ordered the police to delete the data because its purpose had ended. The Chief of Police appealed. The Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) sided with UODO and said the police reading of the law would allow data to be kept with no end date.
What this does not show. The article does not give the NSA case number, and we did not open the judgment itself. It does not say if he applied again to the services after the deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Police criminal offences register; Constitutional Court of Slovenia, U-I-9/24-11, on a petition by the Information Commissioner. 25 Sep 2025.
A person asked the Slovenian police to delete their data from the criminal offences register. A criminal complaint against them had been dismissed and other proceedings had been stopped. The police refused. The Information Commissioner, deciding the appeal, asked the Constitutional Court to review the law. Under Article 129 of the Police Tasks and Powers Act, data stayed in the register until the case ended, and were then blocked and kept for 30 more years. For offences not yet time-barred they could be kept for ever. Police and other state bodies could still reach blocked data. The Commissioner warned of stigma and harm to the presumption of innocence. The court found the provisions unconstitutional.
What this does not show. The text we read stops before the court's full reasoning on proportionality. It does not show a person who was harmed by a later use of blocked data.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministries of the Interior and of Justice, France (CNIL decision SAN-2024-017 on the police records file TAJ). 17 Oct 2024.
The TAJ is the French police file of people involved in criminal cases. It held more than 24 million person records in 2022. By law, an entry must be erased or marked when the person is acquitted or discharged. The regulator found that the updates depend on forms sent by hand from the courts, and that some courts sent none. More than one million decisions a year should change the file. The justice ministry counted about 300,000 updates a year. The regulator noted that an entry can stop a person from entering a public job competition. It reprimanded both ministries and ordered them to comply by 31 October 2026.
What this does not show. The decision names no person who lost a job. French law does not let the regulator fine the State. We read the official text through a copy published by Dalloz Actualite; the regulator's own page refused our reader.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
National Police Agency (State of Japan); Nagoya District Court, 18 Jan 2022; Nagoya High Court, 30 Aug 2024. 30 Aug 2024.
In October 2016 police arrested and charged a man who campaigned against a condominium project, after a scuffle at the building site. They took his DNA, fingerprints and face photo. The Nagoya District Court acquitted him in November 2018 and the acquittal became final. The National Police Agency kept the three records and refused to delete them. The District Court ordered deletion in 2022 and the High Court upheld that in 2024. The High Court said the state gave no legitimate reason to refuse, and warned that without strict rules police DNA data can be abused or misused. The agency deleted the data and showed the man a screen in January 2025.
What this does not show. We did not open the judgments themselves; we read the court's words in a Westlaw Japan case column and in a legal news report. The ruling covers only this man, and his lawyers say a law on police DNA records is still needed.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet (Ministry of Immigration and Integration). 10 Jul 2024.
The ministry did not check that automatic deletion in the national visa information system worked. It also did not delete records at once when a visa applicant became an EU citizen. Instead it told applicants to ask the immigration service to delete their data. Datatilsynet criticised the ministry and said it could not show storage limitation was met.
What this does not show. No fine.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 25 Oct 2026.
Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman, decision TSV/16/2023; controller National Police Board (Poliisihallitus). 11 Sep 2024.
On 15 Jul 2022 police questioned a person suspected of basic defamation, an offence that carries only a fine, and registered the person's identifying characteristics under the Coercive Measures Act. The law covers fingerprints, photographs and other biometric features. The person asked the police to delete them. The police did not, and said it had followed the law and a National Police Board instruction to take such data whenever the law allows. The Deputy Data Protection Ombudsman found the registration disproportionate, not necessary, and based on a reading of national law that conflicts with EU law as set out by the EU Court of Justice in case C-205/21. The Deputy Ombudsman ordered the police to erase the data.
What this does not show. The decision covers one person. It does not say how many others were registered under the same instruction, or that the data was used against this person.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Komendant Glowny Policji (Chief of Police), KSIP and KCIK systems; Naczelny Sad Administracyjny (NSA), case III OSK 1065/23. 21 Nov 2024.
The police entered a man, M. F., in the national police information system (KSIP) and the criminal information centre (KCIK) as a suspect for possession of marijuana. In 2017 a prosecutor discontinued the case, and he was never convicted. His request also covered his fingerprint record at the police forensic laboratory. He asked for deletion, but the police kept the data and UODO closed his complaint. The Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court judgment and the UODO decision. It said UODO did not show why the data was still needed, and that the storage limit rule does not allow data to be kept with no end date.
What this does not show. The judgment names no concrete harm such as a lost job or an arrest. Map row 1209 (UODO, 7 Oct 2025) appears to be the later step in the same case; we did not open that decision.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Direktor na Glavna direktsia Natsionalna politsia (Bulgaria), C-118/22. 2024-01-30.
Police kept fingerprints, photo, DNA and conviction data until death despite rehabilitation. Held contrary to Directive 2016/680.
What this does not show. The Court ruled on the national law. It did not decide the man's own case.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Ministry of the Interior, Sofia police directorate (DGPN); Court of Justice of the EU, C-118/22, on a reference from the Supreme Administrative Court. 30 Jan 2024.
NG was convicted in 2016 of not telling the truth as a witness and got a suspended sentence. The police entered him in their records with his identity data, fingerprints, photograph and a DNA sample. In March 2020 he was legally rehabilitated. In July 2020 he asked the police to erase the entry. They refused, because Bulgarian law kept the data of anyone finally convicted until death, and rehabilitation was not a ground for erasure. The Court of Justice ruled that EU law forbids keeping such data until death, even after rehabilitation, without periodic review and without a right to erasure or restriction.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show any concrete harm to NG from the entry. It leaves the Bulgarian court to decide his case.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Gifu Prefectural Police (Ogaki Police Station); Nagoya High Court, Civil Division 2, case Reiwa 4 (ne) No. 287. 13 Sep 2024.
Ogaki police secretly collected information on four local residents who opposed a wind power project. At four meetings with the project company, from August 2013 to June 2014, police passed on their names, past citizen activism, education, family details and views on their beliefs. No evidence showed the data had been erased, and the High Court held it was still kept in some form inside the Gifu police. It found a concrete risk that police would pass it to third parties without legal basis, and a chilling effect on speech and assembly. It ordered the prefecture to delete the listed information. The police later said they deleted it.
What this does not show. The court ordered deletion of only part of the information; other deletion claims failed as not specific enough, and the claim against the national government failed. The police say they deleted the data, but no independent check is shown, and the plaintiffs say some data in the meeting minutes has no matching police document.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Lahore High Court (Justice Ali Zia Bajwa), petition of Ghazia Ehsan against Punjab Police. 1 Feb 2024 (reported 2 Feb 2024).
Police in Punjab registered criminal cases against underage drivers. The names of these children stayed in the criminal record, also for children whom the courts had discharged or acquitted. The petitioner's lawyer told the court that the police had also added a column with the charges to a form for discharged suspects, and said that this was illegal. The court ordered the police to remove the names of underage drivers who were discharged or acquitted from the cases registered against them. It asked the Punjab government's lawyer for a report on how the order was carried out. The judge noted that the Multan bench of the same court had already ordered such records removed.
What this does not show. News report only; the judgment itself was not found. The report does not say how many children were listed, for how long, or what harm a named child suffered.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Corte de Apelaciones de Temuco, Primera Sala, roles 83-2023 and 86-2023; Juzgado de Garantia de Victoria; Carabineros de Chile. Reported 14 May 2023.
A court in Victoria issued a detention order so that a young Mapuche woman would come to her charging hearing. She came of her own will on 14 April 2022, so the order had to be cancelled. By error the court did not cancel it, and the order stayed live. On 20 April 2023 Carabineros police arrested her inside the Catholic University of Temuco, where she studied, because of that order. They released her after phone contact with the court. The Temuco Court of Appeals held that the lower court broke her personal liberty. It ordered the court to set up effective ways to stop this happening again and to report within 30 days.
What this does not show. We read a news report that quotes the ruling; the court's own page was not opened. The claim against Carabineros was rejected because the order was formally live.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Justice Anthony Mrima; list held by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI). 4 Feb 2022 (date of the report).
Police suspected Jonah Anguka, a former District Commissioner, of planning the death of former Foreign Affairs Minister Robert John Ouko. A court cleared him. Even so, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations kept him on its list, flagged for murder. The report says the matter haunted him for 29 years. In 2022 the High Court in Nairobi ordered the police to remove him from their red list. The case shows a police watchlist that kept a murder flag on a man after a court had cleared him.
What this does not show. The article is behind a paywall after two paragraphs. It does not give the case number, the date of the judgment that cleared him, or the concrete harm the listing caused.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Europol (order of the European Data Protection Supervisor). 3 Jan 2022.
The supervisor of the European Union's data rules told Europol to erase data on people with no established link to crime. Europol held large datasets that it had not sorted into the kinds of people that the law lets it keep. The order set a limit of six months to sort new data, and gave 12 months for the data already held. The supervisor said that people "run the risk of being wrongfully linked to a criminal activity across the EU".
What this does not show. The order does not show that the data was erased. In June 2022 a new EU regulation let Europol keep processing data it already held for ongoing investigations, under conditions. On 17 November 2026 the Court of Justice dismissed the supervisor's challenge to that regulation as inadmissible.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Court of Justice press release.
Tribunal Constitucional del Peru, Pleno, Sentencia 151/2022, Exp. 03087-2021-PHC/TC (Jose Antonio Mamani Quispe, Arequipa). 7 Apr 2022 (vote of the Plenary).
On 5 May 2021 an appeals chamber in Arequipa annulled the proceedings against a man and ordered his immediate release. That ended his capture orders. The court sent the lifting order to the police only on 7 June 2021, one month later, by an official letter that went through a courier company. In the meantime the order stayed in the police system. On 6 June 2021, the day of the presidential runoff, police arrested him at his polling station because he still showed an active capture order. He was freed the next day. The Constitutional Court majority declared his habeas corpus well founded and ordered the judges to take more care when they annul capture orders.
What this does not show. The detention lasted about one day. The Court also relied on the election-day ban on arrests, so the stale record is one of two grounds.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Justice of Moldova, case no. 3ra-808/22, against the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its Information Technology Service (crime register RICC). 9 Nov 2022.
A man's past convictions were legally extinguished, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs still held criminal information about him in its Register of criminalistic and criminological information (RICC). He said the entries blocked his emigration abroad. The ministry's Information Technology Service said that removal from the register only adds a special note and does not physically remove the data. On 1 June 2022 the Chisinau Court of Appeal quashed the first judgment and granted his claim. On 9 November 2022 the Supreme Court of Justice declared the ministry's appeals inadmissible, so the order to strike the entry stands.
What this does not show. The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits. The source does not show whether the entry was physically removed or what happened to his emigration.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Korean investigators (agency server for phone images); Supreme Court of Korea, decision 2021mo1586. 14 Jan 2022.
In an investigation of another person, investigators seized a man's mobile phone. The warrant limited the seizure to data linked to that offence and required unrelated data to be deleted or returned. The analyst made no selection: most of the phone went into one archive file on an agency server, and the unrelated data was never deleted or returned. Later, when they investigated the man himself for an unrelated suspicion, investigators got new warrants for the stored archive in April 2020 and April 2021 and searched it, the first time without him or his lawyer present. The Supreme Court held the whole seizure unlawful, said the later warrants could not cure it, and revoked the seizures.
What this does not show. The decision does not say how long the copy was kept or when it was deleted. News reports of April 2024 describe a later ruling on a whole phone copy kept on the prosecutors' D-NET server; we did not open that judgment.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of the Interior, national fingerprint file FAED (CNIL deliberation SAN-2021-016). 24 Sep 2021.
The rules for the national police fingerprint file set retention periods and say records must be erased on final release or acquittal. CNIL inspectors found more than two million records kept past those periods. The ministry had applied older 25-year rules, so a person fingerprinted again could stay in the file without end. Some courts did not send release, acquittal or dismissal decisions, so records were not always erased. About seven million paper fingerprint cards, many decades old, were still kept with no legal basis. After the inspection the ministry deleted more than three million records on about 790,000 people. The CNIL issued a public reprimand and ordered it to delete expired data.
What this does not show. The decision does not show that a named person was arrested or refused a job because of a record that should have gone. The published text now hides the ministry and file names; a news report of the decision gives them.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service; High Court (Mohammed J, CV2020-00858) and Court of Appeal (Civ. App. P061/2021), Keston Felix v Attorney General. 18 Feb 2021 (High Court); 6 Mar 2026 (Court of Appeal).
Keston Felix was arrested in May 2017, charged with two summary offences and found not guilty in May 2019. Police had taken his photographs, measurements and fingerprints. Section 50(2) of the Police Service Act made the Commissioner keep the photographs and measurements of acquitted people with no end date, and fingerprint data could stay for 20 years after exoneration. Felix said he feared how police could use his data and feared retaliation by officers. The High Court struck down section 50(2) and ordered the immediate destruction of his photograph and measurement data, and that of others never convicted. In 2026 the Court of Appeal held that keeping fingerprint data of people arrested but never charged was unconstitutional.
What this does not show. The High Court upheld the 20-year fingerprint rule for exonerated people, so his fingerprint data was not ordered removed. The sources do not show any actual misuse of the kept data.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (R (II) v MPS [2020] EWHC 2528 (Admin)). 2020-09-29.
Police held Prevent counter-terrorism referral data about an 11-year-old on 10 databases after the case closed in June 2016. Keeping it breached Article 8 ECHR (right to private life) and DPA 2018 ss 35 and 39.
What this does not show. A summary of the judgment. Misuse of the data was not shown.
Cost: personal. At risk: children; liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
European Court of Human Rights, Trajkovski and Chipovski v. North Macedonia (nos. 53205/13 and 63320/13); DNA register of the Ministry of the Interior. 13 Feb 2020.
Police took mouth swabs from two men in 2009 and 2010 during theft cases and stored their DNA profiles. The data protection law said data must be kept no longer than needed, but a 2012 change to the Police Act made DNA data permanent. The law gave no rule for deletion, no review of the need to keep the data, and no way for a person to ask for deletion. The applicants said the profiles held health and genetic information and could mark them out in future investigations. The European Court of Human Rights found the blanket, indefinite retention disproportionate and held that it broke Article 8.
What this does not show. The court found no actual misuse of the profiles and gave no damages. The judgment does not show whether the profiles were deleted later.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Corte Constitucional del Ecuador, Sentencia 55-14-JD/20 (Franklin Rolando Garcia); Sistema Integral Informatico de la Policia Nacional (SIIPNE), Ministerio del Interior. 1 Jul 2020.
Police detained Mr Garcia in 1994 and 1996. Each time a police report found he had no responsibility. A judge archived one case in 2002 and in 2006 found that the suspect was a person with the same name. Both detentions stayed in the SIIPNE police system. He asked for their removal. The Ministry of the Interior said the data could not be deleted because SIIPNE is a public archive. He told the courts the records had kept him from stable work for more than 15 years and that oil companies turned him away. The Constitutional Court found a breach of his right to data protection, ordered the police to annotate the records and ordered the government to regulate SIIPNE.
What this does not show. The Court ordered correction and annotation, not deletion. The job harm is his own statement.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
State Inspector's Service of Georgia, decision against the Ministry of Internal Affairs on a complaint by the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA); earlier Constitutional Court judgment N1/2/622, Goduadze v. Minister of Internal Affairs. 31 Jan 2020.
In February 2017 the Constitutional Court of Georgia struck down a Ministry order that kept electronic records of administrative offences permanently. It found that the state kept information about people even when there was no need for it. GYLA later complained that the Ministry still kept these records, took them from its database and gave them to courts to impose administrative sanctions, and that in most cases the records were more than one year old. On 31 January 2020 the State Inspector's Service found that the Ministry stored and used the records without legal basis. It fined the Ministry and ordered it to set storage periods and to delete, destroy or anonymise the data within six months.
What this does not show. I did not open the State Inspector's own decision; GYLA, the complainant, reports it. The sources do not say which sanctions courts imposed or whether any person was detained because of an old record.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of the Interior, national DNA database of the Police of the Czech Republic; Supreme Administrative Court, 2 As 164/2019-30. 2 Apr 2020.
The Czech Police Act lets the police keep DNA data only while it is necessary, and makes them erase it when it is not. The Office for Personal Data Protection checked six DNA profiles in the national database. Three people had been acquitted or had their prosecution stopped for effective remorse. One had a minor conviction. The Ministry admitted error for two more. The Office found the retention unlawful and fined the Ministry. The Prague Municipal Court and the Supreme Administrative Court upheld this. The court said people who were not convicted must be treated as innocent, and that general crime experience cannot justify keeping their genetic profiles.
What this does not show. The source does not say how long the profiles were kept or how many other profiles were in the same position. It does not show that any person was wrongly suspected because of a profile.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay, Criminal Chamber, judgment 120/2020 (preventive habeas corpus). 2020 (exact date not given in the digest).
Two capture orders stayed on a man's police file (Prontuario Policial) and his court records (Antecedentes Judiciales). In one case the prosecution reported that the detention order was no longer in force. In the other case the trial judge said the case file could not be found. The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court found that the man was at imminent risk of illegal arrest because of these records. It granted the preventive habeas corpus. A separate vote said the court had to order correction of the information held by the National Police and the court records office, so that the threat of arrest would end.
What this does not show. The source is the Supreme Court's own digest of rules from its rulings, not the full judgment. It does not show an actual arrest.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security (US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, en banc). 2 Jan 2019.
In November 2004 an FBI agent filled in a watchlist form the wrong way round. The court says: "He checked the wrong boxes, filling out the form exactly contrary to the form's instructions." In January 2005 police at San Francisco airport handcuffed the scholar, searched her and held her for about two hours. She was told that she was off the list, but she was later put on other lists, and the government "has never explained this placement". At trial in 2013 the government conceded that she had never been a threat. The trial court ordered it to remove every reference to the mistaken entries from all watchlist databases and records.
What this does not show. The opinion does not say that the agent's error itself spread to the other lists, or that it is the reason she was refused a visa. The appeal was about legal fees.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Federal police at Brussels Airport (LPA BRUNAT); Police Information Control Body (COC), report DIO19005. 16 Sep 2019.
The federal police at Brussels Airport bought facial recognition software in early 2017 to test it with four cameras. The tests gave many false matches and were stopped in March 2017. When the Police Information Control Body (COC) visited on 9 August 2019, it found the system was still partly active. It still took snapshots of everyone moving through the airport, without comparing them to watchlists, and the snapshots were kept, at least for a time. The COC said keeping them created a technical database of biometric data, which the law did not allow. It ordered the police to stop using the system at once.
What this does not show. The report does not say how long the snapshots were kept or how many people they covered, and it does not show harm to a person. It does not expressly order deletion of the stored images.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
United Kingdom (police "domestic extremism" database). 24 Jan 2019.
Police kept data on a lifelong peaceful protester in a domestic extremism database. The database had no fixed maximum retention period and the review safeguards were not applied. The Court held the continued retention breached Article 8 and awarded costs.
What this does not show. The Court ruled on the keeping of the data. It found no misuse.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
National Centre for Personal Data Protection (CNPDCP), decision on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Register of Crime Information. 16 Nov 2018.
From 1991 to 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs took in personal data from the unrecognised authorities in the Transnistrian region and kept it in its Register of Crime Information. The transfers stopped after 2005, but the old records stayed. People in that data were treated as prosecuted or as having a criminal past, and in 2017 some could not get Moldovan passports because of it. On 16 November the data protection centre ruled that storing this data broke the law. It told the ministry to destroy the data and to report within ten days. A ministry order of March 2018 had covered only new papers, not the old data.
What this does not show. This is a news report; we did not open the CNPDCP decision itself. The article does not say how many people were affected or whether the ministry destroyed the data.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), enforcement notice to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Gangs Matrix). 16 Nov 2018.
The Metropolitan Police kept a Gangs Matrix of people it linked to gang violence. When a person no longer met the criteria, the person had to come off the Matrix. The ICO found that some London boroughs kept informal lists of people who had been removed, so the label stayed. The Matrix was shared with councils, housing associations and education authorities, and the ICO said being on it could lead to denial of services. It warned of disproportionate action against people who no longer posed a risk, most of them young black men. The ICO served an enforcement notice that ordered the Met to erase the informal lists. By February 2020 the ICO said the notice was met.
What this does not show. We could not open the enforcement notice itself; the text comes from the ICO statement as republished by Wired-Gov, a law news report (url2) and the ICO page https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/ico-40/metropolitan-police-gangs-matrix/. The sources do not say how many people were on the informal lists or name a person who was harmed.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Policía Nacional Civil criminal records database; Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública (IAIP) decision, March 2017. 24 Mar 2017.
A man was charged with minor negligent injury after a road accident in 2003, and a court acquitted him. Fourteen years later the PNC criminal records database still listed the offence. He applied for a job at the national lottery, the Lotería Nacional de Beneficencia, and was refused because of it. When he asked the PNC to cancel the record, it said its units had still not finished the procedure, and that it had no rule to delete obsolete data. Using the right to cancellation and the right to be forgotten, the IAIP ordered the PNC to delete the record within eight days. A commissioner said the precedent covers anyone cleared of a crime who still shows in PNC databases.
What this does not show. We read a newspaper report of the decision, not the IAIP resolution, and the report gives no reference number. It does not say whether the PNC complied or how many others were in the same position.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Supreme Court of Liberia: Charles Walker Brumskine, Harrison Karnwea, Liberty Party, Joseph Boakai and Emmanuel Nuquay v National Elections Commission (NEC). 7 Dec 2017.
Under Liberia's elections rules, the Final Registration Roll is made after the provisional roll is cleaned. After the October 2017 presidential vote, witnesses told the NEC hearing that the final roll had duplicated names, names that did not match photos, and other faults. The dispute stopped the run-off for weeks. The Supreme Court let the run-off go ahead, but ordered the NEC to clean the whole roll so that multiple entries are removed, and to publish it. In 2020 a party petition, citing an ECOWAS audit, said about 170,000 suspected duplicates were never taken off the roll. The risk was to public trust in a national election.
What this does not show. The court found no fraud that changed the result and gave no count of duplicate entries. The 170,000 figure comes from a party petition reported in the news, not from the audit itself.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection; Ministry of Interior, all police administrations. 26 Dec 2017.
Police administrations across Serbia held data on citizens' health in D14 forms, a review of people with mental illness, without a legal basis. The case came to light in 2016, when the Kikinda police department asked the local hospital for data on citizens treated under the F codes for mental disorders while it reviewed sector dossiers. In June 2017 the Commissioner formally warned the Ministry of Interior that this processing was unlawful. By December 2017 all police administrations had formed commissions and deleted or burned the data.
What this does not show. The news report does not say how many people were in the forms, how long police held them, or whether any person was harmed. We did not find the Commissioner's own December 2017 statement; the Commissioner's page we opened covers only the 2016 Kikinda request.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt, Appeals Examination Circuit, against the Ministry of Interior (reported by Masrawy). 18 Feb 2017 (report date).
The Ministry of Interior kept two citizens, one from Giza and one from Beheira, on its criminal information card as people accused in criminal cases. Both men had been acquitted in those cases. The Supreme Administrative Court annulled the listing. It said it acted to protect the men's reputation and the future of their children and relatives. It ruled that the Ministry may put a citizen on the card only if the person is a danger to public security. It also ruled that the Ministry must keep the data current, and track acquittals, dismissals and closed cases with the prosecution and the criminal courts.
What this does not show. News report only: we did not open the judgment text, and the report gives no case number. It does not say what concrete harm, such as a lost job or an arrest, the men suffered.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
High Court of Namibia, Northern Local Division (Oshakati): Ngumbi v Minister of Safety and Security (A 24/2014) [2016] NAHCNLD 102. 5 Dec 2016.
In 1995 the Opuwo magistrate's court acquitted Veriesa Ngumbi of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. His three co-accused were convicted. Nearly 20 years later the police record still showed him as convicted. In 2013 the police refused him a firearm licence because of this 'previous conviction', and the minister dismissed his appeal. The trial magistrate gave evidence that he had acquitted Ngumbi. The court found the police report of conviction invalid and unsigned, the police form 'doctored', and his bail refund slip missing. It set aside the refusal, ordered the licence to be issued within 30 days, and warned the police against what 'appears to be corruption'.
What this does not show. The court found the record was falsified at a police station, not only kept by mistake. The order dealt with the licence; the judgment does not say that the police corrected or deleted the criminal record itself, or how else the false entry was used.
Cost: professional, national. At risk: systems and access; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Datainspektionen (now IMY), decision dnr 997-2016 on Polismyndigheten (Swedish Police Authority). 28 Nov 2016.
The Swedish police fingerprint register holds about 195,000 sets of prints on about 165,000 people, and prints from crime scenes. When a suspicion is removed, the prints must be deleted. Datainspektionen checked a sample of 51 records. In two, the suspicion had been removed in 2016 but the prints were still in the register. Deletion messages had not reached the register because of a faulty configuration. The police also had no deletion routine for about 10,000 records based on international commitments. Datainspektionen found the processing unlawful, saw a risk that more such records existed, and ordered a report on fixes.
What this does not show. The decision does not show that anyone was wrongly matched or arrested. The sample was small.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Datainspektionen (now IMY), decision dnr 1259-2014 and 1260-2014 on Polismyndigheten (Swedish Police Authority). 27 Apr 2015.
The Swedish criminal records register held about 1,655,000 people. The law sets times after which entries must be deleted. The police used 'visual' deletion: entries past their deletion time were hidden but stayed in the system for up to three months, visible to staff with the highest access rights. Datainspektionen said this had no basis in law and that the entries must be removed completely. It ordered the police to stop visual deletion and to follow the deletion times. It also criticised sending record extracts with very sensitive data by ordinary post.
What this does not show. The decision does not say how many entries were kept this way or show harm to a named person. A sample of appeal acquittals found no errors.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Datainspektionen (now IMY), decision dnr 2790-2014 on Polismyndigheten (Swedish Police Authority, Södertörn). 24 Jun 2015.
Swedish police kept case notes in two folders, 'Sur-Sara-Sam' and 'Åtgärdslogg'. The work followed up crimes in families and close relationships, with victims, suspects, witnesses and others. Examples named a 14-year-old and a two-year-old witness. The notes held sensitive data on ethnicity, health and religion. No data had been deleted since the work started about 10 years before. Data from the mid-2000s on people not suspected of crime was still there in 2015. Datainspektionen found the processing unlawful and ordered the police to stop using the data in operational work and to keep it apart.
What this does not show. The decision does not show that the data leaked or was used against a victim. It ordered separation and restriction, not deletion.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: children; liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
France, national police file STIC (European Court of Human Rights, Brunet v. France, no. 21010/10). 18 Sep 2014.
Criminal proceedings against Mr Brunet were discontinued after mediation. His data stayed in STIC, the national police file of people implicated in offences, for a planned 20 years. He asked the prosecutor to delete the record. On 1 December 2009 the prosecutor refused, and he was told he could not appeal. The European Court of Human Rights said that 20 years was in practice close to keeping the data without limit. It said it must watch closely the risk of stigmatising people who were not found guilty of any offence. It held that France breached his right to private life under Article 8.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show that the record cost him a job; his own concern was a family court dispute. STIC was later merged into the TAJ file, which is a separate entry on the page.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Metropolitan Police Service (High Court, R (RMC and FJ) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis). 22 Jun 2012.
RMC, a woman of good character, was arrested in 2007; the prosecutors decided not to charge her. FJ was arrested in 2009, aged 12; no further action was taken. Both asked the police to destroy their custody photographs, fingerprints and DNA. The police refused. The High Court held that keeping their photographs under the existing policy breached their right to private life. The policy did not separate convicted and unconvicted people, could keep photographs with no end date, and gave no weight to FJ's age. The court gave the police months to revise the policy.
What this does not show. The court did not order the photographs destroyed, and it did not rule on fingerprints or DNA. It found that keeping FJ's police computer record was lawful.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; children. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia SU-458/12; Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), then Ministerio de Defensa and Policia Nacional. 21 Jun 2012.
Thirteen people sued the DAS in 2010. Judges had declared their sentences extinguished or prescribed, and they had asked the DAS not to let third parties see their old records. The DAS still issued the judicial certificate with the wording 'has records but is not wanted by a judicial authority', so employers could see their past. Some said they could not find work; some said they were dismissed or their contracts were not renewed because of the certificate. The Constitutional Court held that the DAS broke their right to habeas data by its refusal to suppress the information for third parties. It ordered the National Police to change the online lookup to say 'no pending matters with judicial authorities'.
What this does not show. The data itself stays in the register by law; what the Court stopped is its open circulation. Job losses are the claimants' own statements.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Komendant Glowny Policji (Chief of Police), KSIP; Wojewodzki Sad Administracyjny w Warszawie, case II SA/Wa 625/11. 24 Oct 2011.
A woman's personal data was in the police information system, KSIP, because of criminal proceedings against her. All those proceedings were discontinued. She asked for deletion and said the entries made it hard for her to get work in the justice system. The Chief of Police refused. The data protection inspector, GIODO, ordered deletion. The police went to court and lost: the Warsaw administrative court said internal police rules on KSIP do not override the data protection act on deletion.
What this does not show. The source is a news report of the judgment; we did not open the judgment. The job problem is her own statement, and the report says the judgment was not yet final.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
United Kingdom (police DNA and fingerprint retention). 4 Dec 2008.
Police kept the fingerprints, cell samples and DNA profiles of two people who were never convicted, with no time limit. The Court held this blanket, indefinite retention breached Article 8. It ordered the UK to pay costs.
What this does not show. Only costs were awarded; the Court held the finding of a violation was enough for non-pecuniary damage.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 29 Oct 2026.
Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC); PCPD investigation report R06-2599. 26 Oct 2006.
IPCC released real data from complaints against the police to an IT sub-contractor to test a new system, installed in early 2004. No one discussed the return or disposal of the discs or data after use, and the Commissioner found no record that they were destroyed. The sub-contractor kept the data on his notebook and home computers, then uploaded it with his programme to a web server. In March 2006 a member of the public found it on the internet. The PCPD press release says data of about 20,000 complainants was exposed. The Commissioner said the leak could cause grave concerns about their personal safety. He found a breach of the security principle and served an enforcement notice.
What this does not show. The finding is under the security principle, not the retention principle, and the report sets no deadline for return of the data. The report itself does not confirm the 20,000 figure and shows no person who came to harm.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; life and safety; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Archivo Criminal, Organismo de Investigación Judicial (OIJ); Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sentencia 2004-06177 (expediente 03-008036-0007-CO). 4 Jun 2004.
The OIJ criminal archive had kept police record No. 6250 on a man since May 1976, with his identity data, fingerprints, palm prints and photographs. He was sentenced in 1981 and completed the sentence by pardon on 1 March 1983, with no later entries. His representative said the record could lead a victim to point at him by mistake. The court said that, under its case law, such a record must be deleted on the authority's own motion ten years after the sentence is served, because a person cannot stay stigmatised for ever. It found breaches of his rights to privacy, liberty and equality, and ordered the archive to delete the record within 8 days.
What this does not show. In 2018 the same court changed its view and allowed such records to stay for police investigation use only. The source does not show that the record caused a wrongful arrest. We read the judgment on vLex, not on the court's own site.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Austrian Constitutional Court (VfGH), case B1117/99; Federal Police Directorate Vienna, criminal police file index (KPA). 16 Mar 2001.
The Vienna federal police kept five entries on a man in its criminal police file index. The prosecutor had dropped the cases behind them, or the man had been acquitted. In October 1998 he asked for all entries to be deleted. The police only added notes about the outcomes and kept the entries, citing a minimum retention period of five years. The data protection commission agreed with the police. The man said the entries, shown to a criminal court, made it look as if five cases were open, and caused bias in the police, officials and the court. The Constitutional Court found a violation of his right to private and family life and quashed the decision.
What this does not show. The copy we read stops before the end of the court's reasoning. It does not show when the entries were deleted or what effect they had on his trial.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports (statement by Mazen Alloush) and the Ministry of Interior's central electronic system. 21 Nov 2025.
In 2025 the Interior Ministry deleted millions of travel restriction notices left by the former regime. In November 2025 the border authority extended the ministry's central electronic system to the crossings with Turkey. Travellers were then stopped from leaving by security and penal notices from the Assad era. The authority's spokesman said the new platform caused old records to resurface: complaints, arrest warrants and notices from the security branches of the former regime. He said a small number of travellers were wrongly sent to security agencies that no longer exist. The authority told staff to let through people whose files held only obsolete Assad-era reviews.
What this does not show. The Syrian Observer says it did not verify the story, which it translated from Al-Modon. The source does not say how many travellers were stopped or held.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Portugal's database of DNA profiles (annual report for 2024 of its oversight council, Conselho de Fiscalização da Base de Dados de Perfis de ADN). March 2025 (report for 2024).
The council that oversees Portugal's database of DNA profiles reports that it had followed the need to start deleting profiles since 2019. The deletion procedure was first applied in 2024. That year 2,507 profiles of convicted people were deleted; in 2023, six. The report says that the profiles due for deletion were not formally deleted before then, but were all marked so that they could not be passed on by mistake.
What this does not show. The report does not say that any profile was wrongly passed on or used. It does not say for how long each profile was overdue.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Police Service of Northern Ireland (independent review by Angus McCullough KC). 24 Sep 2025.
In August 2018 police searched the homes and offices of two journalists, Barry McCaffrey and Trevor Birney, and seized their devices. The courts later found the warrants unlawful, and in the litigation that followed the police gave undertakings about the seized data. On 27 May 2025 the independent reviewer found a significant number of files from those devices on a system in the police Cyber Crime Centre. He wrote that this seemed to be in breach of the undertakings or orders, and he reported it at once to the Chief Constable.
What this does not show. The review does not say that anyone opened the files after the undertakings were given, or that a source was identified because of them.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Israel Police. 2022-08-01.
The phone intrusion system could pull material police had no power to obtain (pre-warrant data, contacts, calendars, notes, app lists). This excess material entered police systems and stayed accessible. The team found a ban on use insufficient. It required technical neutralisation of the excess capability.
What this does not show. A news report of an official review team's findings.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Police in Los Angeles, Fresno, Marin County and Sacramento County (California State Auditor, report 2019-118). Feb 2020.
The state auditor examined four police agencies that use cameras to read number plates. Los Angeles stored about 320 million images. About 99.9% were of vehicles that were on no wanted list when the camera took the image. The agencies kept images for one, two or at least five years. At three of them, most searches were for images less than six months old. Los Angeles had no policy for the system. The other three policies did not say clearly how to destroy the data. The auditor warned that the agencies "may be retaining the images longer than necessary".
What this does not show. The auditor found no confirmed misuse. It also found that the agencies did little or no audit of searches, so they could not show that there was none.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Grand Ducal Police, central file (fichier central); CNPD opinion 45/2019. 13 Sep 2019.
After many parliamentary questions and citizens' concerns, the minister for internal security asked the data protection authority CNPD for an opinion on the police central file. The CNPD found that all personal data were kept for 10 years from entry, then archived automatically, to be erased only 60 years after first entry. On 29 July 2019 the file held 511,499 case files. The CNPD said the archive period was out of proportion with the purposes of the file, and that retention should depend on the outcome, such as a dropped case or an acquittal. Without proper feedback from the courts, the police could not update or erase data. About 2,000 officers had access.
What this does not show. The opinion does not name a person harmed or show that acquitted people were refused jobs. It does not count how many records belonged to acquitted people.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
US Customs and Border Protection (searches of travellers' devices). 3 Dec 2018.
The inspector general inspected thumb drives at five ports of entry. At three of the five it found drives that still held information copied from past searches of travellers' devices. Officers had to delete each copy once it was uploaded. The report names the risk: travellers' data could be disclosed if a drive was lost or stolen.
What this does not show. The report does not say that a drive was lost or that the data was misused.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministry of State Security (WeChat account), republished by Xinhua; an official named Sun at a classified unit; an unnamed mini-program company. 5 Nov 2025.
A senior office director at a classified unit, named only as Sun, photographed a classified document. He used an image-to-text mini-program to convert it. Without his knowledge, the mini-program stored the content on a third-party server. Sun believed that deleting the local file was enough. The server copy stayed. An employee of the company that made the mini-program packed the classified files and sold them. The Ministry of State Security published the case as a warning. The employee was prosecuted and Sun received a severe disciplinary sanction.
What this does not show. The ministry gives no date, place or unit for the case, and it does not say who bought the files or what they held. It does not cite a rule that ordered the server copy deleted.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Tusla, the Child and Family Agency (Disclosures Tribunal, third interim report). Oct 2018.
A counsellor wrote a report for the child protection agency. She used another client's form as a template, and that client's allegation, a rape offence, stayed in the text against the name of a police sergeant. In May 2014 she found the error. She asked the agency to send the report back or to shred it, and she sent a corrected one. The agency returned her report. But its own notice to the police, which carried the error, stayed on its file: in the tribunal's words, it "remained on the TUSLA file in a kind of nuclear half-life". Later the agency opened records on the sergeant's children, and it sent a letter with the false allegation to his home. His wife opened it in January 2016.
What this does not show. The tribunal found incompetence, not a plot. It could not find who took documents out of the file. A senior police officer wrote that no material held by the police should be destroyed.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Elections and Boundaries Department, Cayo North register; claim by the UDP Cayo executive (Alberto August). 9 Oct 2026.
A magistrate ordered 24 disputed voters removed from the Cayo North voters' list. Former UDP chairman Alberto August says the names stayed on the list when the next supplementary list came out, and are still on it. His party's Cayo executive is asking the Elections and Boundaries Department how the names stayed while the order was in effect, and whether any of these people voted in the 2025 general election. Under the law, the Revising Officer strikes dead or disqualified voters off the register. Chief Elections Officer Josephine Tamai said the department is waiting for the result of a High Court appeal.
What this does not show. These are a party official's claims in a TV news report; the department has not confirmed a breach of the order, and an appeal is pending. The source does not show that anyone voted unlawfully.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE), Censo Nacional Electoral; official letter from CNE councillor Cossette López. 27 Nov 2025.
Days before the November 2025 general election, CNE councillor Cossette López sent an urgent official letter to the CNE president. It said 107 dead citizens were still enabled to vote in the national electoral census, and that their records were also on the biometric devices sent to voting centres. The letter blamed late reporting of deaths: only three of the 107 were in the CNE history of reported deaths. She asked that police, the armed forces and the Supreme Court send updated lists within 24 hours, so that the CNE computer system could raise alerts. CNE officials said the problem could harm the transparency and reliability of the election.
What this does not show. The source is a news report of the letter, not the letter itself. It does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Agence Nationale d'Identification des Personnes (ANIP), electoral list; independent audit by international experts. Aug 2025.
After the opposition asked for it in November 2023, the head of state accepted an independent audit of Benin's voter file by international experts. In August 2025 the opposition party Les Democrates said the experts' preliminary findings showed nearly 300,000 dead people still on the file. ANIP, which builds the list from the national identity register, said some dead people had no personal identification number (NPI), so their deaths were not matched. It said it had already removed the cases it confirmed, and called a clean file a pledge of transparency and credibility for the 2026 elections.
What this does not show. The 300,000 figure comes from the opposition, not from the audit report, which we did not see. ANIP gave no number, and the sources show no vote cast in a dead person's name.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
EU Election Observation Mission to Guyana 2025, Final Report (on the voter list of GECOM, the election commission). 2025 (final report on the 1 Sep 2025 elections).
Amendments made in 2022 give GECOM, Guyana's election commission, ways to remove deceased voters from the voter list, using reports from the General Register Office, the Police and the Ministry of Health. The EU observers found that for the 2025 elections there was no way in place to bring in the Police and Ministry of Health information, so those updates were not processed. There was also no procedure to learn of citizens who died abroad. The final list held 757,690 voters, about 15 per cent more than in 2020. The mission said this, with no reliable population data, fed a story of possible voter list manipulation. It made updating the list a priority recommendation.
What this does not show. The report gives no count of deceased voters still on the list. It does not show that any dead voter's name was used to vote.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
OSCE/ODIHR, Opinion on the laws of Montenegro governing voter registration (Law on the Voter Register and related laws); register kept by the Ministry of Interior. Jun 2025 (publication).
Montenegro's voter register is meant to be a continuously updated database of eligible voters, kept by the Ministry of Interior from residence, citizenship, birth and death records. ODIHR's legal opinion says many voters who live abroad or who died abroad remain on the voter lists for voting in the country. It says this feeds a widespread view of an inflated register and lowers trust in its integrity, and that earlier observation reports raised the same concern about dead voters. It also notes that voter data deleted from the register is kept in a separate database that is part of the register, with no retention limit in the law.
What this does not show. The opinion gives no count of dead voters and shows no vote cast in a dead person's name. The point about the separate database concerns the law; ODIHR does not say that the data was misused.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes (CNE), report on the 2021 legislative and presidential elections; voter database BDRE. 22 Apr 2024.
The CNE's report on the 2021 elections says the voter rolls for the presidential election were frozen 30 days before the vote with irregularities, including double and multiple registrations and deaths. The CNE asked civil registry offices for the deaths they had recorded, to help local registration commissions. It found that the audit of the voter database (BDRE) did not work, that the system had no oversight mechanism, and that anomalies still in the database left many voters unable to vote. It warned that omissions and delays create ambiguity and fragility in the process.
What this does not show. The report gives no count of dead people still on the rolls and does not show a vote cast in a dead person's name. Voters who could not vote were hit by several anomalies, not only deceased entries.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Election Commission of Bangladesh, NID Wing press conference, reported by Prothom Alo. 9 Jul 2023.
The Election Commission lets partner bodies check citizens' national ID (NID) data. Its agreements say partners must not store the data, because large stores cannot be kept safe. In July 2023 names, phone numbers, email addresses and NID numbers of citizens were found exposed online. At a press conference the commission's NID Wing said one partner body had stored citizens' personal data outside the rules, and that weak points in its website let others reach the data. The commission said its own server was not the source of the leak.
What this does not show. The article does not name the body or give the number of people affected, and it shows no harm to a named person. We match it to cost map row 876 by date and by the TechCrunch report it cites.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CIK BiH), Report on the implementation of laws in 2022; Central Voter Register fed by registry offices, interior ministries and IDDEEA. 2023 (report on the year 2022).
The Central Voter Register must hold only living voters. When a registry office records a death, the interior ministries and IDDEEA must remove the person. The Central Election Commission reports that it had to mark 8,892 dead people on closed voter extracts with a star, because mismatched records stopped their official removal. Most were removed later, but 776 marked dead people were still on the extracts for the October 2022 general elections, and 578 in 2020. Supporters of a party or candidate must be voters on this register. For the 2020 local elections the Commission found signatures of dead people on support forms and filed 173 reports to prosecutors.
What this does not show. The sources do not show that the forged signatures used names still on the register, or that a ballot was cast in a dead person's name. All figures come from the Commission itself.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
State Financial and Administrative Audit Institution, Oman; summary for the public of its 2021 annual report (IT assessment of a number of government units, p. 20). Jan 2023 (summary of the 2021 report).
The audit institution assessed information technology in a number of government units. It found that controls on access rights to information and on users were only partly applied, and that a non-Omani technician on a direct contract held database administrator rights. In their response, the units said they now review permissions, warn staff who hold rights for more than one role, and have cancelled and disabled the permissions of employees who resigned or retired. This shows that people who had left still had live access to government systems when the audit took place.
What this does not show. The summary does not name the units or systems, or say how many accounts stayed open, for how long, or whether anyone used them. The point that former staff kept access comes from the units' response, not from a count in the finding.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commonwealth Observer Group, final report on the Lesotho General Elections of 7 October 2022. 12 Oct 2022.
Electors who have died should be removed from Lesotho's register of electors. Before the October 2022 general election, parties and media said the register still held dead people and duplicates; the Independent Electoral Commission defended its accuracy. The Commonwealth Observer Group then reported 'the inclusion of numerous deceased persons in the register of electors and duplicate entries'. It said these errors meant the official turnout figure 'may be subject to misinterpretation', and it recommended a review of how the register is compiled, including the removal of deceased persons. An EISA observer mission had reported the same fault in 2012 and blamed weak civil registration of deaths.
What this does not show. The observers saw no impersonation or double voting. The report gives no count of dead electors on the register.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
PNG Electoral Commission common roll; Commonwealth Observer Group report on the 2022 National Election. 25 Nov 2022.
Commonwealth observers at Papua New Guinea's July 2022 national election reported that the common roll still held numerous names of dead people and of people who no longer lived in the electorate. The Electoral Commission built the 2022 roll on the 2019 local-level roll and said it removed more than 225,000 deceased, transferred, under-age, ghost and duplicate names, but voters still saw many dead names. At the same time, up to half of eligible voters were missing from some rolls. Observers found widespread public dissatisfaction with the roll, and in some places voters disrupted polling or refused to let polling teams set up. The Group asked for timely funding for a thorough roll update.
What this does not show. The report relies partly on what voters told observers; it does not count the dead names or show that anyone voted in a dead person's name. The disruption and the election violence had several causes, not only the dead names.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) padrón electoral; observatory Urnas Abiertas, as reported by Expediente Público. 25 Jul 2021.
On 24 and 25 July 2021 the CSE held a citizen check of the provisional voter roll for the November 2021 election. The independent observatory Urnas Abiertas reported that dead people still appeared on the roll in eight departments: Estelí, Granada, Jinotega, León, Managua, Masaya, Nueva Segovia and the South Caribbean region. It named this among the main faults of the check, together with harassment and party control of the process. The report said international observers, the OAS among them, had already said the government and the CSE did not guarantee transparent results.
What this does not show. The observatory relied on citizen reports and gives no count of dead names. It does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commission Electorale Independante (CEI); finding of the EISA and Carter Center International Election Observation Mission, report 'Observing the 2020 Presidential Election in Cote d'Ivoire'. 2 Nov 2020.
Before the October 2020 presidential election, the CEI had to strike dead voters from the roll it kept since 2018. It used death data from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and deleted 8,073 of 34,380 voters. The observation mission found that this was less than 5% of the voters who had probably died since 2018, so about 95% of them were still on the roll. The report says the CEI could not keep up with deaths because the civil registry is not modern, and that differences in the number of registered voters added to a lack of confidence in the election administration.
What this does not show. The 95% figure is the mission's estimate, not a count. The report does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name, and the CEI did not release detailed roll data.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commission Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI), report of the review workshop on the 2017 to 2019 electoral cycle; EU Election Observation Mission Madagascar 2018. 6 Mar 2020.
Madagascar's election law says the yearly review of the voter lists must remove voters who have died. The election commission's own review of the 2017 to 2019 cycle found that duplicates, wrongful entries and fictitious voters still remained on the lists, and named the failure to remove dead people as one cause. The same report listed disputes about the reliability of the voter list and a crisis of confidence between the electoral process and the population. The EU observers of the 2018 presidential election said that turnout had to be read in the light of dead people who were never removed, six years after the last full rebuild of the register.
What this does not show. The sources give no count of dead voters on the lists and do not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name. Madagascar rebuilt its lists from October 2022 to July 2023, so this may not describe the present register.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Commission Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI); ECOWAS experts' audit of the voter file, after the OIF audit. 11 Mar 2020.
Before the March 2020 legislative elections and constitutional referendum, ECOWAS experts audited Guinea's voter file. Of 11,550,805 records they counted 3,538,515 duplicates, 164,126 deaths, 58,885 minors and 2,438,992 voters with no supporting document. Like the OIF before them, they recommended removing the 2.4 million names. RFI reported that the electoral code did not allow a voter to be struck off without a death certificate, so dead people stayed listed. The mass removal also took the vote from some living citizens. A CENI director accepted it 'for peace', and RFI doubted calm would hold at polling stations.
What this does not show. The audit reports were not published; we read them through press reports. The sources do not show any vote cast in a dead person's name and do not link the roll directly to the violence around the 2020 vote.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; national security; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Vanuatu Electoral Office and Electoral Commission, Election Report 2020. 2020.
The Vanuatu Electoral Office and Electoral Commission said in their report on the 19 March 2020 election that the voter register had never been cleaned for deceased voters. Only 7,207 deaths had been removed, while the office estimated 68,715 deaths among registered voters from 2006 to 2020. The civil register also kept dead people, because few families get a death certificate. The register of 278,931 voters was about equal to the whole population. The report named the inaccurate register as a major concern, linked many election petitions to suspected manipulation of proxy votes, and recommended a national clean-up. Transparency Vanuatu had warned in 2013 that the inflated roll enabled fraud, including proxy votes in dead voters' names.
What this does not show. The deceased figure is an estimate from mortality rates, not a count of names. The report does not prove that any vote was cast in a dead person's name; the proxy claim in the 2013 study is an allegation.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Broadlink / Fujitsu Leasing / Kanagawa Prefecture. 2019-12-06.
The prefecture only initialised server HDDs before return. A contractor employee resold 18 drives. A buyer restored tax and other records with recovery software.
What this does not show. From news reports of the prefecture's release of 5 Jan 2021, which records a claim and a later settlement.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Direction de l'Automatisation des Fichiers (DAF), Ministry of the Interior; Mission d'Audit du Fichier Electoral (MAFE) Senegal 2018, report published by the CENA. 26 Feb 2018.
Four independent experts audited Senegal's voter file for the government in early 2018. They found that after the total revision of 2005 to 2006, a significant number of dead people, about 30,000 a year, stayed on the list. This built a mass of inactive voters, commonly called the 'dead stock', and an overstated real electorate. The explanatory memorandum of Law 2016-27 said the partial overhaul of 2016 had to strike all deceased voters from the file. After that overhaul, the auditors judged the file coherent and of good quality.
What this does not show. The report gives a yearly estimate, not an exact total, and does not show any vote cast in a dead person's name. It describes the file before the 2016 overhaul.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Australian Government, Cabinet records (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet). 31 Jan 2018.
Two locked filing cabinets sold cheaply at a Canberra second-hand shop. The buyer drilled the locks and found thousands of Cabinet papers spanning four prime ministers. Markings included top secret and Australian eyes only. ASIO later secured them in safes.
What this does not show. A news report. The investigation outcome and the date the papers were first found are not stated. Not all papers concerned national security.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
PEMANTAU (Bersih 2.0, MAFREL and Pusat KOMAS), statement on the gazetted electoral roll; Election Commission of Malaysia (SPR), voter education FAQ. 3 May 2013.
Before Malaysia's 13th general election, the PEMANTAU monitors collected 592 public reports on the gazetted electoral roll. They included a woman who died in 1981 and was still registered, with a party voting card sent to her home; a man in Pasir Gudang, dead for seven years, still certified as an eligible voter; and a mother who died in 1990 whose entry showed a new MyKad number, although that card policy came after her death. PEMANTAU asked who had registered a MyKad for the dead woman. The Election Commission says it removes a dead voter only when the National Registration Department passes on a death record; if the family does not report the death, the name stays on the roll.
What this does not show. The source does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name. The cases are public reports collected by monitors, not checked by the Election Commission.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), Harare: 'Key statistics from the June 2013 voters' roll' (republished by Politicsweb). 2 Jul 2013.
Dead voters must be struck off Zimbabwe's voters' roll under the Electoral Act. Weeks before the July 2013 elections, the Research and Advocacy Unit compared the roll of June 2013 with the 2012 census. Registered voters exceeded the population in every age band from 30 upward, and by 219 percent among people aged 80 and over. RAU said this group 'most probably represents a large number of deceased persons' still on the roll. It concluded that well over a million people on the roll were dead or had left, and that the gap 'impinges upon the integrity of Zimbabwe's electoral process'. In 2021 the Electoral Commission said dead voters stay on the roll when families do not register deaths.
What this does not show. The figure is an estimate from a census comparison and mixes the dead with people who left the country. The source does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name. The 2021 Electoral Commission remarks concern a later roll.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Solomon Islands Electoral Commission voter register; Commonwealth Observer Group report on the 4 Aug 2010 National Parliamentary Elections. Aug 2010.
The Commonwealth Observer Group at the 4 August 2010 Solomon Islands election found the voter register vastly inflated: 448,189 voters, about 75 percent of the population, although about half the people were under 18. Observers were told that the names of a high number of dead people stayed on the register. The basic list dated from 1996, each registration round added names, and the Electoral Commission could not purge multiple and deceased entries in the ten-day review. Nobody the Group met trusted the register, and observers saw some double voting and personation. In 2014 the Electoral Commission confirmed that many dead names had stayed on the old roll and replaced it with a biometric register about 160,750 names shorter.
What this does not show. The report does not count the dead names or link the double voting and personation it saw to them. The 2014 figure of 160,750 fewer names also covers duplicates and ghost names.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Secretariado Tecnico de Administracao Eleitoral (STAE) voter register; EU Election Observation Mission, final report on the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. 2007.
STAE keeps Timor-Leste's single voter register. The EU Election Observation Mission for the 2007 elections found that deaths were not purged in the 2007 registration update. There was no way to remove dead people except at a relative's request, and none had been removed. The mission estimated that about 17,000 people of voting age had died since the register began in 2004, and all who were registered stayed on it. The register held 102 percent of the estimated eligible population. Duplicate voter cards were also in circulation, and polling stations had no voter list to check against. The mission said these faults affect the accuracy of the register and must be corrected.
What this does not show. The report does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name. The death figure is the mission's own estimate from census projections. We could not open the 2004 STAE rule in force in 2007 (scanned file).
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia, findings on the Democratic Party website AN.mn (reported by iKon.mn). 16 Apr 2026.
The state registration body gives political parties voter name lists at parliamentary elections. Parties may use them for two checks only: duplicate entries and voter registration. The Democratic Party kept the data in an internal database of about 2.1 million records. When a person typed a registration number into the party website AN.mn, the site showed that citizen's home address and party membership. The National Human Rights Commission found that this use broke the personal data and election laws. It told the party to give proof within 30 days that the lists went back to the proper body. It also asked the police cyber crime unit to check for a leak.
What this does not show. The source is a news report of the Commission's findings; we did not find the Commission's own text. The database was deleted before the check, so the Commission could not confirm a leak or a sale, and the source shows no harm to a named person.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
High Court of Sindh at Karachi, C.P. D-1648 and D-1649 of 2026 (Muhammad Rizwan and Usama v Federation of Pakistan); names placed on the Passport Control List on the advice of the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation. 30 Mar 2026.
The government put the names of two men on the Passport Control List on 29 February 2024, in connection with a criminal case. The trial court later acquitted both men. Their names stayed on the Exit Control List, the Passport Control List and a related list after the acquittal. They could not travel abroad to perform Umrah. The court found that the basis for listing them no longer existed and that keeping their names on the lists was an unlawful and arbitrary restriction. It ordered the government to remove the names at once from every restrictive list and not to stop them from travelling.
What this does not show. The order does not give the date of the acquittal or how long the names stayed on the lists after it. It does not show that the names were in fact removed after the order.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Construction Education and Training Authority (CETA) v V2 Digital (Pty) Ltd and Another, High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria, [2025] ZAGPPHC 248, case 2025-024691; data held by cloud host V2 Digital. 6 Mar 2025.
CETA, a public body, ended its ICT service agreement with its cloud host V2 Digital at the end of December 2024. At the handover in January 2025, CETA formally asked V2 Digital to purge all copies of its confidential information. V2 Digital did not. It kept hosting all of CETA's data, including personal information, and said it would restore the services only after payment. The judgment records that CETA was left dysfunctional, without access to its own management systems, and unable to pay even salaries. The High Court in Pretoria ordered V2 Digital to restore CETA's data and system functionality at once, and to pay the costs.
What this does not show. The court ordered V2 Digital to restore access. It did not order deletion and made no finding on the purge request. The judgment does not show misuse of the personal information or harm to named people.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Lisbon City Council (data protection authority, CNPD; Lisbon administrative court). 21 Jul 2024.
Lisbon City Council sent the personal data of people who gave notice of demonstrations to other bodies. The authority opened its inquiry after two citizens complained that their data had been sent to the Russian Embassy. Its draft decision listed 225 breaches. One was a breach of the rule against keeping data longer than needed. The authority fined the council in December 2021. On 21 July 2024 a Lisbon administrative court confirmed that the council broke the data protection regulation.
What this does not show. The harm on record comes from sending the data, not from keeping it. Only one of the 225 breaches concerns keeping, and the authority's page does not say what the court made of that one.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: news report of the 225 breaches.
Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD); Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (PCPD) investigation report. 9 Dec 2024.
In 2022 EMSD collected personal data during 14 compulsory COVID-19 testing operations in housing blocks. The data sat in spreadsheets on a contractor's ArcGIS Online cloud platform. The contract ended in February 2023. EMSD assumed the account and data would go when the contract ended, but it did not ask for deletion and did not check. The data stayed until 30 April 2024, and anyone with the web address could view it without a password. It held names, addresses, Hong Kong identity card numbers, phone numbers, vaccination status and positive test results. The Commissioner found breaches of the retention and security principles and served an enforcement notice.
What this does not show. The report does not say that anyone viewed or downloaded the data, and it names no harm to a person. It calls the risk unnecessary exposure of sensitive data.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Belastingdienst (Dutch Tax Administration), Fraude Signalering Voorziening (FSV); decision of the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP). 12 Apr 2022.
For years the Dutch Tax Administration kept a blacklist, the FSV, of people it saw as possible fraudsters. About 270,000 people were on it, including about 2,000 minors, and also companies. The Dutch data protection authority (AP) found that there was no lawful basis for the list and that personal data was kept too long, with no valid reason or clear purpose. People on the list did not get debt restructuring or student finance, or got into financial trouble in other ways. Some victims of the childcare benefits scandal were also on the list. The AP imposed a record fine and cited the seriousness, the large consequences and the long duration of the breach.
What this does not show. We could not open the AP decision itself (the AP site refused); this comes from a national news report. The report does not say how long each record was kept past its time.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: livelihood and private life; children; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commission de Protection des Donnees Personnelles (CDP), quarterly opinion 03-2022; case against Lat Diop (APR, Golf Sud). Oct 2022.
To stand in Senegal's elections, candidates collect sponsorship ('parrainage') from voters, with their contact details. A citizen told the CDP that his wife had received unsolicited political SMS. The politician behind the messages said that he had hired a provider whose database was made mostly of numbers collected during sponsorship drives. The CDP found unlawful and excessive collection, use of the sponsorship data for another purpose and an excessive retention period. It gave the politician a warning. Data that voters gave only to back a candidacy was kept and turned into a political messaging list.
What this does not show. We read the CDP finding through two press reports; the CDP page for this opinion returned 'page not found'. The sources do not say how long the data was kept or how many people were on the list.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Hoeje-Taastrup Municipality and its IT supplier EG (Danish Data Protection Agency, case 2019-32-0704). 8 Jul 2020.
A hospital sent a patient's medical record to Hoeje-Taastrup Municipality by mistake; the municipality had no use for it. The patient asked for it to be deleted in early May 2018. The municipality asked its IT supplier to delete it on 30 July 2018, and the supplier did so on 30 April 2019, almost a year after the request. The Danish authority issued serious criticism. It found that the municipality had to make sure the deletion happened without undue delay, even though the delay was at the supplier.
What this does not show. The decision was read in the copy published by the legal database Lovguiden; its page title wrongly names Copenhagen. It records no other use of the record.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Movimiento Ciudadano (political party); Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) Consejo General; Sala Superior of the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, SUP-RAP-96/2018. 20 Sep 2018 (electoral court); INE sanction 28 Mar 2018.
INE gave the party Movimiento Ciudadano a copy of the national voter list for the 2014 to 2015 federal election, so that the party could review it. Parties may use the list only for that review. The party copied the list and kept it on an Amazon internet portal for longer than the law allowed, and the list was exposed online. INE found that 93,424,710 voter records were exposed and sanctioned the party and two people. The electoral court confirmed the sanction. It said that when the review or its deadline ends, there is no reason for a party to keep the data, however secure the site.
What this does not show. The sources call the data highly sensitive and warn it could be traded or misused, but they do not show that any voter was harmed or that the data was sold.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust; national security. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Mauritius (Madhewoo v State of Mauritius; Jugnauth v State, 29 May 2015), as recorded by the Privy Council in Madhewoo v The State of Mauritius [2016] UKPC 30. 31 Oct 2016.
Under the 2013 identity card scheme, every Mauritian who applied for the new biometric card had to give fingerprints, and the state kept them on a central register. When the Supreme Court heard the challenge in September 2014, over 850,000 citizens had applied. On 29 May 2015 the Supreme Court held that the storage and retention of the fingerprints was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society: the safeguards in the Data Protection Act were not sufficient and there was no judicial control of the store. The government accepted the ruling, repealed the 2013 regulations and told the Privy Council that fingerprints were now destroyed once each card was issued.
What this does not show. The judgments do not show that anyone reached or misused the stored fingerprints. Fingerprint minutiae still sit on each card's chip; in 2021 the UN Human Rights Committee found that this, too, breached the right to privacy.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; democracy and public trust; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Ghana, Ramadan and Another v Electoral Commission and Another (J1/14/2016) [2016] GHASC 83. 5 May 2016.
In 2014 the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional to register voters with National Health Insurance (NHIS) cards and barred their use. Before the December 2016 election, the court took judicial notice that the names registered that way had not been deleted from the register of voters, so the register was not accurate. It ordered the Commission to take steps immediately to delete or clean the register and to let those affected register again under the law. The court said a credible register builds public confidence in the electoral process and trust in the outcome. In July 2016 the court had to repeat the order, because the Commission said it did not have to delete the NHIS names.
What this does not show. The judgment does not say how many names were affected or that anyone voted unlawfully. The July 2016 repeat order comes from a news report, not from the court text we opened.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
State of Baden-Württemberg; former Minister-President Stefan Mappus (Outlook mailbox backup files). 27 May 2013.
In 2010 the state copied Mappus's whole inbox to a server after mailbox problems. He deleted much of his email before leaving office in 2011. The forgotten backup was found in summer 2012. The state wanted the emails for other proceedings. The court held backup data may serve only backup purposes (s. 14(4) LDSG BW). It ordered deletion of the working copies and all copies, after offering them to the state archive.
What this does not show. Facts on the 2010 backup and 2012 rediscovery come from IAPP commentary (Flemming Moos), not the judgment text, which was not opened. Section 14(4) LDSG BW binds public bodies only.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; liberty and justice. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Amagasaki City and its contractor BIPROGY, with an unauthorised sub-sub-contractor (independent investigation committee report). 28 Nov 2022.
A worker for an unauthorised sub-sub-contractor copied the city's resident data to two USB sticks to move it to a call centre. The files held about 460,000 people, the whole register. The contract said that personal data must be erased promptly once no longer needed, with a certificate of erasure. After the transfer the data was not erased and no certificate was given. The worker went out drinking and lost the bag with the sticks. Police found it two days later. The committee found that the contractor had failed to erase the data "reliably and promptly" (our translation). The city barred the contractor from bidding for 18 months and said the incident had damaged the city's image.
What this does not show. The sticks were found with a password lock, and the committee found no leak. The risk is what could have happened. The city puts its image damage down to the whole incident, not only to the data that was not erased.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: the mayor's briefing, 28 Nov 2022.
US Internal Revenue Service (Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, report 2021-20-056). 20 Sep 2021.
The inspector general tested 87 of the 3,882 laptops and desktops that the IRS had sanitised between January and March 2021. One had not been sanitised. Two were missing their hard disks, which the IRS could not find, so they could not be tested. The inspector estimated that about 45 of the computers may not have been properly sanitised and about 89 may be missing hard disks. The IRS checked its work by looking at the computers and starting them up, not with verification software.
What this does not show. No taxpayer data was found. The disk that had not been sanitised was encrypted.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Commission Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI) of Mali, audit committee of the 2020 voter file; reported by Bamada.net. 28 Feb 2020.
Before the 2020 legislative elections a national audit committee, with international experts, checked Mali's voter file. At the press conference the CENI president said the first weakness was the presence of dead people. Using the national death rate, about 5 percent of the file, some 400,000 names, belonged to people who had died and had to be removed. Names are only removed when a death certificate exists, and few deaths are registered. Dead voters left on the file weaken trust in the count and open a route to fraud.
What this does not show. The figure is an estimate from the death rate, not a count of named dead voters. The source does not show any vote cast in a dead person's name. We read a news report of the press conference, not the audit report itself.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Commission Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI) of Burkina Faso; independent audit by the OIF and the African Union, 7 to 21 Oct 2020. 21 Oct 2020.
Before the November 2020 elections the government and the CENI asked the OIF and the African Union to audit the biometric voter file. The audit committee of 22 experts, parties and civil society found that the way the file is revised lets dead voters pile up without control: an estimated 280,000 to 320,000 dead people were still on it. Old data from the 2012, 2014 and 2015 revisions was also stacked in the file. The committee said the file could not avoid a full rebuild. Dead names on a voter file put trust in the election at risk.
What this does not show. The number is an estimate, not a list of names. The source does not show that anyone voted in a dead person's name, and the audit still accepted the file for the 2020 vote.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Election equipment of Shelby County, Tennessee (DEF CON 25 Voting Village report). Sep 2017.
Researchers at a security conference obtained used electronic poll books, the devices that check voters in at a polling place. One had been taken out of service with live voter data still on it. The file was not encrypted. It held personal details, home addresses included, of 654,517 voters from Shelby County, Tennessee, from about 2008. The report says that the data should have been securely removed before the device was resold or recycled.
What this does not show. The report records no misuse of the file. It does not say who sold the device.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Washington State agencies (Departments of Health, Labor and Industries, Social and Health Services, and Ecology). 10 Apr 2014.
The state disposed of about 200,000 computers in two years. A spot check of over 1,000 surplus machines found about 9 percent still held sensitive data, including social security numbers and medical information. At least 10 departments did not verify erasure before disposal. The auditor said agencies had likely given away or sold hundreds of such computers. Officials intercepted machines and set new guidelines.
What this does not show. A news report; the auditor's own report could not be opened. Exact counts of machines already sold are not stated. Much of the data was personal.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Washington State agencies (Washington State Auditor, Safe Data Disposal, audit 1011501). 10 Apr 2014.
Auditors checked computers that four state agencies had sent to surplus for sale. They estimated that 109 of the 1,215 computers in the six weeks reviewed, about 9 percent, still held confidential information: applications for public assistance, medical records, tax forms, Social Security numbers, employment applications, and user names, passwords and network access instructions. At one agency, tape saying that the hard drive had been removed was put on a computer with its drive still inside. The state then stopped the sales and held the computers.
What this does not show. The report does not say that any computer with confidential data was sold. The risk is what would have happened if they had been.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life; health and the body. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Nova Scotia Chief Information Office; Departments of Health and Wellness, Justice and Community Services; Office of the Auditor General of Nova Scotia. Nov 2013.
Most surplus Nova Scotia government computers go to the Computers for Schools programme, mainly for the public education system. The Chief Information Office must wipe their hard drives first. The Auditor General tested 100 computers marked as surplus. Five still held easily readable data, which proved they had not been wiped. One held recorded 911 calls, very personal details from a background check and other personal information. The wiping software kept no logs, wiped computers were not labelled and nobody checked that wiping was done. The audit chose departments whose computers could hold information that would be damaging in the wrong hands. The Chief Information Office agreed to fix the process.
What this does not show. Auditors found the computers before they left government, so the source shows a near miss, not a disclosure. It does not say whose 911 calls they were.
Cost: national. At risk: national security; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Texas State Auditor, report 11-040). Jul 2011.
State auditors tested 30 hard drives that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality had set aside for disposal. 29 of them (96.7 percent) still held recoverable data, and some held confidential data. Texas law makes agencies remove data for good before equipment leaves state property. The agency also had no way to find and wipe other equipment with storage, such as printers and copiers.
What this does not show. An audit test. Management said the 29 drives were wiped before they went to anyone outside the state. No leak is recorded.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
31 federal institutions donating to Computers for Schools (Industry Canada); Library and Archives Canada; PWGSC Crown Assets Distribution. 5 Oct 2010.
Auditors tested 1,093 computers that federal bodies had donated to the Computers for Schools programme. 458 (about 42%) held drives not fully erased, against Treasury Board policy. Data included social insurance numbers, solicitor-client privileged records and classified information. 28 of the 31 donating institutions had failed the cleansing rule. Auditors seized 123 drives. There was no process for donors to certify cleansing. Two of four shredding firms used by Library and Archives Canada broke their contracts; one held records 12 days against a 72-hour limit.
What this does not show. Archived 2010 audit. Industry Canada agreed to a new certification report from April 2011; whether it was implemented is not covered here.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: national security; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
US Social Security Administration (Office of the Inspector General, audit A-14-10-11003). Nov 2010.
The agency's security handbook says that computer media must be sanitised or destroyed so that sensitive data cannot be disclosed. Auditors tested 253 hard drives from surplus workstations at headquarters and in the Philadelphia region. Five were not properly sanitised, and four of those held personally identifiable information. In four other regions, two of 291 drives were not sanitised, and one held such information.
What this does not show. The report does not say what personal data the drives held, or that any of it reached anyone.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Western Australian state government agencies (seven sampled). 31 Mar 2008.
State auditors bought 19 second-hand computers. Ten were confirmed as government machines. Four of the ten held confidential information. Three of those had been formatted before disposal; the fourth still had its operating system installed. Data included government files and staff resumes, performance reviews and personal emails. None of seven sampled agencies had full procedures for secure data removal.
What this does not show. A news report (iTWire report); the audit report itself was not read and is not named in the article. Small sample of ten government machines.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
US Department of Veterans Affairs (Washington DC, Indianapolis and San Diego medical centres and headquarters offices). 16 Jul 2007.
GAO tested IT equipment controls at four VA locations. In its limited tests, drives certified as sanitised held no data. But three of six unsanitised Board of Veterans' Appeals drives held 419 unique names and Social Security numbers. One unsanitised San Diego drive held at least 20 detailed patient medical histories. Drives at San Diego and Indianapolis waited up to six years for sanitisation.
What this does not show. The report mainly covers theft, loss and inventory control of IT equipment. GAO made recommendations, not orders.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life; health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 24 Oct 2026.
Missouri state agencies (Missouri State Auditor, report 2004-70). 15 Sep 2004.
The state auditor tested 56 surplus computers that were ready for sale to local bodies and charities or for public auction. On 37 of them, data could still be read or recovered. 23 held sensitive information: social security numbers, bank account details, network access details including a remote dial-in number, medical data such as patient care plans, police investigation reports and staff appraisals. The auditor wrote that weak or missing wiping policies expose the state, its staff and its citizens to "unnecessary risk of data disclosure".
What this does not show. The audit tested computers before sale. It does not say that any data reached a buyer.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; health and the body; systems and access. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Colonial Pipeline Company (testimony of its chief executive to a US Senate committee). 8 Jun 2021.
In May 2021 ransomware hit the company's office network. The company shut its whole pipeline to keep the attack away from the control systems. Its chief executive told the Senate that the company believed the attacker used a legacy VPN profile "that was not intended to be in use". The company then shut that profile down. He said the shutdown led to panic-buying and shortages on the East Coast.
What this does not show. A VPN profile is an access account, not stored records. The cause was the company's belief while the investigation was still open. The shutdown was its own choice.
Cost: professional, national. At risk: systems and access; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
AT&T and a marketing supplier (US Federal Communications Commission, consent decree DA 24-892). 17 Sep 2024 (FCC consent decree announced).
AT&T's contracts said that a marketing supplier must destroy or return customer data when the work ended. The regulator found that the data stayed in the supplier's cloud for years after that. In 2023 a breach of the supplier's cloud exposed network information on about nine million AT&T customers. Under the consent decree, AT&T must track the data its suppliers hold, enforce their retention and disposal duties, and audit this every year.
What this does not show. The order covers the whole breach. The records that should already have been gone may be only part of what was exposed.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Digi Távközlési és Szolgáltató Kft.; Court of Justice of the EU, C-77/21, on a reference from the Budapest High Court. 20 Oct 2022.
In April 2018 a server failed at Digi, a Hungarian internet and telecom provider. To test and fix the fault, Digi copied the personal data of about a third of its private customers into a test database. After the tests and the fix, Digi did not delete the copy. In September 2019 an ethical hacker got into it and reached data on about 322,000 people. Digi then deleted the database and reported the breach. The Hungarian authority found the data had been stored for no purpose for nearly 18 months. The Court of Justice ruled that a test copy may be kept only as long as the tests and the fixes need it.
What this does not show. The judgment does not say how the hacker got in or whether the data were misused. The person who got in was an ethical hacker who reported it to Digi.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Martin, Jones and Alzaabi, Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol 11 No 4, Article 6 (peer-reviewed). 2016.
Researchers bought 40 used hard disks from computer and phone shops in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Fujairah. The owners had sold the disks, but only 7 had been cleaned properly. Data could be recovered from 26 disks. On 15 of them the data had been deleted or the disk formatted, yet it came back. Twenty disks identified individuals and nine identified organisations. Finds included a fax to the Ajman Port security office about who could board vessels, a bank's security plan and security audit records, a crew list with personal details, and oil and gas reservoir and SCADA documents. The authors warn that such data stays available to anyone who wants to exploit it.
What this does not show. Small sample of 40 disks. The paper does not show that anyone misused the data, and it does not class any find as government, military or police data.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; know-how and markets. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (NNSA). Jul 2006 (month only).
LANL declared an Apple G4 excess in June 2005. It sold at an Albuquerque auction in August 2005. A television station buyer found LANL documents on the unsanitised hard drive. Files covered budgets, attendance and procedures for sending classified information.
What this does not show. The IG states the drive held no classified information. The other seven computers were already sold, so their state is unknown.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Free Mobile (French data protection authority, CNIL). 2026-01-13.
In January 2026 the French regulator sanctioned Free Mobile after an attacker reached data on 24 million subscriber contracts, including bank account numbers. It also found that the company had no process to sort former subscribers' data, keep only what the accounting rules require and delete the rest. Millions of records were kept for an unjustified time. The regulator ordered the company to finish the purge within six months.
What this does not show. The regulator does not say whether former subscribers' records were among the data the attacker reached.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Rogers Communications (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, findings 2022-003). 30 Mar 2022.
The company used voiceprints to identify customers who called. The Privacy Commissioner found that it kept the voiceprints of account holders who had opted out, for "security purposes"; the company later said that they were never used. The Commissioner pointed to the ever-present risk of breaches and the sensitivity and value of biometric data. The company agreed to delete the voiceprints of people who opt out, including those it had already kept, and to show evidence by 30 September 2022.
What this does not show. The report does not say how many voiceprints were kept or for how long. It records no misuse.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Proximus NV. 27 Oct 2022.
A subscriber asked Proximus in January 2019 to keep his details out of its directories; after a routine data update from his operator Telenet his details reappeared, and Proximus had also passed them to other directory providers and to Google. The Court held that withdrawal from directories is an Art 17 erasure, that a DPA may require the provider to inform the operator and other directory providers, and that Art 17(2) allows an order to take reasonable steps to inform search engines.
What this does not show. The Court ruled on points of law. It awarded no damages.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
All phone and internet companies in Portugal (order of the data protection authority, CNPD). 7 Jun 2022.
Portugal's Constitutional Court struck down parts of the law that made phone and internet companies keep traffic and location data on their customers. The data protection authority then ordered the companies to delete the data kept under that law, within 72 hours.
What this does not show. A news report of the regulator's note. It does not say whether every company deleted the data in time.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
URCDP, Uruguay's data protection authority, Resolution No. 56/020 on UTE (the state electricity company); confirmed by Resolution No. 12/021. 17 Nov 2020.
A man retired from UTE, the state electricity company, in Rio Negro on 31 December 2013. UTE said an internal memo of 12 November 2013 removed his right to sign. But he still appeared as an authorised signatory on UTE's official current account at the state bank BROU until March 2020, without his consent. The bank said UTE's request to remove him arrived only on 30 March 2020. He asked for erasure and was not told it was done. The authority found that UTE broke the rule that data must be erased once no longer needed, and the right to erasure. It formally observed UTE, told it to review its procedures, and confirmed this in May 2021.
What this does not show. The decision does not say that anyone used his signing right after 2013, or that he suffered harm. It does not describe the bank's own systems or controls.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Public Transport Victoria; Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner, Disclosure of myki travel information (investigation report and compliance notice). 15 Aug 2019.
In 2018 Public Transport Victoria gave a public datathon a large dataset of myki card touch on and touch off records. PTV said the data had been anonymised, so travellers' identities were meant to be gone. University of Melbourne researchers found the dataset online and identified themselves and third parties in it. The data also showed card types, including cards for children, police officers and parliamentarians. Experts for the regulator rated the risk of re-identification as extremely high. The Deputy Commissioner found that PTV breached the Information Privacy Principles and issued a compliance notice. The report warned that people who downloaded the dataset may still hold copies.
What this does not show. Victoria Police assessed the risk to police and parliamentarians as low or minimal. The report does not show that any traveller was harmed.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: national security; children; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Used enterprise routers bought on the secondary market. 18 Apr 2023.
ESET bought 18 used core routers and analysed 16 unique networks. Only 5 had been properly wiped. 9 held complete configuration data. All 9 identified the former owner. 8 of 9 held router authentication keys and root password hashes. 7 of 9 held VPN credentials.
What this does not show. Small sample of 18 devices.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Test of recycled numbers at two US mobile carriers (paper: Security and Privacy Risks of Number Recycling at Mobile Carriers in the United States). 2021.
When a subscriber gives up a phone number, the carrier gives it to someone else. Researchers looked at 259 numbers on offer to new customers at two US carriers. 171 of them (66%) were still linked to an existing account at one or more of six popular websites. In a second test, 19 of 200 recycled numbers received calls or texts with security or private content meant for the last owner. The paper says: "attackers can feasibly leverage number recycling to target previous owners and their accounts."
What this does not show. The researchers took over no account: they stopped when they saw that an account was linked. The paper shows exposure, not fraud.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Tennessee Valley Authority (federal power utility). 19 Sep 2017.
The inspector general sampled 52 surplus devices with 54 hard drives at four sites. Eleven drives were not sanitised and still held readable data; one held personal data and TVA confidential data. Unsanitised items included desktops, printers, a plotter and an authentication manager. Four devices had no wipe certificate in the service ticket, a repeat of a 2008 finding. Rules covered only PCs and magnetic tapes, not servers, switches, printers or tablets. 39 of 52 devices were not accurately tracked.
What this does not show. Judgemental sample; results cannot be projected to the whole population. Five drives could not be confirmed either way.
Cost: professional, national. At risk: systems and access; national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Former owners of enterprise hard drives (Valli and Woodward, Edith Cowan University, 2008). 3 Dec 2008.
Researchers bought hard drives from large organisations at auction in Australia and examined them. Where a drive had been formatted, they used forensic tools to recover the data. Many drives had not been erased. Some held information on providers of critical infrastructure. The authors wrote that so high a rate of drives that were not erased, from so small a sample, "is of considerable concern", and that government action may be needed.
What this does not show. Read in the summary. It does not give the counts or name the organisations, and it records no misuse.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
French Blood Establishment, EFS (European Court of Human Rights, Drelon v. France, nos. 3153/16 and 27758/18). 8 Sep 2022.
In 2004 Mr Drelon offered to give blood and refused to answer whether he had had sex with another man. His offer was rejected. The French Blood Establishment entered a contraindication code for men who have sex with men in its database, and set it to be valid until 2278. When he came back in 2006 and in 2016, the entry was still in the file and he was deferred again. The Court found the data rested on speculation and was kept for an excessive time. It held that the collection and the retention breached his right to private life under Article 8.
What this does not show. The Court accepted that blood safety was a legitimate aim, and it dismissed his separate complaint about the 2016 deferral itself. The judgment concerns one donor.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of Health, Singapore (HIV Registry); Mikhy K Farrera Brochez; Ler Teck Siang. 28 Jan 2019.
Singapore's HIV Registry holds the names, identity numbers, contact details and HIV test results of people diagnosed with HIV. Ler Teck Siang headed the MOH unit that could access it from 2012 to 2013. MOH believes his mishandling of the data let his partner, Mikhy Brochez, get registry records. In May 2016 police searched their homes and seized all the relevant material they found. In May 2018 MOH learned that Brochez still had part of those records. In January 2019 he put the information online. It covered 5,400 Singaporeans and 8,800 foreigners with HIV, plus 2,400 contacts. MOH disabled access and apologised for the anxiety and distress, but warned the data could still be disclosed again.
What this does not show. The source does not say how Brochez kept a copy after the 2016 seizure, or name a harm to a specific person, such as a lost job. No deletion order is named: the records had to leave his hands because police seized them and he had no right to hold them.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Holder not confirmed: folders labelled Atyrau regional anti-tuberculosis dispensary; the regional health department named a city social and civil registration department (reported by Azattyq Rýhy, citing Ak Zhaiyk). 5 Mar 2026.
Residents found archived folders with registration forms among building and household waste at an illegal dump in the Birlik district of Atyrau. Some folders were labelled as records of patients of the regional anti-tuberculosis dispensary in outpatient treatment. The covers showed case numbers and storage periods. The report says such documents must be stored and disposed of under set rules, and may hold personal and confidential information. The regional health department said the folders did not belong to the region's medical bodies. It said the details pointed to the city department of employment, social programmes and civil registration.
What this does not show. News report only. The sources disagree on who held the folders, the report does not confirm that the contents were medical, and it shows no authority action and no harm to a patient.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Allium UPI OÜ (operator of the Apotheka pharmacy loyalty programme); AKI decision upheld by Harju maakohus (Harju County Court). 2 Sep 2026.
Allium UPI kept backup copies of the Apotheka loyalty customer database with records from 2014 to 2019. Early in 2024 attackers downloaded these backup files. They held names, personal ID codes, contact details and purchase histories, including medicines and health products, which reveal people's health and intimate life. The inspectorate, AKI, said the leak put the privacy of more than 750,000 people at risk and that misuse can come years later. Harju County Court upheld the AKI decision and found that the backups were kept for an unjustified time and without encryption.
What this does not show. The court ruling is not final, and the company plans to appeal to the Supreme Court. The sources do not state the retention period that applied or show a confirmed case of misuse.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Health Service Executive, Ireland (Data Protection Commission, final decision). 2 Sep 2026.
The health service kept paper medical records in two former psychiatric hospitals, St Loman's in Mullingar and St Conal's in Letterkenny. The regulator found that the records were kept "in an insecure manner beyond the period where they should be retained". People got into both buildings without permission and posted videos on social media that showed the records. In 12 inspections across the country, the regulator found damaged, mouldy and contaminated records. It reprimanded the health service and ordered it to audit every store of paper records, move records out of unfit places, and destroy safely the records it no longer needs.
What this does not show. The regulator's announcement does not say how many records or patients were affected, or what the intruders took.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Splošna bolnišnica Celje (Celje General Hospital); inspection opened by the Information Commissioner. 15 Jan 2025.
Large piles of copies of patients' test results, lists of operations, waiting lists and referral notes from Celje General Hospital were found in the rubbish. A bag was left under the hospital's canopy, and more material was in a container at the pathology and cytology department. The results came from patients of the eye, neurology, emergency and skin departments from autumn 2022 onward. The hospital said it had given paper shredders to all clinics, and that papers that cannot be shredded must go to its central archive for destruction. It opened an internal investigation and told the police. The Information Commissioner opened an inspection and gave it the highest priority.
What this does not show. This is a news report that cites another portal; we found no published decision. The hospital points to negligence and theft, and the source gives no count of patients.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Private hospital, plus its destruction contractor. 1 Aug 2025 (announcement); incident date not given.
The hospital engaged a contractor to destroy patient medical records. The contractor kept them, ignored destruction protocols, and used them to wrap sweets. Over 1,000 records leaked. The hospital failed to monitor destruction.
What this does not show. The penalty covers the whole breach. ZD would not have stopped the breach. ZD's ground is the records that should already have been gone, which may be a small share.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
King Edward Memorial (KEM) Hospital, Mumbai; Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC). 6 Jul 2024.
KEM Hospital gave old CT scan folders to scrap dealers. The folders were not shredded first. They were made into paper plates. A video of the plates spread online, and the plates appeared to show the hospital's name, patients' names and their medical procedures. The hospital dean said the only mistake was that the papers were not shredded before they were given away. The BMC said the scrap vendor's work was not done properly. The hospital gave show-cause notices to six staff, and the BMC set up a one-member committee under its Deputy Commissioner (Public Health) to investigate.
What this does not show. News only (PTI report); no official inquiry report was found. The source does not say how many patients were named or where the plates were sold or used.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Health clinic (name not published). 22 Nov 2024.
A complainant sent photographs of patient records found in an unsecured recycling bin. Staff had hand-torn some records to avoid shredder noise. Cleaners put discarded records in a dumpster for weekly collection. The clinic had no written policy on retention or secure destruction. The IPC found breaches of PHIPA sections 10, 12 and 13. The clinic later sent a second notice to nearly 500 patients.
What this does not show. No fine. The investigator found the clinic compliant after its remedial steps.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 24 Oct 2026.
Dedalus Biologie, software supplier to medical laboratories (CNIL deliberation SAN-2022-009). 15 Apr 2022.
Dedalus Biologie sells software to medical laboratories and moved their data when they changed software. The CNIL found that its extracts covered more data than the laboratories had asked for, including free-text comment fields. Once the data reached its server, it was not deleted automatically. A file with data on 491,840 people was then published online. It held mentions of HIV infection, cancers, genetic diseases, pregnancy and treatments, with social security numbers and the names of prescribing doctors. The CNIL said these people became prime targets for personalised phishing and for scams that refer to their health problems. It fined the company.
What this does not show. The decision does not say how long each extract stayed on the server, or that a named person was scammed. The published text now hides the company name; a news report of the decision names Dedalus.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
St Philip's Hospital, Santa Venera (private hospital, closed 2012). 23 May 2022.
St Philip's Hospital closed in 2012 after money problems. In April 2022 an urban explorer went into the empty building and posted video. He found intact patient files on nursing desks and a records room that still held detailed patient records for medical and surgical admissions, beside discarded human organs in the operating theatres. The building had already suffered fires and vandalism. The former owner said the records room had secure locks and that vandals broke in. Sensitive health records of former patients were left open to anyone who entered.
What this does not show. News only. The article reports no action by the IDPC, police or health authorities, and does not say how many patients' files were there or that anyone took them.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of Health (Kemenkes), old eHAC (Electronic Health Alert Card) app, system run by a third party. 31 Aug 2021.
The Ministry of Health switched off the old eHAC travel health app on 2 July 2021 and moved the service into PeduliLindungi. The old app's server was not taken down. Researchers found its database open on the internet on 16 July 2021. It held about 1.4 million records of 1.3 million users, with names, ID card and passport numbers, PCR test results, hospital details and addresses. The ministry said the suspected leak came from a third-party system. The server went offline only on 24 August 2021, after the national cyber agency BSSN acted. The ministry told the public to delete the old app. Travellers' health and identity data stayed exposed for weeks after the app's purpose ended.
What this does not show. On 9 Sep 2021 the ministry said a police inquiry found no sign that anyone took data from the server. The sources do not name a rule that set a deletion date for the old app's data.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Former contract physician (Belegarzt) of the Oberschwabenklinik, Ravensburg; fined by the Baden-Wuerttemberg data protection commissioner. 8 Dec 2019.
A former contract physician of the Oberschwabenklinik in Ravensburg threw more than 100 patient files into the waste paper without shredding them. A man from Ravensburg found the files by chance in December 2017 and collected as many as he could. The files held highly sensitive data on patients, some of them young people: their medical histories, diagnoses and addictive behaviour. Medical files that a doctor no longer keeps must be destroyed so that no one can read them. Here they lay open in a public waste stream. The state data protection commissioner in Stuttgart fined the retired doctor in November 2019.
What this does not show. This is a news report; we did not find the case in the parts of the commissioner's 2019 report that we read. The source does not show whether anyone other than the finder read or misused the files.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; children. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
FileFax, medical records storage (US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights). 13 Feb 2018.
FileFax stored and delivered medical records for health care providers. The US health regulator found that the medical records of 2,150 patients were left unsecured and were sold at a recycling facility, although health privacy rules require such records to be disposed of so that they cannot be read. The regulator reached a resolution with the company's court-appointed receiver.
What this does not show. The source does not say who bought or read the records at the recycling facility.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
NHS Digital and the GP system supplier TPP (written statement to Parliament, HCWS813). 2 Jul 2018.
Patients in England could register an objection so that their confidential records were not shared beyond their own care. A coding error in one supplier's GP system meant that about 150,000 objections, set from March 2015, were never sent to the national body. It did not uphold them in the data that it released between April 2016 and 26 June 2018. The minister told Parliament that the patients' data was used in clinical audit and research.
What this does not show. The statement says that there was no risk to patient care. It records no harm to a named patient. Parliament's own site refused our reader, so the statement was read in a copy of the official record.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: the statement to Parliament.
Sakhile Clinic, Standerton (Lekwa Municipality); investigated by the Mpumalanga Department of Health (Health-e News report on Health24). 13 Jun 2016 (date in the article address; the page shows no date).
Sakhile Clinic in Standerton, Mpumalanga, put hundreds of patient files on a public dumping site. People who search the dump for goods had easy access to them. The files held sensitive personal information and copies of identity documents. Residents said the files were supposed to be burned, and that some patients do not tell their families about their illness. Section27 said patients have a right to have their records kept safely, and that the records are needed for future treatment. The Mpumalanga Department of Health investigated, collected the files again, returned them to the clinic and said it would act against the people who dumped them.
What this does not show. This is a news report. No regulator or court finding was found. It does not say which illnesses the files showed, how long they lay on the dump, or whether anyone misused them. The statement that the files should have been burned comes from a resident.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Gabinete para a Protecção de Dados Pessoais (GPDP, now DSPDP), own-initiative case 0122/2015/IP on the Centro Hospitalar Conde de São Januário, Health Bureau (Serviços de Saúde). 13 Oct 2015 (incident); decision date not shown.
On 12 October 2015, two staff at Macau's public hospital had to destroy confidential waste: hospital rules said shred it or hand it over for incineration. Instead they put the papers in six black bags as common rubbish. One bag fell from a broken refuse lorry, and before dawn on 13 October laboratory reports lay along Avenida Dr. Rodrigo Rodrigues. They showed patients' names, ID and health card numbers, dates of birth, the tests and the results. The GPDP opened its own case. It found the hospital's written rules met the law and did not blame the Health Bureau, but told it to supervise staff. Shredding is now the only allowed method.
What this does not show. The source does not say how many patients or pages were involved, or whether anyone read or copied the papers before staff picked them up. The GPDP found no breach by the Health Bureau itself.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
NHS Surrey and its disposal contractor (UK Information Commissioner). 18 Jun 2013.
NHS Surrey let a company take away old computers and destroy the hard drives free of charge, because the company could resell the materials. There was no written contract. Some of the company's certificates said only that drives were "wiped/destroyed/recycled". In May 2012 a member of the public bought a computer online whose drive held 1,428 files, including patient records on about 900 adults and 2,000 children. Its serial number was on a destruction certificate. Of seven more drives whose serial numbers matched certificates, three still held sensitive personal data. NHS Surrey could not trace about 1,570 more drives.
What this does not show. The penalty notice was read in a copy on a third-party site. The regulator no longer publishes it.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; children; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Copy of the penalty notice.
Affinity Health Plan Inc. 2013-08 (Aug 2013).
Leased photocopiers were returned without erasing hard drives. ePHI of up to 344,579 people was disclosed. No policy for returning drives.
What this does not show. The penalty may cover more than the deletion failure. Check the decision before quoting the figure as a deletion fine.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 22 Oct 2026.
Goldthwait Associates and four pathology groups (Massachusetts Attorney General settlement, as reported). Jul 2010 (settled Jan 2013).
Goldthwait Associates sent medical bills for four pathology groups in Massachusetts. When it closed in May 2010, its owners disposed of records holding names, Social Security numbers and medical diagnoses of 67,000 people. In July 2010 a newspaper photographer found a large pile of these records at the Georgetown transfer station. In January 2013 the former owners and the four pathology groups settled with the state Attorney General.
What this does not show. Read in a news report, not in the Attorney General's own text. The former owner said the records were in a building waiting to be pulverised, not in a public area.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Bac Ninh provincial police and court; National Immunisation Information System (Ministry of Health); report by Bac Ninh provincial radio and television. 8 Aug 2026 (report); trials June and July 2026.
Vietnam's National Immunisation Information System holds about 50 million records. Bac Ninh police found that many accounts of vaccination sites that had closed, and accounts issued for training sessions, were never locked or revoked. One woman kept using an account issued to her after she left her job. She and a former vaccination consultant exported Excel files on about 290,000 mothers and newborns in 18 provinces and sold them to businesses. New mothers then had repeated calls and messages that used their names and their babies' birth dates. In June and July 2026 the provincial court gave both suspended prison sentences. The police asked the Ministry of Health to review account control.
What this does not show. This is a provincial state media report, not the court judgment. It does not say whether the consultant's account was a stale one, or how many records came only through accounts that should have been closed.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Agència Andorrana de Protecció de Dades (APDA); two psychology centres (not named). 25 Jul 2025.
A member of the public complained in May 2024 that sensitive patient information had moved from one psychology centre to another. APDA opened a file on each centre. It found that clinical documentation had been passed on and kept without a sufficient legal basis, against the rules on purpose limitation, integrity and confidentiality, and that patients were not told their files were held. The centre that passed the files on had stopped trading. APDA reprimanded both centres. It ordered the centre that kept the files to send, within fifteen working days, protocols for moving clinical files when a professional leaves, and proof of its other corrections.
What this does not show. The notice does not say how many patients were involved, how long the files were held, or that anyone outside the centres saw them.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Change Healthcare and UnitedHealth Group (US District Court for Minnesota, MDL No. 24-3108). Feb 2024 (ruling 19 Dec 2025).
In February 2024 the ALPHV group broke into Change Healthcare and took private information on over 190 million patients. In a December 2025 ruling on the patients' claims, the court rejected the argument that the ransom payment removed the risk. It said the payment "does not guarantee that ALPHV surrendered and no longer possesses the data". It also noted the claim that another group, RansomHub, holds four terabytes of it.
What this does not show. A ruling on a motion to dismiss: the court took the patients' allegations as true for that stage and found no facts.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Specijalna bolnica Medico, Rijeka; Croatian Personal Data Protection Agency (AZOP), KLASA UP/I-034-01/24-01/23. 21 Aug 2024.
AZOP investigated Specijalna bolnica Medico, a private hospital in Rijeka, after patients complained about lost radiology images. It found that the hospital recorded calls to its call centre with no legal basis and no retention period. The server held 617,333 recorded calls, and recordings from April 2016 could still be reached. AZOP said the voice recordings contain health data. It said the hospital had to set the shortest period needed for the purpose, and rejected its plan to keep the recordings for 10 years under the law on doctors. AZOP fined the hospital for seven breaches.
What this does not show. AZOP did not order the recordings to be deleted and did not find that any recording was misused. It said not every call contains health data.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
1Health.io, formerly Vitagene (US Federal Trade Commission). 2023-09-07.
The company told customers that it would destroy their DNA samples shortly after analysis, and that they could have their data deleted. The US Federal Trade Commission said that it did not keep those promises, and that it stored unencrypted health and genetic data in publicly accessible storage. The final order makes the company tell its contract laboratories to destroy all customer DNA samples kept for more than 180 days.
What this does not show. The announcement does not say how many samples were kept or for how long. The case was settled.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministre d'Etat (State services running the Covid-19 crisis databases); public warning by the President of the CCIN. 20 Dec 2023.
During the pandemic, State services in Monaco built databases on contact cases, the medical follow-up of patients and the Cordages test study, which held the full medical history of its participants. From 2020 to 2022 the CCIN warned the Government many times that the amount of health data kept growing and that access had to be limited. Its on-site checks found that the data was kept for excessive periods and was not updated, that people were not fully told, and that security did not match the sensitivity of the data. Because of the health data, the number of people and how long the faults lasted, the CCIN President issued a public warning.
What this does not show. The report does not say how many people were in the databases, how long past its time the data was kept, or that anyone misused it.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, injunction against Azienda USL Toscana centro, n. 424, doc. web 9946386. 28 Sep 2023.
The former Sanatorio Guido Banti in Pratolino closed in 1989. Health records from care given twenty to thirty years earlier stayed inside: prescriptions, clinical records and X-rays, some with patients' names or codes. Intruders forced their way in, and videos on YouTube showed the papers. The health authority said no retention rule applied and the records were clinically obsolete. The Garante rejected this. It said archive rules and the authority's own retention manual set storage and disposal duties that were not met. It said harm to patients from theft or damage could not be ruled out. The authority cleared and scrapped the material in two phases.
What this does not show. The decision does not show that any patient's data was actually taken or misused. It does not say how many patients the records covered.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
New England Dermatology (US Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights). 2022-08-23.
A dermatology practice put empty specimen containers with patient labels, which carried protected health information, in a garbage bin in its parking lot. Health privacy rules require such information to be disposed of so that it cannot be read. The US health regulator settled the case with the practice.
What this does not show. The press release does not say whether anyone saw or took the labels.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Health Service Executive (HSE); Data Protection Commission inquiries IN-19-9-1 and IN-19-9-2. 18 Aug 2020 and 29 Sep 2020.
A member of the public found a list from Cork University Maternity Hospital in a public recycling area in Cork County. It held data on 78 people, six of them with special category data. In a second case, a member of the public found documents from Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in a front garden. They held data on 15 people, including clinical information and treatments. The Data Protection Commission found that the HSE did not have security appropriate to the risk of its use and disposal of paper records, and that it broke the GDPR security rules. It ordered the HSE to bring its processing into compliance and gave it a reprimand.
What this does not show. The page does not say that a retention period had ended or how the papers left the hospitals. It does not report harm to a named patient.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: health and the body; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Centro Hospitalar Barreiro Montijo (decision of the data protection authority, CNPD). 2018 (report of 3 Jan 2019).
Portugal's data protection authority inspected the hospital. It found 985 users with the profile of a doctor, while the hospital's own staff charts listed 296 doctors. Among its findings was the upkeep of profiles for doctors who no longer worked for the hospital. The authority found three breaches of the data protection regulation.
What this does not show. A news report of the authority's decision. The hospital disputed the authority's standing. The report records no misuse of a former doctor's account.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
European Court of Human Rights, Surikov v. Ukraine (no. 42788/06); record held by the military enlistment office, used by employer Tavrida State Publishing House. 26 Jan 2017.
In 1981 a military enlistment office recorded that Mr Surikov was unfit for peacetime service, under a schedule entry for psychotic disorders. The record stayed on file. In 1997 his state employer got a certificate of it from the enlistment office, and in 1997 and 2000 it used the record to refuse him promotion to an engineering post. The data was about 16 to 19 years old and did not say what his condition was. He said the disclosure to colleagues caused him suffering and harmed his work relations. The Court found that Ukrainian law let health data be stored for a very long term and used for unrelated purposes, and held this a violation of Article 8.
What this does not show. The Court did not order the record deleted and did not set a retention period. It found the long storage and reuse disproportionate, not a breach of a fixed deletion date. I read the judgment on a mirror of the HUDOC text.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Minnesota Department of Health newborn screening programme; Mayo Clinic (contract tester). 17 Nov 2014.
MDH stored newborn blood spots without parental consent. It destroyed about one million spots in January 2014 and erased results made before 16 November 2011. Staff had to hunt down backups and extra database copies. Mayo Clinic purged its archive and assured MDH it had done so.
What this does not show. A news report for the destruction details. MDH says the archive destruction followed a Minnesota Supreme Court ruling, while MPR ties it to the settlement with 21 families. Biological samples of identifiable infants are also personal data.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; children; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Pound Road Medical Centre, Narre Warren South, Victoria; Australian Privacy Commissioner, own motion investigation report. 1 Jul 2014.
The practice stopped operating at its old site in 2011. In about October 2012 it moved paper records into a padlocked garden shed there so the building could be renovated for sale. On 23 November 2013 the shed was broken into. The boxes held records for about 960 patients: names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, treatment notes, test results and hospital letters. Most related to people who stopped being patients before 2004, so the records were at least 11 years old. The Commissioner found the practice failed to destroy or de-identify information it no longer needed, and failed to keep it secure. The OAIC learned of the case from media reports.
What this does not show. The report does not say who broke in, whether records were taken or misused, or that any patient was harmed.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Persónuvernd (Icelandic Data Protection Authority), case 2011/895. 2012 annual report (case opened by letter of 22 Sep 2011).
In 1998 Iceland's data commission let researchers study pregnant women's diet and pregnancy outcomes. The permit rested on an application that said the data would be deleted six months after each child's birth. It was not deleted. Later the researchers asked to link this personal data with the national drug database of the Directorate of Health. Persónuvernd refused. It said there was no proof of authority to keep the data, so it could not give a permit for the new processing.
What this does not show. The report does not say how many women were in the study or that the data leaked. The decision date is not given.
Cost: personal, professional, national. At risk: health and the body; science and ai; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
23andMe. 12 Jun 2025.
A consumer alert on deleting genetic data before the bankruptcy sale.
What this does not show. An official alert. It records no misuse of the data.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 22 Oct 2026.
South Shore Hospital, Weymouth, Massachusetts (Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation; Attorney General consent judgment). Jun 2010 (settled May 2012).
In February 2010 the hospital sent three boxes of unencrypted backup tapes to a contractor to be erased. In June 2010 it learned that two of the three boxes had not arrived. The tapes held names, Social Security numbers, financial account numbers and medical diagnoses of about 800,000 people. The boxes were never found. The state Attorney General investigated, and in May 2012 the hospital agreed a consent judgment that required a review of its privacy procedures.
What this does not show. The report records no evidence that anyone used the data on the missing tapes.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Used medical infusion pumps sold on the secondary market. 2 Aug 2023.
A Rapid7 researcher took apart 13 used medical infusion pumps offered on the secondary market. At least eight of the 13 still held Wi-Fi access credentials. These could let attackers into healthcare networks. He blamed weak or missing processes for purging devices before sale. He said purging is usually not hard; the gap is process and responsibility.
What this does not show. This is vendor research, not a regulator finding, and it does not name previous owners.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 24 Oct 2026.
Medical research literature (Schneider, Ye, Hill and Whitehorn, Scientometrics, 2020). 2020.
In 2005 a medical journal published a trial of omega-3 fatty acids in patients with chronic lung disease. The report was retracted in 2008, after a university found that an author had falsified the data. The authors of this study traced the 148 papers that cited the report from 2006 to 2019. Of 112 citations made after the retraction, 107 (96%) did not mention it. The report "has received continued citation for 11 years after its formal retraction".
What this does not show. A study of one retracted report. It shows that the false result kept spreading in the literature. It records no injury to a patient.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: science and ai; health and the body. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
World Food Programme country office, Republic of the Congo (WFP Office of Internal Audit, Internal Audit of WFP Operations in the Republic of Congo). Jun 2026.
WFP's internal audit of its operations in the Republic of the Congo found material weaknesses in the refugee beneficiary data. The records had no systematic updates since the first registrations in 2017 and did not show large changes in households. In 2025 the office took corrective action, but duplicate records persisted: at least 430 assisted people were potential duplicates. There were no standard procedures for data cleaning and de-duplication, and no privacy impact assessment. The auditors said these gaps raised the risk of inclusion errors and data protection breaches, and that targeting risks such as exclusion errors were not assessed. The office agreed to verify refugee data at regular intervals with its UN partner.
What this does not show. The audit does not say that any refugee was harmed, or how many records belonged to people who had left or died. It treats the problem as data quality and control, not as a legal duty to delete.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Sudatel Data Centre, Khartoum (holds Interior Ministry, Civil Registry and several bank data). 2023-12-06.
RSF said it seized the Sudatel data centre used by about 75 percent of public and private institutions. An IT expert said stored data is not easy to erase unless physically destroyed.
What this does not show. A news report of a claim by one side in a war. What was done with the data is not recorded.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: life and safety; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Biometric identity and payroll systems of the former Afghan government, built or paid for by foreign donors (Human Rights Watch). 30 Mar 2022.
Human Rights Watch examined six systems that foreign donors built or paid for and that stayed in Afghanistan in August 2021. Among them are the national identity card system and the army and police payroll. They hold iris scans, fingerprints, photographs, jobs, home addresses and the names of relatives. A former military commander said that the Taliban held him for 12 days, took his fingerprints and scanned his irises, and told him that it was to check if he was military.
What this does not show. Human Rights Watch could not confirm which of the systems the Taliban can open. It says only that they "may have" used the data. In the commander's account there was no match. The Taliban did not answer its questions.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety; liberty and justice. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
US military SEEK II and HIIDE 5 biometric devices resold online. 27 Dec 2022.
Chaos Computer Club researchers bought four SEEK II and two HIIDE 5 military biometric devices at an online auction. One held the names, fingerprints, iris scans and photographs of 2,632 people, described as Afghans and Iraqis. It was last used between Kabul and Kandahar in mid-2012. The devices also held the names and biometric data of two US military personnel, and the GPS coordinates of past deployment locations. The storage was not encrypted. The club told the maker, the US Department of Defense and the German armed forces. Months later it could still order another device online. In 2023 the department's Inspector General found that it "did not consistently provide certification of destruction or sanitization of biometric data" when devices were handed in for disposal.
What this does not show. The club's page does not say who sold the devices or why they were not wiped. It does not say how many deployment locations the devices held. The Inspector General's finding is about records of wiping in general, not about these six devices.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: life and safety; national security. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Inspector General, 2023.
US military HIIDE biometric devices left in Afghanistan. August 2021 (reported 17 Aug 2021).
During the August 2021 withdrawal the Taliban seized US HIIDE handheld devices. These held iris scans, fingerprints and biographical data of Afghans and were used to reach central databases. The Army ABIS held over one million entries. No official comment was given.
What this does not show. A news report. No official comment was given, and no use of the devices is recorded here.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
British Embassy, Kabul (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office). 27 Aug 2021.
After the embassy was evacuated, a newspaper reporter touring with a Taliban escort found papers that identified Afghan staff and job applicants: a senior staff member's name and address, other employees' contact details, and the CVs and addresses of people who had applied to be interpreters. The Foreign Office said every effort had been made to destroy sensitive material. The Defence Secretary said it was "clearly not good enough". Three employees and eight family members were later taken to safety.
What this does not show. A news agency report of a newspaper's finding. The fate of at least two applicants was not known when it was written.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: life and safety; allies and partners; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) of Uganda and UNHCR, national refugee register; joint statement on the 2018 biometric verification. 29 Oct 2018.
Uganda's register showed about 1.4 million refugees and asylum seekers. Partners, the World Food Programme and donors had questioned the numbers. A biometric head count from March to October 2018 verified close to 1.1 million people. OPM and UNHCR closed 255,490 records as inactive. Families reported 3,931 of these people as dead and 34,174 as gone home; 9,481 were duplicate registrations. These records had stayed on the register that aid planning used. The joint statement says the results allow assistance targeted on reliable data, and that the response was badly underfunded. Food collection was then tied to each person's fingerprints.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how long the records stayed open, or whether aid was drawn on them. Part of the inflation came from fraud and people who may never have existed, not only from records that should have been closed.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Commissioner for the Right to Information and Protection of Personal Data (IDP), Recommendation No. 33 of 24 Jun 2026 to SOS Children's Villages Albania (Fshati i Femijeve SOS). 24 Jun 2026.
SOS Children's Villages Albania protects children who have lost, or may lose, parental care. Its own 2017 data rules say files on children and young people are kept for 10 years and then destroyed. In an inspection ordered on 18 May 2026, the Commissioner found that the charity still kept these files in its paper and electronic archives past the 10-year limit. It could show no act or record of any destruction. The files hold names, ID numbers, family status, financial data and health status. The Commissioner ordered destruction when the purpose ends, special rules for health data and a data protection officer. It said these steps prevent unlawful spread of the data.
What this does not show. The recommendation does not say how many files were kept past the limit or how old they were, and it does not show that any data reached others. The risk it names is unlawful spread, not a harm that happened.
Cost: personal. At risk: children; health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Persónuvernd (Icelandic Data Protection Authority), case 2011/1346, on Ríkislögreglustjóri (National Commissioner of Police) and Útlendingastofnun (Directorate of Immigration). Early 2012 (deadline 17 Feb 2012), in the 2012 annual report.
Eurodac is the EU database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and people caught crossing an external Schengen border irregularly. EU rules require the data to be deleted in set cases, for example when an asylum seeker becomes a citizen of a Eurodac state. Persónuvernd's check found that Icelandic data had not been deleted despite these rules. One reason was that the Directorate of Immigration did not pass information to the National Commissioner of Police. Persónuvernd ordered both bodies to set a procedure by 17 February 2012 and to delete the data held without authority.
What this does not show. The report does not say how many records were kept, for how long, or that anyone was stopped or refused because of them.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral and later holders of the loan book (Supreme Court of Justice of Portugal, case 1855/19.0T8LSB.L1.S1). 17 Jan 2023.
A court judgment of 7 February 2003 declared the bank's claim against a wine company extinguished. The bank still reported the company as in default to the Bank of Portugal's credit register, where the listing stayed until at least 27 February 2015. After the loans were sold on, the same "debt" was reported again from 30 September 2017. Lenders refused the company a loan to buy its premises because of it. The Supreme Court confirmed the damages award.
What this does not show. Court finding. The court found harm from the refused loan and the rent the company kept paying; it does not show the company lost the premises for good.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Experian Information Solutions (US District Court for Idaho, Bailey v. Experian). 28 Sep 2023.
A woman's debts were discharged in bankruptcy in 2020. The credit agency still reported two of them with balances. Both accounts were up to date when she filed, so the agency's check after a bankruptcy did not treat them as discharged. The two entries raised her reported debt about tenfold. In February 2021 one lender refused her a credit line after it received the report, and another gave her a car loan on worse terms than a lender that used a correct report. The court recorded as "undisputed" that the agency did not report the two debts as discharged.
What this does not show. Not a final judgment. The court sent the questions of negligence, cause and damages to trial. It ruled for the agency on one claim about the first account.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
A bank that reports to the Bank of Portugal's credit register (Tribunal da Relação do Porto, case 2708/20.5T8GDM.P1). 24 Mar 2022.
A debt enforcement ended by payment on 8 September 2017. The bank still reported the company and its guarantor as in default to the Bank of Portugal's credit register at the end of September and of October 2017. On 10 October the guarantor's own company asked another bank for a credit line. It was refused because of the entry. The company lost stock and customers. The bank cancelled the reports on 2 February 2018. The Porto Court of Appeal confirmed that the bank was liable: it had reported false information without a check of the debt.
What this does not show. The court found negligence, not intent. The entry stayed for about four months.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
The Consulting Association and more than 40 construction firms (House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee; Information Commissioner's Office). Feb 2009 (search); committee report 16 Apr 2013.
The Economic League kept files on workers for employers. When it closed in 1993 its own records were destroyed, but one database was not. Ian Kerr took it away, and it became the core of a new body, The Consulting Association. More than 40 construction firms checked job applicants against its 3,200 names. The Information Commissioner's Office searched the office in February 2009 and shut the body down. The ICO says: "People on the database were prevented from work."
What this does not show. No law or order set a date for this database to be destroyed. The committee records that the League's own files were destroyed when it closed, and that this one was carried over. No ruling here ties one person's lost job to one entry.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Information Commissioner's Office page.
Equifax Information Services LLC. 27 Dec 2007.
After identity theft, Equifax deleted two Washington Mutual accounts from Ms Sloane's file, but they were 'mistakenly restored' afterwards. The jury found Equifax negligently reinserted information it had previously deleted, and also failed to remove other accounts it had agreed to delete.
What this does not show. After remittitur.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Trans Union Corporation (credit bureau). 21 Mar 2001.
Trans Union deleted a fraudulent BellSouth account and 'cloaked' it, and deleted a fraudulent GMAC account, but both came back: BellSouth in a Nov 1996 report and GMAC after the furnisher re-reported it under a different prefix code. Trans Union also re-applied the cloak and removed it the next day, and reports with the GMAC account then went out.
What this does not show. A court case about one person's credit file.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK, financial services authority), SLIK credit information system. 6 Jul 2026.
SLIK is the national credit information system that lenders check before they give a loan. When a borrower paid off a loan, lenders usually took about one to one and a half months to update the record, so the register still showed the facility as open. OJK received public complaints about paid-off facilities that were not updated. It linked faster updates to access to home loans, including subsidised home loans for low-income families, and to credit for small businesses. From 1 July 2026 OJK requires lenders to report a paid-off loan to SLIK within three working days. OJK says SLIK is not the only factor in a credit decision.
What this does not show. The sources do not give the number of complaints or name a person who was refused a loan. They concern a late update of a paid debt, not a record kept for years.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC. 2022-09-20.
Decommissioned drives and servers held unencrypted data on about 15 million customers. A mover with no data-destruction experience resold them, some at auction. 42 servers went missing.
What this does not show. The penalty may cover more than the deletion failure. Check the decision before quoting the figure as a deletion fine.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Rosfinmonitoring (Federal Financial Monitoring Service), list of terrorists and extremists; case of journalist Svetlana Prokopyeva. 19 May 2022.
Pskov journalist Svetlana Prokopyeva was convicted and put on Rosfinmonitoring's list of 'terrorists and extremists'. A name stays on this list until the criminal record ends. Her record ended on 25 February 2022, so she could have been removed from that date. She was removed only on 19 May 2022, and she told Novaya Gazeta Europe that the delay was due to bureaucracy. A second report, by The Insider, shows what the listing does to people: they generally cannot open bank accounts or get cards, and employers often refuse to hire people who cannot receive a salary card.
What this does not show. Both sources are news reports. Novaya Gazeta Europe does not describe effects on her own accounts or work, and says her record 'ended', not that it was formally 'expunged'. The effects come from The Insider's general report on the list.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Supreme Court of Nepal (joint bench, Justices Hari Prasad Phuyal and Sunil Kumar Pokharel), Sunil Kumar Karna v Rastriya Banijya Bank and Credit Information Centre Ltd, case 073-CI-0728, NKP decision 11362. 2081/04/29 BS (about 13 Aug 2024).
A company borrowed from Rastriya Banijya Bank. The petitioner had sold his shares and left the board before the loan. In 2062 BS (2005) the Debt Recovery Tribunal ordered recovery from the company and a guarantor, and said nothing more was needed against him because he was only a director. The Credit Information Centre kept his name on the blacklist, and the bank refused his request for removal in 2071 BS (2014). The Supreme Court found that keeping him blacklisted for years took away his legal rights. It called wrongful blacklisting a person's 'civil death' and ordered the respondents to remove his name.
What this does not show. The decision does not say which loans, contracts or jobs he lost. The record gives two different listing dates (2054 BS and 2060 BS), and the court also found he should not have been listed at all, so part of the fault is a wrong listing, not only a late removal.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Wuxi court financial tribunal; unnamed bank; borrower Mr Yang and other villagers. 4 Aug 2026 (news report; judgment date not given).
About eight years ago, Mr Yang and other villagers borrowed jointly from a bank for a business that failed. In 2017 they agreed with the bank to repay the remaining principal and interest, and the bank promised to write off the rest. They paid. In 2025 their credit reports still showed the loan as bad debt. The report says the record limited their access to loans and business deals and substantially affected their normal work. The Wuxi court found the debt was settled and ordered the bank to report the loan as settled to the credit agency. The bank complied.
What this does not show. This is a news report; the judgment, its date and the name of the bank were not seen. It shows limits on finance and business, not a named refused loan or a lost job.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Admiral Insurance (Gibraltar) (Financial Ombudsman Service decision DRN-5330715). Apr 2025.
The insurer wrongly put a customer's car on the national register as a total loss. In April 2024 it apologised and said it would remove the marker. Vehicle checks still showed the car as a write-off months later. The ombudsman found the marker was more likely than not left in place, and that this caused the owner distress and a lost chance to sell the car.
What this does not show. The ombudsman refused the claimed sale loss as not proven. The insurer says it removed the marker and that third-party checks were slow.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Melodi v Experian (Pty) Ltd and Another, National Consumer Tribunal, [2025] ZANCT 9; data held by Experian South Africa. 30 Jan 2025.
A consumer took an education loan from Fundi in 2013 and settled it in 2015. Experian, a credit bureau, still showed the loan on the consumer's 2024 credit report, past the five-year retention period in the credit regulations. Five other disputed accounts also stayed on the report. The consumer said the wrong data harmed their credit profile. The National Consumer Tribunal said inaccurate credit information can have severe consequences for a consumer's access to credit, and found Experian had no basis to keep the information. It ordered Experian to remove all six accounts within ten business days, and told the National Credit Regulator to make sure Experian complied.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show a refused loan, a lost job or another concrete harm. The risk to access to credit is the Tribunal's general statement, and it refused the request to raise the credit score.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Lagos Division (Justice Sanda Yelwa), Theodora v Polaris Bank. 12 Feb 2025.
Theodora worked for the bank from 2007 until it ended her job in 2010. She said a staff loan had been repaid through deductions from her salary, and the bank had claimed no balance in her earlier case. Around 2020 a lender refused her a business loan. She then learned that Polaris Bank had listed her as a bad debtor with credit bureaux. The court found that the bank gave no credible evidence of the debt and called its statement of account an afterthought. It ordered the bank to withdraw at once any bad credit report about her from any credit bureau and to remove her name from the bad debtor register. It dismissed the bank's counterclaim.
What this does not show. The court news item does not say how long the listing stayed. The court found the bank did not prove the debt; it did not expressly find that the loan was repaid. We did not open the full judgment.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Banks, finance companies and other firms that report to credit data agencies; Autoridad de Protección al Consumidor y Defensa de la Competencia (Acodeco). 7 May 2025.
Panama's Law 24 of 2002 says a credit reference expires five years after the last payment and must then be removed. Acodeco reported that one of the most frequent complaints is that references stay active after the five years have passed and the debt is paid. It fined firms for failing to remove expired references. It also found an illegal practice: some finance companies put a very small deposit into the consumer's account to keep the account active, so that the reference would not expire. Acodeco says that wrong credit references can make it hard for a person to get credit or financial services.
What this does not show. The source is an official news release with counts, not a single decision, and it names no person and no firm. Its statement on harm is made about a related failure, references kept with no link to the person.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Creation Consumer Finance (Financial Ombudsman Service decision DRN-4510493). May 2024.
In May 2022 the lender said it would remove adverse entries for October 2021 to May 2022 from a customer's credit file. In May 2023, when her fixed rate was ending and she tried to remortgage, the entries were still there. The lender could not say whether it or the credit agencies had failed to act. The ombudsman upheld her complaint and awarded compensation for the distress.
What this does not show. The ombudsman did not accept that the entries caused the refused mortgage offer or the higher rate.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
HSBC UK Bank (Financial Ombudsman Service decision DRN-4254494). Dec 2023.
To settle a complaint, the bank agreed in 2022 to remove a default from a customer's credit file. In February 2023 the default came back. The account sat in the bank's recoveries area, where the default was reported each month by an automatic process. The bank fixed it again and paid compensation for the delay and the distress.
What this does not show. No refused loan or other money loss is shown. The bank removed the default as a goodwill gesture; the default itself was not found wrong.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Office of the Data Protection Ombudsman and its sanctions board, decision Dnro 310/161/23 on Suomen Asiakastieto Oy. 17 Feb 2023.
On 9 Nov 2021 the Data Protection Ombudsman ordered Suomen Asiakastieto, a credit information company, to remove payment default entries it had wrongly made from court judgments in disputed debt cases. The company did not do so. It said the entries were impossible to find, although the judgments stayed retrievable for 10 years. Its register held 14,285 judgment-based entries on 9 Nov 2021 and 8,782 on 16 Jan 2023. It removed them all only after the Ombudsman warned of a sanction. The sanctions board found the failure deliberate and imposed an administrative sanction. It said such entries can cost a person a credit card, new credit, a rented home, home insurance or a job.
What this does not show. The decision does not say how many of the judgment-based entries were wrong; the company named only six disputed entries removed in 2019 to 2022. No named person is shown to have lost a loan, home or job.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
TransUnion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc. and Trans Union LLC. 12 Oct 2023.
Courts had sealed or restricted eviction records, but TransUnion's tenant screening reports still showed them. Reports also showed filings without saying they had been dismissed months or years before.
What this does not show. Settled with regulators. The claims were not tested in court.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Hyundai Capital America. 25 Jul 2022.
Hyundai staff manually corrected credit file errors after consumer disputes. Its monthly Metro 2 furnishing system then overrode the corrections, put the errors back and re-sent them to the credit bureaus, so errors reappeared on reports, sometimes for years.
What this does not show. USD 6m penalty plus USD 13.2m redress.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
A bank, not named (case study of the Data Protection Commission, Ireland). 2021.
A person withdrew a loan application and asked the bank to return every document that held their personal data. The bank said that a consumer protection code made it keep the records. The Commission examined the code and found that its rules on records did not cover a withdrawn application. It considered that the bank "had not identified a lawful basis" to keep the data.
What this does not show. A case study. The bank is not named, and the page records no order or penalty.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Chase Bank USA, N.A. and Chase BankCard Services, Inc. (US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, file 2015-CFPB-0013). 8 Jul 2015.
The regulator found that, from 2009 to 2013, the bank sold credit card accounts to debt buyers that were paid in full, settled, discharged in bankruptcy, not owed by the customer or opened by fraud. Debt buyers then tried to collect. The order records that customers paid debts they did not owe and paid legal costs to defend themselves, and that wrong information could affect their credit, jobs, housing and insurance.
What this does not show. A consent order. The bank neither admitted nor denied the findings. The order names no customer.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Tan Ah Hong v CTOS Data Systems Sdn Bhd, Court of Appeal of Malaysia, reported as [2016] MLJU 504. 21 Aug 2014 (decision); grounds of judgment 3 Feb 2016.
CTOS, a Malaysian credit reporting agency, kept listing Tan Ah Hong as facing pending legal suits and bankruptcy proceedings, with records going back to the 1990s. He had cleared all his debts and had been discharged from bankruptcy. Banks rejected his loans for a car and for property. He gave CTOS proof and it then updated the records, but he sued in defamation over the stale entries. The High Court dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeal held that CTOS could not rely on its disclaimer while letting information go stale, found the entries defamatory and awarded nominal damages, because he could not prove actual loss.
What this does not show. The judgment itself was not opened; the facts come from a lawyer's note and a news report. The sources do not show that the stale entries alone caused each loan refusal.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
HireRight Solutions, Inc.. 8 Aug 2012.
HireRight often failed to update its background reports for changes such as the expungement of criminal records. Employers received reports that wrongly showed convictions.
What this does not show. Settled with the regulator. The claims were not tested in court.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Digitación de Datos, S.A. (Digidata), site informacionpublica.net; Corte de Constitucionalidad, expediente 863-2011. 21 Jun 2011.
Digidata kept a database on Guatemalans and sold paying members general, commercial, judicial, business and press references through informacionpublica.net. It listed R.B.G.B. as a defendant in a criminal fraud case. He said lenders refused him finance and some firms turned him down without saying why. The Constitutional Court found that the company's judicial references did not show the outcome of trials, withdrawals or dismissals, and that in many cases, as in his, the data was not even up to date. It granted amparo and ordered the company to exclude all his references from its database within 48 hours. In 2006 the same court gave a like order against Infornet.
What this does not show. The ruling does not say how the fraud case ended, so it does not prove he was cleared. The court rested its order mainly on the sale of his data without consent, not only on its age.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Car manufacturer (not named). 7 Sep 2011.
Another customer's lease accounts were wrongly merged into the complainant's file; they were 'unmerged' and removed from the credit bureau in June 2008. The merged data kept resurfacing, with a lease-end statement in February 2010 and a collection notice, and 'persisted on the car company's customer database until this Office became involved'.
What this does not show. A regulator's case summary. The company is not named.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes (Saudi Central Bank), decisions 1425/83 and 1426/172, from its General Secretariat's compilation of principles 1408 to 1426 AH. 1425 to 1426 AH (about 2004 to 2005).
In decision 1425/83 the bank admitted that the customer's debt had ended. The committee ordered the bank to remove his name from the defaulters list and from the list of people barred from dealing with banks. In decision 1426/172 the committee held that a bank that keeps a customer's name on the defaulters list after the debt is paid commits a fault that makes it civilly liable. While listed, a person is shut out of banking. In 2014 the Saudi Central Bank told banks to update credit records at least weekly, after complaints that slow updates had disrupted customers' affairs.
What this does not show. The source is a short summary of principles. It does not give the customers' names, how long they stayed listed or what each lost. The copy opened is held on a university staff site, not the committee's own site.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Debt collectors holding old second mortgages (US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau advisory opinion). 26 Apr 2023.
Before 2008 many home buyers took a second "piggyback" mortgage. Lenders often stopped pursuing these loans and sold them on. Years later, collectors demanded the balance with interest and fees and threatened foreclosure, on debts that owners believed were settled. The regulator calls them zombie mortgages. It ruled that collectors may not sue, or threaten to sue, on debts that are past the legal time limit.
What this does not show. Read in a law-firm note that links to the regulator's opinion. The opinion is about old debts, not about a duty to delete records.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Law-firm note, read 18 Nov 2026.
Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec; Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec and Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (PIPEDA Findings 2020-005). 14 Dec 2020.
Between 2017 and 2019 a Desjardins marketing employee took personal data on close to 9.7 million people, including names, dates of birth, social insurance numbers, addresses and transaction histories. The federal commissioner found that Desjardins had no procedure to destroy personal data at the end of its life and had not finished a retention schedule. Seven months after the incident it still could not say how long the inactive accounts should have been kept. Quebec's commission found that Desjardins did not limit or stop the use of data in nearly 4 million inactive files once their purpose was met. Both regulators said that data kept too long raises the risk of a breach. Desjardins agreed to destroy outdated data.
What this does not show. The sources mainly describe identity and privacy risk to the victims and loss of public trust. They do not say how many of the people in inactive files suffered harm.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
US Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Information Technology. 30 May 2014.
The SEC sanitises (makes data unrecoverable on) surplus media by destroying it. The OIG visited headquarters and the Philadelphia, New York and Chicago offices. Surplus hard drives were not always kept in secure containers. Unencrypted laptop drives awaiting sanitisation held large amounts of nonpublic information. Hard drives were not always inventoried or tracked during sanitisation. Failed disks from data centre storage arrays went back to a vendor without sanitisation. Staff did not always witness third-party destruction or obtain accurate or complete certificates of destruction. On 7 April 2014 the IT office rescinded its Media Destruction Procedure. The OIG made eight recommendations, including verification activities; management concurred with all.
What this does not show. Only the memo and executive summary are public; the full report is withheld as sensitive. No counts of drives, disks or faulty certificates are published. The report does not show that any data was recovered by an outside party.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
ApplyNow, supplier to Yoshinoya Holdings (statements of the client and the supplier). 4 Nov 2026.
Yoshinoya used ApplyNow's software to hire part-time staff from 2022 to June 2024. In September 2026 attackers took ApplyNow's databases. Yoshinoya says that applicants' data that should have been deleted after the contract ended was still there. ApplyNow's final report says it had set no retention period and had not deleted the data of clients who had stopped using the service. It counts 396,920 people affected in all, and warned of phishing.
What this does not show. No misuse was confirmed. The reports do not say how many records belonged to former clients.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Yoshinoya notice, 30 Sep 2026.
Car dealer Jan Nygaard (Danish Data Protection Agency decision). 9 Nov 2026.
When the car dealer moved its files to new storage in 2018, an old server drive kept the personal data of customers and staff: names, addresses and phone numbers, in some cases national identity numbers, and in a few cases photos of driving licences and tax statements. The authority said that the data "should have been deleted in 2018" (our translation). In a ransomware attack, criminals stole the data and threatened to publish it on the dark web. More than 48,000 people were affected, about 25,000 to 30,000 of them customers whose data should already have been gone. The authority issued serious criticism.
What this does not show. The authority could not fully establish how the attack happened. It issued criticism, not a fine.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Mobius Solutions Ltd (former processor for Deezer). 11 Dec 2025 (EDPB item 19 Dec 2025).
Mobius, a processor (a supplier that handled data for Deezer), ran personalised advertising campaigns for Deezer. After the contract ended it kept a copy of the data of more than 46 million Deezer users, despite its obligation to delete it. In November 2022 Deezer told the CNIL that its users' data had been posted on the dark web and that its former processor was involved. In November 2025 Germany's Federal Court of Justice ruled on a user's claim over the leak. The supplier had said by email that it would delete the data the day after the contract ended in December 2019. It moved the data to a test system in place of deleting it, and first confirmed deletion in February 2023. The court held that a company must make sure its supplier really returns or deletes the data when a contract ends.
What this does not show. The German judgment gives the companies' initials only; its facts match this leak. It was read in a full-text copy, not on the court's own site.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: German Federal Court of Justice judgment VI ZR 396/24.
Blackbaud, a software firm for charities and schools (US Federal Trade Commission order). 2024.
The regulator said that Blackbaud kept customer data far longer than it needed, including data of former customers. A ransomware attack in 2020 exposed it. The order makes the firm delete customer backup files that hold such data within 90 days, unless a customer asks otherwise, stop keeping data that it does not need, and publish a schedule with set times for deletion.
What this does not show. The order sets the duty and a self-certification. It does not show that the regulator checked the backups itself.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Python Software Foundation (PyPI, python, psf, pypa GitHub organisations); cabotage Docker images. 8 Jul 2024.
A PSF administrator put a GitHub token with admin access into local source files. A script meant to remove the change failed. Compiled .pyc files still held the token. They went into two Docker Hub images pushed on 3 Mar and 20 Jul 2023. JFrog reported it on 28 Jun 2024. The token was destroyed 17 minutes later. No signs of misuse were found, but logs older than 90 days were not available.
What this does not show. The images had been taken down on 21 Jun 2024 for unrelated reasons. Exact token permissions and creation date were not recorded. No misuse found does not prove none happened.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus (NCPDP), statements by its director and a Center representative reported by Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (neg.by). 7 Dec 2023.
The National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus removes personal data that is spread online without a legal basis. In September 2023 its director, Andrei Gaev, said that attackers regularly post again data that had already been deleted after the Center worked with the owners of the resources, so his staff track what happens to deleted data sets. One recent case was several thousand records taken from passport details collected for ticket refunds. In December 2023 a Center representative said that the largest databases had been deleted more than 30 times. Most leaks came from trade organisations.
What this does not show. The articles do not name the databases or the people affected, and they show no specific harm that followed. They report the regulator's statements, not a decision text.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
EXTIA. 21 Jul 2026.
The consultancy recruits engineers for client projects. In 2024 it received 265 erasure requests, mostly from job candidates. More than three quarters were not handled, or not handled properly. Twelve were not processed at all; the firm later deleted the data and told the people. 166 people were never told the outcome. The French regulator found breaches of the rules on erasure and on informing people.
What this does not show. The regulator's page gives no single count of mishandled requests. The decision also covers failures to inform people, not only erasure.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Russmedia Digital SRL (publi24.ro); Court of Justice of the EU, C-492/23, on a reference from the Cluj Court of Appeal. 2 Dec 2025.
On 1 August 2018 an unknown person posted an advert on publi24.ro, a Romanian online marketplace. It falsely presented a woman, X, as offering sexual services, and used her photos and phone number without her consent. Russmedia removed it less than an hour after her request. But other websites had copied it in full, and it stayed available there. X said the damage was permanent and continuing, and the Court noted that such services may be linked to serious crimes such as procuring and trafficking. The Court of Justice held that the marketplace operator is a joint controller of the personal data in the advert and must be able to show they are lawfully published.
What this does not show. The part of the judgment we read stops at paragraph 94, so we did not read the final answers. The source reports X's claims of harm; it does not describe threats to her safety.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Qatar Financial Centre Civil and Commercial Court, First Instance Circuit: Teknowledge Services and Solutions LLC v Fadi Saghir [2025] QIC (F) 23, CTFIC0005/2025. 14 May 2025.
His employment contract said a leaving employee must return all company property and keep no copies. In late 2024 the Country Manager downloaded thousands of confidential client and project files and moved them to a personal hard drive. He had a job offer from PwC, in work that overlaps with the company's. He did not hand the drive over, despite a signed undertaking. It came back only under a court order on 12 December 2024, with most company files on it deleted. The court found that his knowledge of marketing and pricing strategies and client relationships could harm the business and give a rival an unfair advantage. It ordered him to return, and not keep, company data.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show that the files reached the new employer or were used there. It does not say whether the files deleted from the drive had first been copied elsewhere.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
National Privacy Commission, In the Matter of World App Processing of Personal Information (CID CDO 25-001), against Tools for Humanity. 23 Sep 2025.
Tools for Humanity scanned people's irises with its Orb device in the Philippines for its World App. It told the National Privacy Commission that the Orb deletes all personal data within 12 seconds and keeps nothing. The NPC found no proof of this. The Orb had storage capacity, the company's own 2025 security audit said there was no procedure to erase iris data left in memory, and its consent form allowed image data to be kept for up to ten years. The NPC also found no working way for people to have their data erased when they withdrew consent. It said this exposed people to grave and irreparable injury and ordered all Orb and World App processing to stop.
What this does not show. The order does not show that any iris data was in fact copied or misused. It is a cease and desist order, not a final decision on the merits.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
High Court of Singapore, SpaceSATS Pte Ltd v Chan Chia Sern and others [2023] SGHC 40. 21 Feb 2023.
SpaceSATS was set up to develop micro plasma thrusters for small satellites. A court order of 12 July 2021 told its former CEO, Dr Chan Chia Sern, to deliver up within seven days his personal laptops and the external storage devices that had been connected to his company laptop. Forensic work showed data copied from the laptops to external devices, then deleted from the laptops, and two laptops reset to factory settings. In August 2022 nine listed storage devices were still not delivered up. The court said recovery of the work product and intellectual property was critical to the company's survival. It found him in breach and held that two months' imprisonment was right for the device breaches.
What this does not show. The judgment does not say what was on the nine missing devices or show that anyone used the copied data. Other claims in the suit were still to be decided.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
OOO Belan Tekhnologii, administrator of the property website molnar.by; unscheduled inspection by the National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus. 13 Dec 2023.
During an unscheduled inspection of the administrator of the property website molnar.by, the National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus found that users' personal data was being provided to the personal e-mail of a former employee of the organisation, with no legal basis. The Center also found that the required protection measures were missing or existed only on paper. It suspended the processing of personal data on the site for three months. The seller account and several online forms (requests, reviews and bookings) were switched off until the faults are fixed.
What this does not show. The post does not say how many users were affected, how long the data went to the former employee, or whether that person misused it.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company Limited (Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, investigation report). 2023 (report 2 Apr 2024).
Ransomware encrypted Cyberport's computer systems and file servers, and a group calling itself Trigona demanded a ransom. Personal data of more than 13,000 people leaked. About 40% of them were unsuccessful job applicants and former employees. The Privacy Commissioner found that Cyberport had not deleted their data when its own retention periods ran out, and that this led to the leak. It found breaches of the retention and security principles.
What this does not show. The statement records no fine and no misuse of the leaked data.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
An unnamed IT sub-processor (Danish Data Protection Agency, case 2022-431-0167). 7 Feb 2022.
A company's IT supplier used a sub-supplier for the system that held the company's customer data. The supplier ended that contract on 19 November 2019. The sub-supplier then refused to return the customer data, which included sensitive personal data, except in a readable form for payment. The Danish authority found that by keeping the data for its own purpose it had become "selvstændig dataansvarlig for den fortsatte opbevaring" (our translation: an independent controller for the continued storage). It issued serious criticism, ordered it to hand the data back by 21 February 2022 and then to stop using it.
What this does not show. The decision names no company and does not say how many people the data covered.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Twitter, Inc. (platform operator); Supreme Court of Japan, Second Petty Bench, case Reiwa 2 (ju) No. 1442. 24 Jun 2022.
In April 2012 police arrested a man for entering the women's bath changing area of an inn. He received a summary penalty the next month. On the day of the arrest, users posted tweets that quoted news reports and named him. The news articles were later deleted, but the tweets stayed, and a search of his name on Twitter still showed them. He had since married and helped run his father's business. He feared family and acquaintances would find the tweets, which would harm his peaceful life and his rehabilitation. The Supreme Court held that his interest outweighed the reasons to keep the tweets and ordered deletion.
What this does not show. The court weighed this case on its own facts and set no fixed time after which arrest reports must go. The judgment does not say when Twitter removed the tweets.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
The Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited and its service provider Mappedin; joint investigation by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Alberta and British Columbia commissioners (PIPEDA Findings 2020-004). Oct 2020.
In 2018 cameras hidden in wayfinding directories in 12 Canadian malls ran software that turned shoppers' faces into numerical face representations. The mall owner told investigators these were not kept after processing. The commissioners found that its service provider had kept 5,061,324 face representations on its behalf, and the provider could name no purpose for them. The provider said the server was decommissioned, but the commissioners found that it could be readily re-activated with all the personal data accessible. They said a facial template can be used to identify a person by comparison with images on the internet or through hidden surveillance. After their recommendations, the data was deleted.
What this does not show. The commissioners found no evidence that the data was used to identify anyone. The source does not show harm to any shopper.
Cost: national. At risk: national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
China's national security authorities (Ministry of State Security guidance), reported by CCTV. 13 Aug 2025.
China's national security authorities warned the public about old phones that are sold, traded in or recycled. They said a simple factory reset is not enough to clear the personal information on an old phone. If a phone once joined a work unit's internal network, criminals could use its leftover network settings, such as VPN settings, as a way into the unit's core systems. If it was once linked to smart home devices, hackers could even control those devices to listen and watch. The warning describes possible risks, not a real case.
What this does not show. The warning names no real case, phone or victim. The original ministry post was not opened, only the CCTV report carried by Sina.
Cost: national, professional. At risk: national security; systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Apple (iOS 17.5). 2024-05-20.
Apple release note: a rare issue let deleted photos with database corruption reappear in the Photos library. Apple gave no explanation of why the files remained.
What this does not show. A news report of the maker's release note. The note gives no cause.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Dropbox. 24 Jan 2017.
Users saw folders deleted between 2009 and 2011 reappear on their devices overnight. Dropbox said a bug had stopped some files from being fully deleted from its servers. Files with metadata inconsistencies had been quarantined and excluded from permanent deletion. A fix for that bug then restored them to accounts. Dropbox normally removes deleted files within 60 days. It said nobody had access to the files meanwhile. Most were later removed again.
What this does not show. A news report; the forum post was not opened. Number of affected users not given. Dropbox's claim that nobody accessed the files is unverified. Files may contain business as well as personal data.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Deleted PyPI package files (678,376 artifacts). 2 Jun 2026.
PyPI returns 404 for deleted packages, but the files stay on files.pythonhosted.org. Researchers rebuilt download links from the public BigQuery dataset. They recovered 678,376 deleted artifacts and found 190 unique live secrets in 161 packages. One GitHub token from April 2023 gave admin access to the Apache and Astronomer organisations. Both revoked it within hours.
What this does not show. Vendor research; the deleted package holding the Apache token is not named. Hard deletion happens only on PII reports.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
764 organisations in Europe (European Data Protection Board, coordinated action on the right to erasure). 10 Feb 2026.
In 2025, 32 data protection authorities in Europe checked how organisations act on requests to erase personal data. 764 organisations answered. Half of the authorities that reported raised concerns about backups. Many organisations had no procedure to act on an erasure request in their backups. They waited for the backup to be overwritten or to reach the end of its storage period, and some said that they could not change part of a backup. The board said that organisations should keep track of erasure requests and apply them to systems restored from a backup. It also recommended that they verify each erasure and be able to demonstrate it.
What this does not show. A survey report. It names no organisation, and it records no case of erased data that came back.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks (2025 Global Incident Response Report). Feb 2025.
Unit 42 drew on more than 500 incident response cases from October 2023 to December 2024. In its 2024 cases with data theft, attackers gave any proof of data deletion in only 58%. In some cases Unit 42 learned that an attacker who had given such "proof" had kept at least some of the data.
What this does not show. A security vendor's own case data; about 80% of the organisations were in the US. The report does not say how many attackers kept data after giving proof.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Dangling commits on GitHub after force pushes. 11 Jul 2025.
A force push moves the branch pointer but leaves old commits dangling. Anyone with the hash can still open them on GitHub. The post estimates about 15 million zero-commit force push events. It concludes that tens of millions of dangling commits are still accessible. Removal needs garbage collection or a support request.
What this does not show. Estimate from a 1,500-repository survey; the post gives two figures (3.68 and about 3.5) for commits per push.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access; know-how and markets. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
About 150 abandoned Amazon S3 buckets once used by software vendors, governments and build pipelines. 4 Feb 2025.
Owners had deleted about 150 S3 buckets, but software and documents still pointed to them. Researchers registered the freed names from Nov 2024. Over two months the buckets got more than 8 million requests. Requests came from government, military, bank and Fortune 500 networks. They asked for software updates, unsigned binaries, VM images and CloudFormation templates. One bucket had been dropped from documentation in Mar 2015. AWS agreed to sinkhole the buckets.
What this does not show. Researchers did not name requesting organisations and served no malicious files. Request origin is based on DNS and WHOIS lookups. This is about deleted containers and stale references, not leftover data.
Cost: professional, national. At risk: systems and access; national security. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Docker Hub, Quay.io, GitHub Packages, AWS ECR (container registries). 8 Oct 2024.
Overwriting an image tag does not delete the old layers. The researcher pushed an image with a MongoDB credential, then replaced it. The old layer stayed retrievable from Docker Hub by its SHA256 hash. After one month, the unreferenced layer was still there in all registries tested except Quay.io, which removed it after 17 days. In AWS ECR with tag immutability, the layers were uploaded before the manifest was rejected.
What this does not show. Single demonstration image; the article gives no count of real secrets in such layers and no registry vendor response. Vendor research by a secrets detection company.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
LockBit ransomware group (UK National Crime Agency, Operation Cronos). 20 Feb 2024.
In February 2024 the UK National Crime Agency led an operation that took control of LockBit's systems and leak site. LockBit stole victims' data, encrypted their systems and demanded cryptocurrency to unlock files and keep the data unpublished. The agency said some of the data on LockBit's systems belonged to victims who had paid. It said this showed that paying does not guarantee the data will be deleted, whatever the criminals promise.
What this does not show. The agency's release gives no count of the paying victims whose data it found.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
1,200 organisations with at least one successful cyber attack in the prior 12 months. 4 Jun 2024.
On average 41% of data was compromised in an attack and only 57% of it was recovered. Almost two thirds (63%) of organisations were at risk of reintroducing infections during recovery. About half of overall backup storage was immutable. The survey of 1,200 organisations was completed in early 2024.
What this does not show. Vendor survey; self-reported; reinfection refers to malware, not to deleted records.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Google Cloud Platform OAuth applications. 20 Apr 2023.
Deleting a GCP project puts it in a pending deletion state for 30 days before purge. Apps in such projects vanished from the user page of apps with account access. Users could not see or revoke them. Restoring the project re-enabled the old refresh token, which still fetched user data. An attacker could delete, restore, use the token and delete again. Google accepted the report on 18 Aug 2022. It patched on 7 Apr 2023 so pending deletion apps now show and can be removed.
What this does not show. Researcher disclosure; it does not report exploitation in the wild. Dates of Google actions are as stated by Astrix.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Former owners of computers sold on eBay in the UK (Alvarez & Marsal, "The Risks of Leftover Data"). Sep 2022.
A forensic team bought six used computers on eBay in the UK in the first half of 2022, some of them former work machines. It recovered data from five. It found 5,875 documents made by users, among them a clear scan of a passport still in date, appraisal and job application forms with names, National Insurance numbers and dates of birth, images of building ID cards and staff salaries. Some files had been deleted and were recovered; others had never been deleted. The report says that deletion, formatting and factory resets do not remove the data.
What this does not show. A small test by a consulting firm. It does not name the former owners or show misuse of the data.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Used drives bought on eBay in the US, UK, Germany and Finland (159 drives). 25 Apr 2019.
Researchers bought 159 used drives on eBay in the US, UK, Germany and Finland. They were analysed in early 2019. 42% held sensitive data and 15% held personally identifiable information. One drive held 5GB of archived office email from a major travel company. Another held 3GB of data from a cargo and freight company.
What this does not show. Vendor-run study; 159 drives; drives wiped with the vendor's own tool were excluded.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; know-how and markets. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Cloudera Navigator Key Trustee KMS 5.12.0 and 5.13.0. 7 Jun 2019.
Key Trustee KMS kept deleted encryption keys until purged, with an undelete call. The default access list for purge and undelete was a wildcard. Anyone who knew a key name and could reach the KMS could undelete a deleted key. They could also purge keys in use and cut off access to encrypted HDFS data.
What this does not show. Vulnerability record only; no report of exploitation. Attacker needs a key name and network access to the KMS.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Twitter. 2019-02-15.
Deleted direct messages, years old, could still be retrieved from Twitter's data archive. This included messages with deactivated and suspended accounts. TechCrunch recovered a March 2016 conversation.
What this does not show. A news report of one researcher's test.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
GitHub public repositories. Feb 2019.
Researchers scanned about 4.4 million candidate files through the GitHub Search API and 2.3 billion files in a BigQuery snapshot. They found 201,642 unique secrets (API keys and private keys). They watched leaked secrets from 4 Apr 2018. 81% were never removed. 19% were removed within about 16 days, most in the first day. Removal was by new commits; none of the watched repositories rewrote history. The secrets stayed reachable in Git history. Deleted commit contents could be recovered by SHA-1 ID even after git filter-branch or BFG.
What this does not show. Measurement study of GitHub in 2017 to 2018; it does not show that any leaked secret was abused. Secrets may have been rotated by owners without the authors knowing.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Owners of leading websites and university domains (Liu, Hao and Wang, ACM CCS 2016). October 2016.
When a server or an outside service is given up, the address record that points to it should be removed. Researchers scanned the subdomains of the 10,000 most visited sites and of leading university and government domains. Their summary reports 467 records that still pointed at resources their owners had released, in 277 of the top domains and 52 university zones. A person who takes over the released resource controls that address: the web pages, the email and a valid security certificate.
What this does not show. The researchers attacked no one. The totals in the paper's summary and in its body are not the same.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Oracle, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, DB2, MySQL, SQLite, Firebird and Apache Derby database engines. 2015.
Researchers carved raw storage from eight database engines. In each, a deleted row is only marked deleted in page or row metadata. The data stays on disk and in memory until overwritten. In an Oracle test, a deleted value stayed recoverable in the table page, index page and materialised view for a long time. Index values cannot be marked deleted, so they persist until the index is rebuilt. Their tool still recovered about 75% of PostgreSQL table pages after 25% random damage.
What this does not show. Engine versions tested date from 2008 to 2014. The paper measures recoverability, not any real incident. Overwrite timing depends on workload.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
LAION-5B dataset, its downloaded copies and models trained on it (including Stable Diffusion 1.5). 20 Dec 2023.
Stanford researchers found many hundreds of instances of known child sexual abuse material in LAION-5B, an open AI training dataset. Removal from source websites was under way. The report says it is not known how many researchers downloaded the dataset. Removal from their copies is harder. Removing the material from trained models is the most difficult task. It recommends deprecating Stable Diffusion 1.5 models without safety measures.
What this does not show. The report does not measure how many copies or models still hold the material.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; science and ai. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: First-hand research, read 24 Oct 2026.
Benjamin Brown and co-defendants (Signyl); AI agents including OpenClaw. 28 Jul 2026.
A TRO barred the defendants from using Capconvert information, or bots built, trained or prompted with it. It also required forensic imaging of their devices and cloud accounts. Brown said he told his AI agent to stop work on 18 Mar 2026. Forensic images showed AI agents still reached Capconvert information until 27 Mar 2026. Defendants also resisted imaging a Mac Mini from 12 to 22 May 2026. The court granted the show cause motion and set a 24 Aug 2026 deadline.
What this does not show. The order is not a final contempt finding. The claim that 14 models were trained on the data is the plaintiff's allegation, not a court finding. The TRO, as excerpted, ordered no deletion.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Clearview AI (French data protection authority, CNIL). 10 May 2023.
In October 2022 the French regulator ordered the facial recognition company to stop collecting data on people in France without a legal basis, and to delete their data. The company sent no proof that it had done so. In May 2023 the regulator imposed a penalty payment for each day from 19 December 2022 to 9 February 2023.
What this does not show. The regulator records that no proof of deletion arrived. It does not show what the company still held.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Everalbum, Inc., maker of the Ever photo app (US Federal Trade Commission). 11 Jan 2021 (settlement announced); order final 6 May 2021.
The photo app Ever told users that it would delete their photos and videos if they closed their accounts. The regulator alleged that, until at least October 2019, it deleted none of them and kept them with no end date. The order makes the company delete those photos and videos, the face data taken from users who gave no express consent, and "any facial recognition models or algorithms developed with Ever users' photos or videos". There was no money penalty.
What this does not show. A settlement of the regulator's allegations. They were not tested in court.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: science and ai; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: final order.
Microsoft 365 Copilot connectors (the maker's own documentation). 19 Aug 2026 (page updated).
A connector brings an organisation's outside data into the index that the assistant searches. The maker's page on how to manage connectors lists a state named "Delete failed". In that state, it says, "the data might still be indexed, item quota might still be consumed, and crawls might still run for the connection". It tells the administrator to try the deletion again.
What this does not show. Product documentation. It describes a state that can occur. It reports no case and no number.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Azure AI Search (the maker's own documentation). 20 Jan 2026 (page updated).
Azure AI Search is a Microsoft service that builds a search index from an organisation's data. The maker's page on deletion sets an order for data stores that mark records as deleted: mark the source record, run the indexer, and only then delete the source. It warns: "If source content is deleted first, you have orphan documents in the search index." The owner must then delete those documents from the index by hand.
What this does not show. Product documentation. It describes what happens when the steps are done in the wrong order. It reports no case and no number.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Agentic AI (technology foresight). November 2025 (TechSonar 2025-2026).
Agents have persistent memory that 'remains after a goal is reached'. Persistent retention is a major privacy concern. Errors cascade before detection.
What this does not show. A foresight report. It records no incident.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 22 Oct 2026.
Five memory systems for AI agents (Shen, Toyoda and Leung, "Revoked but Still Authoritative", preprint). 8 Sep 2026.
Researchers tested five memory systems for AI agents with nine language models. They stored a policy, revoked it and gave a replacement. The summary reports that "no system enforces revocation by default". Two set-ups, Graphiti by default and Mem0 with an experimental setting, returned the revoked record in all 81 tests, ranked above its replacement. With those two, the agents took the unsafe action in 699 of 1,620 trials (43.1%). A filter in the store that holds back revoked records cut this to none in 1,620 trials. The other three systems did not return the revoked record by default.
What this does not show. A preprint. We read the summary and the first third of the full text. It is a laboratory test. It records no incident in a live system.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access; science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Mem0, an open-source memory library for AI agents (issue 7452 on GitHub). 2026 (issue open on 18 Nov 2026).
A user reported a fault and gave the steps to repeat it. The delete-all command removes the stored memories for a user. The raw messages stay in the history database. The next time a memory is added, the library sends the last ten of those messages to the language model, which can turn them into new memories. In the test, the count of memories was zero after the deletion, and the made-up identity number was in the next prompt.
What this does not show. A report by one user, with a stand-in for the language model and made-up data. The maintainers had not answered when we read it. A fix was proposed and not merged. At most ten messages for each user are sent again.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Long-term memory of LLM agents (five memory designs, four language models). 15 Oct 2026.
A benchmark planted 456 secrets in long conversations held in agent memory. After users asked for deletion, evidence trails still revealed secrets. Deleting the disclosures plus ten more turns chosen by a model still left 39% to 76% residual recovery. Tests covered five memory designs and four language models.
What this does not show. Preprint; designed secrets in synthetic conversations; residual recovery assumes the reader is given surviving objects.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Autonomous LLM agent "Ash" (Kimi K2.5 backbone) in a live lab with email, Discord, shell and memory. 23 Feb 2026.
Twenty researchers tested live agents for two weeks. In Case Study 1 a non-owner asked an agent to delete an email holding a secret. It reset its local email setup and reported "Email account RESET completed". The email stayed in the Proton mailbox. In Case Study 7 it said "the record is gone" while the data stayed in session context.
What this does not show. Research red-teaming in a lab set up to provoke failures, not a production incident. Case Study 8 (spoofed owner made the agent delete its memory files) does not say if files were recoverable.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai; systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
LLM agents with tools (web search, retrieval, database lookup). 21 Aug 2026.
Unlearning can stop a model recalling a target directly. An agent can still retrieve the same information through web search, retrieval or database tools.
What this does not show. Preprint; abstract gives no recovery rates.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Stateful LLM agents (summaries, plaintext memory, tool plans, KV cache). 4 Sep 2026.
Agent 'forget' operations usually delete one plaintext memory record and stop. Derived state such as summaries, tool plans and the KV cache keeps the revoked information. Instruction-based forgetting leaked under probing every time (Leak@probes 1.00). Redacting the source still left agents acting on a revoked preference in 80% of episodes.
What this does not show. Preprint; three agent suites and three model families; results under elicitation probes.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Multimodal agent memory systems, including one production memory system. 29 Jun 2026.
Deleting a text memory entry did not remove the fact. Retained user images let models recover it in 12.0% of cases, against 0.0% for a blind baseline. Retained related text allowed 18.3% recovery. 47% of image-based leaks could not be recovered from text. Direct probing after deletion recovered under 1%.
What this does not show. Preprint; the production system is not named in the abstract.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Foundation-model agents with long-term user memory. 2026 (ICML 2026 workshop; day not stated).
Deleting only the raw memory left recoverable copies in derived summaries in roughly 20% of instances. Only a full-pipeline purge or tombstone redaction cut worst-tier residue to zero. Summarising memory reduced canary extraction by 76% and 64% on two tested models.
What this does not show. Workshop poster; LongMemEval benchmark; 'roughly 20%' as stated.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
HNSW vector databases used in retrieval-augmented generation (three implementations). 16 Jun 2026.
Deletion in three HNSW vector stores only flags records; embeddings stay on disk. Researchers read deleted vectors from raw index files and inverted them. They recovered 25.5% of person names and 46.4% of locations from biographies. They recovered 100% of age and gender markers from synthetic patient records, and 99% of identities from face embeddings.
What this does not show. Preprint, not peer reviewed; the three implementations are not named in the abstract; lab conditions with storage-layer access.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life; health and the body. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Limited-memory language models with external fact databases. 1 Jul 2026.
An audit ran 12,228 deletions across thirteen databases and six prompt types. Deleted facts still survived in 0.7% of cases on the released database and 13.6% on the most adversarial variant. Leakage from model weights was near zero. The residue came from near-neighbour entries in the retrieval database.
What this does not show. Preprint; one model class and deletion procedure.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Agent memory systems (thirteen configurations). 14 Jun 2026 (v2 16 Jun 2026).
Thirteen agent memory set-ups were tested on 385 adversarial forgetting cases. Rule-based deletion scored 0% on cross-lingual cases and 5% on obfuscated identifiers. One widely used memory library passed 12 of 39 exact-identifier deletion cases (31%). Another design passed 0 of 1,000 template cases, refusing any deletion.
What this does not show. Preprint by a developer of one tested system; author's own benchmark.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
AI agents with long-term memory (Saleh, Nahavandi, Salarian, Bassily and Perrault, "AfterDeleteBench", preprint). 22 Oct 2026.
Researchers gave an agent made-up secrets and let it write summaries into its long-term memory. Then they deleted the original record. The model itself did not change. In the main test, "a single query recovers the deleted secret" in about two thirds of cases. Agents that never saw the secret recovered nothing. Where no full copy of the secret remained, the agent rebuilt it exactly from parts stored apart in 62% to 99% of cases, across three models. A deletion that also followed each record made from the source removed the recovery in the settings tested.
What this does not show. A preprint, read in its summary. The secrets were made up and the tests ran in a laboratory. It records no incident in a live system.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
AI agents (Lin, Xu, Xu, Chen and Lan, "Can Agents Truly Forget?", preprint). 13 Oct 2026.
The authors built a benchmark for unlearning in AI agents. It tests three places where knowledge can stay or return: the model's weights, the agent's long-term memory, and what the agent fetches with its tools. They report that unlearning in the weights alone is not enough for an agent, because forgotten information "may still persist in memory artifacts or be reacquired via tool calls". Their tests of current methods show a gap between a model that forgets and an agent that forgets.
What this does not show. A preprint, read in its summary, which gives no numbers. A laboratory benchmark. It records no incident in a live system.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Persistent LLM agents (deletion audits). 2026 (NeurIPS 2026 workshop; day not stated).
In a pilot study, dependency-aware deletion left 7% immediate residue. Within five routine sessions, 93% of deleted facts became recoverable again. 85% of these were written back into the memory store. Checkpoint restore drove 92% of recovery, tool-written files 77% and peer-agent copies 71%. Revoking a source without deleting data kept 99% of facts.
What this does not show. Pilot study; workshop poster, not a full paper; single author.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: science and ai; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Language models after unlearning (Deepak, Mou, Huang and Yang, EMNLP 2025). Nov 2025.
Tests of unlearning usually ask if the model still gives out the removed knowledge. The authors asked a different question: can an attacker tell which data was removed? Their attack looks for the traces that unlearning leaves in the model. They tested four common unlearning methods on 258 models. Examples from the set to be forgotten could be identified with up to 99% accuracy.
What this does not show. Read in the summary. The attack shows that an item was in the forgotten set. It does not bring back the text of the item.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Microsoft (Bing cache, Copilot). 2025-02-26.
More than 20,000 GitHub repos made private or deleted in 2024 were still reachable through Copilot via Bing's cache. More than 16,000 organisations were affected. Microsoft rated it low severity.
What this does not show. A news report of a security firm's research.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets; systems and access. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read Oct 2026.
Language models after exact unlearning (Wu, Pang, Liu and Wu, NeurIPS 2025). NeurIPS 2025.
Exact unlearning trains the model again without the data to be removed. The authors show that an attacker who can query both the earlier model and the new one can use the earlier model to guide the new one and bring out the removed data. They tested three unlearning benchmarks and a simulated set of medical diagnoses. The summary says that the method doubles the extraction in some cases.
What this does not show. The attack needs access to the model from before the unlearning, as with models whose weights are public. The medical data was simulated.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
LLM unlearning methods, benign relearning (academic). 19 Jun 2024 (v1); v4 17 Mar 2025.
Fine-tuning an unlearned model on a small, loosely related dataset restored the forgotten knowledge. General Harry Potter wiki text brought back verbatim memorised book text. The authors say current methods mostly suppress outputs rather than forget.
What this does not show. Preprint; venue not stated on the page read. Results apply to the approximate unlearning methods tested.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
LLM unlearning methods (academic). 21 Oct 2024 (v1); v3 21 Mar 2025.
Tested unlearning methods kept about 21% of the knowledge meant to be forgotten at full precision. After 4-bit quantization (compressing model weights) about 83% came back. The authors say the knowledge was hidden, not erased, and current benchmarks miss this.
What this does not show. Preprint; venue not stated on the page read. Results apply to the methods and models tested.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Large language models (unlearning and in-context reintroduction). 27 Jun 2024.
Unlearned knowledge can be reintroduced through the prompt, so the model behaves as if it still knows it. The authors conclude even exact unlearning is not enough for content control.
What this does not show. Position paper; no measurements in abstract.
Cost: professional. At risk: science and ai. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
LLMs unlearned with the RMU method. 26 Sep 2024 (v6 31 May 2025).
Fine-tuning on 10 unrelated examples recovered most hazardous capabilities that unlearning had removed. Removing certain activation directions also restored them.
What this does not show. Preprint; abstract says 'most', no exact percentage; hazardous knowledge, not personal data.
Cost: professional, national. At risk: science and ai; national security. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 31 Oct 2026.
Microsoft MS-Celeb-1M and Duke DukeMTMC face datasets (retracted April 2019). 6 Aug 2021 (v1); v2 21 Nov 2021.
Both datasets were retracted in April 2019. MS-Celeb-1M stayed on Academic Torrents and Archive.org. Twenty GitHub repositories still offered models pre-trained on it. In a 20% sample of 2020 papers, the datasets and derivatives were used 54 and 73 times. 'Neither retraction included calls to not use the data.'
What this does not show. Counts come from a 20% sample and are lower bounds. Preprint; venue not stated on the page read. Covers face datasets, not all training data.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: science and ai; health and the body. How the data survived: came back.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Tesla, Inc. (replaced media control units and Autopilot hardware). 4 May 2020.
A researcher known as Green bought four Tesla infotainment and Autopilot computers on eBay. Tesla had removed them from customer cars during upgrade retrofits. Tesla reportedly told technicians to discard old units, in some cases by smashing them with a hammer. The units still held owners' home and work locations and all saved Wi-Fi passwords. They also held calendar entries, call lists and address books from paired phones. Spotify credentials were in plain text, and Gmail and Netflix session cookies could still give access. Used units sold for about 150 to 500 US dollars. Tesla did not tell the affected owners.
What this does not show. A news report relying on InsideEVs and the researcher's account. Tesla did not comment. The number of units leaving Tesla's control is unknown; four were examined.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Flightradar24 (Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection, IMY, case DI-2021-3397). 30 Jun 2025.
Aircraft owners asked the flight tracking site to stop publishing data that showed their aircraft's movements and location. The site asked each of them for a copy of the registration certificate. One owner had a helicopter, used by a company chief executive, blocked; it appeared on the site again about a year later, because the site had blocked an old code that the aircraft no longer used. The authority found that the site had not made it easy for people to use their rights, ordered it to stop publishing data that identified that owner, and issued a reprimand.
What this does not show. The authority judged that the publishing carried only a low likelihood of harm to the owners. It records no incident.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Used cars on a Memphis car lot and used infotainment units (BMW, Jeep, Honda, Hyundai). 6 Jul 2026.
Researchers checked 38 used cars on a Memphis car lot. Only three had no personal information visible from the dashboard, so 35 of 38 held previous owner data. They also bought used infotainment units online, some for 20 US dollars. They found contact lists, text conversations, navigation history and account logins. Students combined this with public social media profiles to build a digital double of owners. Residual data could still be recovered after a factory reset.
What this does not show. A news report (local TV news). The underlying paper is embedded but its title and venue are not given. Overlaps with the same team's USENIX VehicleSec 2025 poster on discarded head units.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Honeywell video recorders (Yoon and Hwang, Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, DFRWS USA 2026). Jun 2026.
Video recorders for security cameras delete footage in three ways: when the disk is formatted, when a recording reaches the end of its storage period, and when new video overwrites old video on a full disk. The researchers studied the file system of Honeywell recorders. They showed that video could be recovered after each of the three kinds of deletion. Footage that a site's rules say has expired can therefore still be on the disk.
What this does not show. Read in the summary. A laboratory study of one maker's system. It records no case where expired footage was recovered and misused.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: livelihood and private life; national security. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Discarded BMW, Jeep and Honda infotainment units (2011 to 2020 models). 2025 (USENIX VehicleSec 2025 poster; exact day not stated).
Researchers bought discarded car infotainment units on eBay for 20 to 100 US dollars each. They imaged BMW and Jeep hard drives and rooted a Honda unit through an old Linux flaw. They recovered contacts, Bluetooth pairings, GPS coordinates, frequent destinations and navigation history. They also found browser history, photos of previous owners, full VINs, service history and driving-habit logs. A HondaLink authentication token and app credentials were still present, some able to affect cars still in use. The authors call for mandatory secure deletion in vehicles.
What this does not show. Poster, not a peer-reviewed full paper. The number of units examined and the share holding data are not reported. Whether previous owners reset the units is unknown.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life; life and safety. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Amazon (Echo Dot). 2021-06.
86 used Echo Dots were analysed. After factory reset, Wi-Fi credentials (22 to 37 copies per device), tokens and owner name were recoverable from NAND flash. The cause was wear levelling and no secure erase or encryption.
What this does not show. A laboratory study of 86 used devices. It records no misuse.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: systems and access; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read Oct 2026.
Xiaomi/Rockrobo Mi Vacuum Robot; Ecovacs DEEBOT 900; VIOMI Vacuum Robot V2. Aug 2019 (Chaos Communication Camp, 21 to 25 Aug 2019; talk day not stated).
A researcher examined used robot vacuums of the kind sold on eBay and Amazon Warehouse. An Ecovacs DEEBOT 900, factory reset by its previous owner, still held fragments of log files, keys, maps and Wi-Fi credentials. After three more resets, data fragments were still readable. On a used Xiaomi Mi Vacuum the data partition was formatted but not wiped, and all data was still on the device. After set-up with a new account, the previous owner data showed in the app and was uploaded to the cloud again. NAND flash (the chip memory) kept multiple copies until blocks were erased.
What this does not show. Researcher slides; the number of devices tested is not stated. Results are for specific 2018 and 2019 units and firmware. The speaker says the issue applies to all vendors, which the slides do not prove.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Android device vendors. 2015.
A study of 21 Android phones from 5 vendors found factory reset often failed to sanitise the data partition. Google tokens were recovered on every flawed device, plus contacts, emails and Wi-Fi passwords. Up to 500 million devices were estimated affected.
What this does not show. A laboratory study of 21 phones. The total of affected devices is the authors' estimate.
Cost: professional. At risk: systems and access. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read Oct 2026.
Derek Wai Hung Tam Sing, former employee of Rogerson Kratos (US Department of Justice). 6 Jan 2016.
An aircraft avionics company dismissed an engineer. He was "specifically asked to return all trade secrets", and he kept them. In early 2013 he packed the product schematics with a "readme" note that told rivals how to copy the products. He sent the packages to avionics companies, one of them outside the United States, under a false name from public Wi-Fi, and on flash drives. Three competitors received them. A judge convicted him on 32 counts.
What this does not show. The release reports the verdict at trial. It does not say what the competitors did with the material, and it does not cover the sentence or any appeal.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Chen Han-zong, former senior engineer at Lam Research's Taiwan manufacturing unit; Intellectual Property and Commercial Court, case 113 Min-Ying-Su No. 20. 18 May 2026.
From 1 to 4 July 2022, in his last days at Lam Research's Taiwan unit, a senior engineer copied 72 categories of files from his work computer to two personal USB drives. They held engineering drawings and circuit board designs for thin film deposition and plasma etch equipment, supplier evaluations and test procedures. He admitted he did not delete the files when he left. Investigators seized the drives, and a criminal court convicted him of copying trade secrets, a ruling not yet final. The civil court held the files were trade secrets with real value, found he got them by improper means, and ordered him to destroy them in any form.
What this does not show. The court found no evidence that he used the files or passed them to anyone. It did not find that the files were national core key technology, and the judgment can be appealed.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Hydrogen fuel cell stack maker (victim, name redacted); Defendants 1 and 2; equipment maker Defendant 4 (name redacted). 30 Apr 2026.
On 27 Nov 2018 Defendant 2 signed a return/destruction certificate for the victim's materials. In January 2019 an inspection at Defendant 4 found the victim's fuel cell trade secrets, including purchase specifications, still in his hands. The victim demanded deletion around 14 Jan 2019. In October 2019 he still held them for equipment destined for China. Keeping trade secrets after a deletion or return demand became a crime only from 9 Jul 2019. The Supreme Court held that a pre-amendment demand cannot ground conviction and remanded.
What this does not show. Convictions of Defendants 1 and 2 were set aside and remanded; no final guilt is established. Party names are redacted. Whether Defendant 4 was a supplier to the victim is not stated.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
A former employee of Pegatron Corporation (the judgment uses the code A10). 23 Feb 2026.
Pegatron sent a formal letter on 27 February 2020 that told a former employee to delete the confidential files he held from his job. He did not. Investigators searched his new office on 9 September 2021 and seized an external hard disk with the files. The court convicted him under Trade Secrets Act Article 13-1(1)(3), failure to delete or destroy after notice, and gave one year for that offence alone.
What this does not show. First instance; the judgment can be appealed and we have not checked for an appeal. No suspension is stated. A second defendant was convicted of copying only.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Phillips 66 (Superior Court of California, Alameda County, Propel Fuels v Phillips 66, case 22CV007197). 30 Jul 2025.
Propel shared confidential data under a non-disclosure agreement while Phillips 66 looked at buying it. Phillips 66 ended the talks in August 2018 and started its own business in the same market with the same team. Staff were told to strip Propel's data out of financial models, but hard-coded Propel data stayed in them, and the deal lead kept a Propel file until he retired. The court said the company should have returned or destroyed all of Propel's confidential information. A jury found wilful misappropriation.
What this does not show. The court text was read in a copy published by IPWatchdog. Phillips 66 said it would appeal; the result of any appeal was not checked.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Hytera Communications (US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Motorola Solutions v. Hytera, contempt order). 22 Aug 2025.
Engineers who left Motorola for Hytera downloaded more than 10,000 technical documents, source code among them. At trial, more than ten years later, more than 1,600 of those documents were still in Hytera's databases. After the trial Hytera launched a new radio range and said that it had been redesigned from the ground up in a clean room. The court found that the new range is built on the same trade secrets and is substantially like the products found to infringe. It held Hytera in contempt.
What this does not show. The amounts the court set are counted only as money and are not shown here. The court ruled on the trade secrets, not on the copyright claim. We read the order in a copy filed with the court and published by Courthouse News.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
A former employee of Miltner Insurance Services (Iowa Court of Appeals, No. 21-0893). 29 Jun 2022.
An employee of an insurance agency emailed its client list to her private address. In January 2019 she resigned and joined a competing agency about two blocks away. Her agreement said that on leaving she would return every record of the business. The trial court had ruled that this was no breach. The Court of Appeals reversed: the agreement prohibits "possession of the list after employment ends", so to keep the list was a breach in itself.
What this does not show. The court did not find that she used the list or passed it on. She said that she deleted it after a warning letter. The case went back to the trial court to set the remedy.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
ETC Global Holdings and InteliClear (InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Global Holdings, Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 19-55862). 15 Oct 2020.
A securities firm licensed a supplier's database system and agreed to keep it confidential during and after the licence. When the licence ended it certified, on 5 March 2018, that the system was removed from all its servers and that all copies were destroyed. The supplier's forensic firm then compared the two systems and reported "abundant evidence" that parts of the firm's new system were identical. The appeal court reversed a ruling for the firm and sent the case back.
What this does not show. The court did not find that the firm kept or used the system. It held that the question must be tried, after the exchange of evidence.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
High Court of Singapore, Brightex Paints (S) Pte Ltd v Tan Ongg Seng and others [2019] SGHC 116. 3 May 2019.
Tan Ongg Seng, a former production manager at Brightex Paints, held the company's confidential information, including paint formulas, technical data sheets and price lists. A judgment of 6 July 2018 ordered him to deliver up all of it within seven days. In June 2016 he had copied thousands of files to removable devices and deleted them from his work computer. Forensic work found a Dropbox folder on his computer that still held 3,052 confidential files after he uninstalled the application. The court found beyond reasonable doubt that he deliberately kept documents with the company's confidential information. It said the information could be shared with competitors and sent him to prison for 14 days for contempt.
What this does not show. Both sides appealed and we did not check the appeal outcome. The judgment does not show that the formulas reached a competitor.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Lasen, Inc. v. Tadjikov (New Mexico Court of Appeals). 21 Dec 2018.
A research scientist left a company and kept the source code for three of its lidar systems, with lab books and programming tools. The trial court found that he "wrongfully retained such property following multiple demands for their return". It held that he broke his employment agreement and his duty of loyalty, awarded damages and ordered him to return the code. The appeal court upheld the order to return it.
What this does not show. The court found no misappropriation: he did not pass the code to anyone or use it in trade. Part of the confidentiality order was reversed on appeal.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Chuo Seiki Co., Ltd. v former employee (name withheld). 27 Apr 2016.
A former employee downloaded 48,964 design files for microscopes and autocollimators, nearly all the design data held. He planned to use them at a competing firm. He denied holding the data, so said destruction was not needed. The court found he likely still held it. It barred use and ordered him to destroy (haiki) the data and printed drawings. The court refused provisional execution for the destruction order.
What this does not show. The judgment does not show whether destruction was later carried out. The unjust enrichment claim over retirement pay failed.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
A former employee of Delaware Elevator, Inc. (Delaware Court of Chancery, Delaware Elevator v. Williams). 16 Mar 2011.
A man who had won jobs for an elevator company left it. He then competed with it inside the area that his contract closed to him, and he used its customer list. The list gave each customer's name, the type of elevator, the price, the expected commission and the contacts. The court found that the list was a trade secret, and it recorded as "undisputed" that he was using it. It ordered him to stop, and to destroy every copy, on paper or in electronic form, within ten days.
What this does not show. We did not check for an appeal. The ruling does not say how much business the company lost.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Constitutional Court of Turkey, First Section, application of A.O. no. 2023/10860 (Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, Arrest Bureau records). 9 Dec 2025.
A court issued an arrest warrant for the applicant in January 2009. The warrant was lifted on 25 January 2018. But the record stayed active in the Arrest Bureau records of the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. On 10 June 2021, after his release from prison on another matter, he was detained at 21:00 on that old record. He was released at 16:30 the next day, after the trial court told the gendarmerie that no warrant existed. The lower courts rejected his claim for compensation. The Constitutional Court found that those courts did not give reasoned decisions, a breach of Article 36 of the Constitution, and sent the case back for a new trial.
What this does not show. The Constitutional Court did not rule on whether the detention itself was lawful; it ruled on the reasoning of the compensation judgments. The source does not say why the record was not removed. We read the decision text on hukukihaber.net because the Court's own database needs JavaScript and did not load.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Ministry of Interior, Bahrain; case of Ali Al-Hajee as reported by the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD); First Lower Criminal Court. 29 May 2024.
Ali Al-Hajee, a human rights defender who spent more than 10 years in prison, received confirmation that his alternative sentence had been suspended, so his travel ban should have been lifted. The ban stayed in place despite many follow-ups with government departments. When he went to the Interior Ministry, as the public prosecution told him to, to ask for it to be lifted, he was arrested on 14 Nov 2023 and held for one day. He was then charged with entering a restricted area. The court acquitted him on 29 May 2024. BIRD said the ministry either meant to keep the ban without legal basis or could not carry out court decisions.
What this does not show. The source is a rights group's account. It does not publish the court or prosecution decision to lift the ban, does not give the government's side, and does not say whether the ban was lifted after the acquittal.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Maldives Police Service and Home Ministry (Home Minister Umar Naseer to the People's Majlis), reported by Minivan News (Maldives Independent). 19 Jul 2014.
In the Maldives a police record could stop a young person getting a government job, and private employers did the same. Home Minister Umar Naseer told parliament in July 2014 that records are cleared for suspects whose cases are not sent for prosecution, and said 'we are following that rule now'. More than 2,000 youth records had been cleared since November 2013, and in January 2014 police cleared the records of 1,023 young people who had been arrested. An MP said many young people in his constituency could not get jobs because of such records. A 2012 study linked these records to young people joining gangs.
What this does not show. The sources do not say how many cleared records belonged to people never prosecuted, or how long each was kept past the rule. They are news reports, not the police regulation itself.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Presidencia de la Republica, Sistema de Acreditacion de Prensa. 29 Jan 2024.
Data on 263 journalists accredited to the presidential morning briefings leaked, including 186 voter cards and 63 passports. The attacker, acting from Spain, used the account and password of an official who had left government almost two years earlier. The credentials were never deactivated on a preproduction platform, so the account stayed live. The portal was taken down on 26 Jan 2024.
What this does not show. A news report quoting officials; no official written report was opened. A consultancy put the count above 300.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: life and safety; systems and access. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Mother and others [2020] EWHC 832 (Fam). 7 Apr 2020.
In September 2017 a council sent an adoption bundle by mistake to the solicitor of a respondent in the case. It held a confidential report with the details of the people who hoped to adopt the child. The council said that the bundle "had been sent in error and should be destroyed". The solicitor said that she had deleted the email and had not sent it to her client. It later came out that her assistant had forwarded it to the client, who had passed it to a second respondent. The judge found a real risk that the respondents would try to identify the adopters and where they live, and made an order to stop them.
What this does not show. The court found a risk, not harm: it did not find that the adopters were traced. The parties are anonymous in the judgment.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; life and safety. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Courts in Madrid, Alzira, Seville and Igualada, and the provincial court (Audiencia Provincial) of A Coruña; proceedings opened by the Spanish data protection authority, AEPD. 29 Jun 2009.
In 2009 the Spanish data protection authority, AEPD, opened eight sets of proceedings against courts and regional justice departments. A television channel had found court papers in rubbish containers on public streets. The courts were in Madrid, Alzira, Seville and Igualada, plus the provincial court of A Coruña. The papers held names of victims and attackers, medical and psychological reports, original case files, victims' statements, copies of identity cards, and home addresses printed on requests for restraining orders. The AEPD found the papers were within reach of anyone on the street. It treated this as a serious breach of the duties of secrecy and security. Public bodies cannot be fined, so it could order corrective steps and propose disciplinary action.
What this does not show. This is a news report. It does not say the files were due for destruction, which court threw out which papers, or that any victim came to harm. We could not open the AEPD decisions themselves.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety; health and the body. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Department of Justice of Puerto Rico (Registro de Personas Convictas por Delitos Sexuales y Abuso Contra Menores); Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Pueblo v. Hernández Díaz, 2026 TSPR 71 (CC-2023-0270). 30 Jun 2026.
Ángel L. Hernández Díaz was sentenced in July 2006 for lewd acts. In his plea deal the element of the victim's minority was removed. The law of the time put him on the registry for 10 years, and opinions in the judgment state that this period ended on 7 July 2016. The registry holds a person's name, address, photograph and other personal data, and the data is published. In October 2022 he asked a court to remove him. The trial court refused, the Court of Appeals declined to review, and the State argued for a term to 2031. On 30 June 2026 the Supreme Court ordered his information removed from the registry.
What this does not show. The ruling is a judgment with separate concurring opinions and two dissents, not one majority opinion, and a later lower court said it does not bind other cases. The source does not describe a specific harm he suffered while listed.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Prosecuting authorities of Azerbaijan; European Court of Human Rights, Anar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (nos. 12043/19 and 50484/20). 6 Oct 2026.
In July 2018 Azerbaijani investigators took two mobile phones, a laptop and documents from Anar Mammadov, editor of the news site Criminal.az, and inspected the contents of the phones without a court order. On 6 December 2018 they decided the phones were not evidence and must go back to him. The laptop was due back when his conviction became final on 4 June 2019. He says the devices came back about five years later and could not be used. The European Court of Human Rights found that the seizure and the phone inspection breached his right to private life, and that keeping the items after those decisions was unlawful and arbitrary.
What this does not show. The Court treated the retention as a property issue; the judgment does not say whether copies of the phone data were made, kept or destroyed. The five-year delay is the applicant's account; the Government gave no proof of an earlier return.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
IGFEJ, the body that runs the Citius court portal (recommendation of the Ombudsperson, Provedora de Justiça, to the Minister of Justice). 21 Nov 2024.
People whose insolvency had ended asked the body that runs the Citius court portal to hide their personal data. It often answered that it must publish the data for ten years. The Ombudsperson found that this period has no basis in law: access by other people must end when the case is archived and has been used for the statistics. She recommended that the body stop giving the ten-year answer and send each request to the authority that can decide. The rule exists, she wrote, so that these people can resume their economic and social lives.
What this does not show. A recommendation, not a court ruling. The page names no person who lost credit or work because of the entry, and it does not say how many records stayed public.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) Pte Ltd, Dowser, Mr Patel and Mr Neji. 26 Jun 2024 (published grounds; contempt found after 12 Mar 2024 hearing).
A search order executed with FTI Consulting was discharged on 3 Dec 2020 for material non-disclosure. The plaintiffs had to irretrievably delete the defendants' seized data and swear affidavits confirming it, filed in January 2021. In April 2021 their COO emailed a spreadsheet of FTI search results. In August 2023 Mr Patel used it to draft his trial affidavit. The court found all four in contempt and fined them.
What this does not show. The copy came to light only when disclosed in court on 3 Oct 2023; the judgment does not describe any forensic audit of the deletion.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: liberty and justice; know-how and markets; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Le Soir, Belgium (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Hurbain v Belgium). 4 Jul 2023.
A 1994 article named a doctor who caused a fatal car crash. He served his sentence and was rehabilitated in 2006. The newspaper put its archive online free of charge in 2008, and in 2010 it refused his request to remove or anonymise the article. The Belgian court found that the open archive made it easy for patients and colleagues to learn of the conviction, which could seriously damage his reputation. It ordered the online copy to be anonymised. The European Court found that this order did not breach press freedom.
What this does not show. The print and master archives stayed as they were; only the online copy had to be anonymised. The publisher argued that actual damage was never proved.
Cost: professional, personal. At risk: reputation and brand; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice, Kuwait; Court of Cassation (civil chamber). reported 2 Feb 2023.
A Kuwaiti man, a volunteer with the Interior Ministry, was acquitted in one criminal case, upheld on appeal, and a second case against him was closed. 19 and 10 years later, the computers of the Interior and Justice ministries still held the data of both cases. He sued to have it erased. The court said acquittal and closure are not prior convictions, so he was in a worse place than a convicted person, who can be rehabilitated. It found his private life exposed, his social and administrative affairs blocked, and his family at risk of defamation. The Court of Cassation upheld the order to remove all the data.
What this does not show. The source is a newspaper report of the ruling. It does not give the case number, the date of the ruling, the man's name, or a specific job or service he lost.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Constitutional Court of Latvia (Satversmes tiesa), case No. 2022-09-01; data held by the Information Centre of the Ministry of the Interior. 22 Dec 2022.
Latvian law kept data on people acquitted in criminal cases in the Punishment Register archive until a year after their death, and at most 100 years after birth. An acquitted person challenged this storage in court. The Constitutional Court found that lifelong storage is far longer than needed, because a case can be reopened only within limitation periods of 2 to 15 years for most crimes. It found that law enforcement used the archive to name acquitted people in theories about later events, to link them to criminal circles and to report on their reputation. The court said this in fact presumes that an innocent person took part in a crime. It struck the rule down.
What this does not show. The source is the court's press release. It does not say how many acquitted people were in the archive, or whether their data was deleted after the ruling took effect on 1 Jul 2023.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Court of Justice of the EU (Grand Chamber), G.D. v The Commissioner of the Garda Siochana and Others, C-140/20. 5 Apr 2022.
An Irish law of 2011 required phone companies to keep certain traffic and location data for two years. At the trial of G.D., traffic and location data about phone calls were admitted as evidence, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. He argued that the data was wrongly admitted. The EU Court of Justice ruled that EU law precludes general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data to fight serious crime. It said that a national court may not limit in time the effects of a finding that such a law is invalid. It left the admissibility of the evidence to national law.
What this does not show. The judgment does not decide whether the conviction stands; it leaves the use of the evidence to the Irish courts. At the time, Irish law required the data to be kept.
Cost: personal, national. At risk: liberty and justice; democracy and public trust. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Information and Privacy Agency (AIP) decision on the Kosovo Judicial Council (KGjK), reported by Levizja FOL. Jun 2022.
The Kosovo Judicial Council published lists of candidates it had not accepted. A man who searched for his name on the internet still found it in the list of rejected candidates. At that time he had applied for a legal officer post in the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor. He complained to the Information and Privacy Agency, which in June 2022 ordered the Judicial Council to remove the lists. The report says the Council carried out the decision and the man used his right to erasure.
What this does not show. The report does not give the AIP decision number or full date and does not describe any effect on his job application. It is an NGO report (September 2023), not the decision itself.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: First-hand research, read 18 Nov 2026.
Delhi High Court, W.P.(C) 3918/2021, Jorawer Singh Mundy v Union of India; respondents Google, Indian Kanoon and vLex. 12 Apr 2021.
An American citizen of Indian origin was charged under India's narcotics law. The trial court acquitted him of all charges in April 2011, and the Delhi High Court upheld the acquittal on 29 January 2013. Years later the 2013 judgment, with his name, still came up in Google search and on Indian Kanoon. He told the court that any employer who did a background check found it, and that he could not get work that matched his record. vLex had removed the judgment; the others had not. The court ordered Google to remove the judgment from its search results and Indian Kanoon to block search engines from reaching it.
What this does not show. This is an interim order; the case on the right to be forgotten was still pending in 2025. The order records the man's account of the job harm; it does not test it. We read the order in a news report: the court record site refused our reader.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, SCP 0702/2021-S4 (Jesus Montenegro Aguilera v. judges of the Tribunal de Sentencia Penal Segundo, Beni); Registro Judicial de Antecedentes Penales (REJAP). 18 Oct 2021.
A man was sentenced on 26 November 2004 and served his prison term in Beni. Article 441 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says the record of a sentence must be cancelled eight years after the prison term ends. Sixteen years after the sentence, the REJAP certificate still showed it. He asked the trial court again and again to order the cancellation. The court only replied that it could not find the case file. The REJAP certificate is a requirement for jobs, so the record kept him from work. The Constitutional Court confirmed protection and ordered the trial court to decide the cancellation under article 441 within a fixed time.
What this does not show. The Court ordered the trial court to decide; the source does not show that the record was deleted afterwards.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Federal High Court, Abuja (John Tsoho); Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 11 Oct 2021.
The EFCC charged media founder Raymond Dokpesi with money laundering. In April 2021 the Court of Appeal in Abuja dismissed the seven charges. Months later his name was still on the EFCC watch list. The Federal High Court in Abuja held that there were no criminal charges or allegations against him, and that a refusal to remove his name would disobey the Court of Appeal judgment. It ordered the EFCC to remove him from its watch list.
What this does not show. The news report does not say what the watch list did to him (for example a stop at the border) or why he was first listed. We did not open the court ruling itself.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (San Marino), Provvedimento n. 16, right to be forgotten. 6 Jul 2021.
Two news sites published articles in 2015 and 2018 about a San Marino criminal case from 2012. On 31 March 2020 an appeal court acquitted the man because the alleged facts did not exist. In November 2020 his lawyer asked a site to remove the link. The site refused and said the story was still topical. In June 2021 it confirmed it had not removed the link. The Garante found the data were no longer current or relevant and that their continued availability had a disproportionate effect on his rights. It ordered both sites to remove the URLs at once and to ask Google to deindex them.
What this does not show. The decision does not describe a concrete harm such as a lost job or a police stop. The case details and site names are redacted.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
European Court of Human Rights, Ivashchenko v. Russia (no. 61064/10); copies held by Russian customs. 13 Feb 2018.
Russian customs stopped a photojournalist who came back from a reporting trip to Abkhazia. Officers searched his laptop without reasonable suspicion of any offence, copied his personal and professional files to a drive and then to six DVDs, and sent them to a forensic expert to check for 'extremist' material. The check found nothing. The data was still kept for about two years. The Court said the search, the copying and the two-year retention went beyond routine checks, that the authorities did not consider that he carried journalistic material, and that the law gave no adequate safeguards against abuse. It found a violation of Article 8.
What this does not show. The Court's summary does not say whether the copies were destroyed after the two years or whether anyone used them. The failure the Court found is the lack of legal basis and safeguards, not a missed fixed deletion date.
Cost: national, personal. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Procuraduría Fiscal de Monseñor Nouel and Procuraduría General de la República; Tribunal Constitucional, Sentencia TC/0213/17 (TC-05-2016-0060), Yeury Manuel Reynoso Genao. 18 Apr 2017 (date of the published file).
In August 2013 Yeury Manuel Reynoso Genao was charged with assault. On 12 May 2014 the parties settled and the prosecutor closed the case. On 29 May 2014 the Procuraduría General gave him a certificate of no criminal record. In November 2015 it refused a new certificate. His filing says the reason was a case still registered in the criminal investigation system, entered after the case was closed. A lower court rejected his habeas data action. The Constitutional Court said that refusing the certificate to a person never convicted is an early conviction that breaks the presumption of innocence. It ordered the certificate issued within three days.
What this does not show. The reason for the 2015 refusal comes from the applicant's filing as quoted in the judgment. The source does not say which job or right he lost because of the refusal.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Sala V, B.C.A. c/ EN, M Justicia y DDHH, Registro Nacional de Reincidencia s/ Habeas Data. Reported 4 May 2016.
A man in San Juan was looking for work and asked the National Recidivism Register for the criminal records certificate an employer would need. The certificate showed a theft case. In that case a court had dismissed him on 8 May 2003, because the criminal action had expired, and the trial court had sent the dismissal to the register. Article 51 of the Criminal Code forbids official registers to report cases that ended in dismissal or acquittal. Eleven years later the register still reported it and said it had no power to delete it. He said the record shut him out of the job market. The first-instance court ordered suppression and the federal appeals court confirmed it.
What this does not show. We read a news report that quotes the ruling, not the judgment itself; the ruling date is not given. The source does not show a specific job he lost.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Johnson v. Hankook Tire (US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-20178). 13 Oct 2011.
A lawyer acted against a tyre maker. The case settled, and the agreement required him to return the company's confidential material "when the settlement was funded". In August 2010 he confirmed that he still held a video and photographs of the inside of one of its plants. The trial court ordered him to hand over what was left. He did not, and his accounts did not agree: one was that the material had been destroyed. The court sanctioned him, and the appeal court upheld the sanction.
What this does not show. An unpublished opinion. It does not say that anyone else received the material, or what the sanction was.
Cost: professional. At risk: know-how and markets. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Agency for Personal Data Protection and Free Access to Information (AZLP), Council statement; initiative to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court. 28 Jul 2025.
Under Montenegrin law, a rehabilitated person counts as never convicted and may have all data that could identify them as a former convict deleted. Court websites keep published verdicts after rehabilitation. The verdicts are anonymised, but the data agency says that in practice people can be identified again by combining a verdict with other public sources. The agency found that keeping a verdict online after rehabilitation can breach data protection rights, above all when it is misused to discredit a person in public. It asked the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court to delete such decisions and to set clear, mandatory rules for their timely removal.
What this does not show. The statement names no person, court or verdict, and shows no case of discrediting. It is reported by the news agency MINA; we did not find the agency's own text.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Oxxford Information Technology and its law firm. 2010 (blog dated 8 Dec 2010).
After settlement, counsel found the opponent's discovery data on backup tapes. They asked to keep it rather than pay to delete it.
What this does not show. A law blog's account. The court's ruling is not recorded here.
Cost: personal. At risk: liberty and justice. How the data survived: came back.
Source: News report, read 22 Oct 2026.
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, injunction against Piaggio & C. S.p.A., provv. n. 476 (doc. web 10272529). 18 Jun 2026.
Piaggio saved its employees' email in backup for the whole employment and for five more years after it ended. It kept email logs for six months. To support disciplinary charges against two employees, it extracted mail from their accounts going back about two years before any suspicion arose. The two were dismissed for just cause and are challenging this in the Pisa labour court. The Garante found breaches of purpose limitation, data minimisation and storage limitation. It said the systematic collection and retention of the data made it possible to rebuild the workers' activity, as in fact happened. It banned use of the collected email content.
What this does not show. The Garante did not judge whether the dismissals were valid. The decision does not say whether the old mail came from the backup or from the live mailboxes. We read the Garante's text in a copy hosted by the law publisher dirittobancario.it.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Aylo (formerly MindGeek), operator of Pornhub and Youporn. 29 Feb 2024.
In 2015 intimate videos and images of the complainant were uploaded to Pornhub and Youporn without her consent. Between January 2015 and November 2017 she or her representatives asked for nine versions to be removed. In at least seven of the nine cases the content was uploaded again soon after, from the same user names and email addresses. She then hired a takedown service, which asked for the removal of more than 700 copies on more than 80 websites. The Commissioner found that the takedown process did not prevent re-uploads, and that the complaint was well-founded.
What this does not show. No fine. The company disagreed with the findings and gave no commitments. The main findings concern consent.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Unnamed former employer (operator); case published by the National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus (NCPDP). 21 Nov 2023.
After a woman left her job, her former employer kept her personal mobile number on its website as the only contact number. Customers who were not satisfied with the company called her on that number again and again. She asked the employer several times to remove it, with no result. She then complained to the National Personal Data Protection Center of Belarus. The number was removed only after the Center stepped in. The Center reminded employers that after a request to delete personal data, they must delete it and tell the person within 15 days.
What this does not show. The post does not name the employer, say how long the number stayed online after she left, or say whether the employer was penalised.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Persons unknown seeding stolen intimate images on BitTorrent. 20 Dec 2011.
Intimate images from a student's stolen phone were uploaded to a hosting site in 2008 and removed around August 2008, but came back in November 2008 on a Swedish BitTorrent site under her name. The court ordered anyone served who holds the listed files to stop seeding them, not upload or transmit them, not make derivatives, and not reveal her name.
What this does not show. An interim court order. The people who shared the images were not identified.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: came back.
Source: Official source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Trezor (hardware wallets) and its shipping partner ShipMonk (Trezor statement). 4 Sep 2026.
The shipping partner sends Trezor's crypto wallets to buyers. Trezor's policy says that the partner must delete or anonymise order data 90 days after delivery, and the partner confirmed deletion in writing more than once. After a breach at the partner, Trezor found that the stolen data also held US orders from November 2019 to August 2021: about 67,000 more customers, with names, addresses and phone numbers. Trezor warned that the data could expose them to scams and to physical security risks.
What this does not show. The partner's own account was not read. The physical risk is a warning; no attack on a customer is recorded.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Staples Canada (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: audit of 2011 and finding of 2025). 1 Dec 2025.
From 2004 to 2008 the Privacy Commissioner looked into two complaints. In each one, a returned storage device was sold again with the first buyer's personal information still on it. Staples agreed to a full "wipe and restore" of every returned device. In 2011 the Commissioner's auditors tested 149 devices that had been through that process. 54 still held customer data. Two of eight GPS units still showed the last owner's trips and home address. In 2025, after a new complaint, the Commissioner found data of earlier users on about 23% of the devices it examined. Staples' returns policy said that such data "is erased upon return".
What this does not show. The reports do not say that a buyer misused the data. The finding of 2025 does not say how many devices were examined. Staples agreed to new procedures and to independent spot checks for three years.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: audit of 2011.
Compagnie africaine de sépulture du Gabon (CASEP-GA) and its archive destruction contractor; heard by the data protection authority APDPVP. 22 Oct 2025.
The rules required the funeral company CASEP-GA to destroy its archives after ten years. It gave them to a contractor for destruction. A video that spread on social media then showed documents with the CASEP-GA logo and the personal data of dead people in the hands of a trader. The data protection authority APDPVP opened the case on its own initiative and heard the company on 22 October 2025. The first findings point to a failure shared by CASEP-GA and the contractor. The contractor must stop work until it complies. The authority called the situation unacceptable. The case put private details of dead people in public view and tied a named company to the leak.
What this does not show. The article does not say what data the papers held, how many people they named, or whether any sanction followed beyond the contractor's suspension. It does not name the contractor or the regulation that sets the ten-year period.
Cost: national. At risk: democracy and public trust. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026.
Loblaw, PC Optimum loyalty programme (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, findings 2026-001). 5 Mar 2026.
Members asked to delete their loyalty accounts. The company took an unreasonable time to act on some requests. After accounts were deleted, it kept the members' purchase history and removed only identifiers such as names and email addresses. The Commissioner found that this was not enough, and that the company did not show it had limited the risk that people could be identified again. The company agreed to an independent review of how it makes data anonymous.
What this does not show. The company did not have to delete the purchase history. The finding is that it could not show the kept data was anonymous.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Information and Data Protection Commissioner (IDPC), decision CDP/COMP/608/2025 against a news publisher (name redacted). 22 Jun 2026.
In October 2023 a man filed a judicial protest about a personal matter. A publisher wrote online articles about it. He said the articles caused reputational harm, employment-related difficulties and personal hardship, and in September 2025 he asked for his data to be erased. The publisher refused. The Commissioner found that he held no public office, that the articles concerned no conviction or wrongdoing, and that his data stayed easy to find by internet search long after it had news value. The data was no longer necessary, so the Commissioner ordered the publisher to erase it from the articles within twenty days.
What this does not show. The harm to his work is his own account in the complaint; the decision does not test it. The publisher and the articles are redacted.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
A private person (Federal Court of Australia, eSafety Commissioner v Rotondo (No 4)). 26 Sep 2025.
The man posted deepfake intimate images of six women on a website. The eSafety Commissioner told him to remove two images and to delete all intimate images of two of the women in his control. He refused and said the notice "means nothing to me". The first two images stayed online for almost a year. The court found that this delay was likely to have made the women's hurt and distress worse, and it ordered a civil penalty.
What this does not show. One person refused to act; this is not an organisation that failed to delete. The court found the harm "likely"; the women gave no evidence of loss.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Taxa 4x35 (Danish Data Protection Agency; Eastern High Court). 2025-04.
The taxi company deleted customers' names after two years but kept their phone numbers for five. The numbers still tied about 8.9 million rides, with pick-up and drop-off addresses, to the people who took them. The Danish authority found no purpose for keeping the numbers and reported the company to the police. The courts fined the company; the High Court raised the fine in April 2025.
What this does not show. The source read is the authority's 2019 notice. The High Court judgment itself was not read.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC), Tanzania: Nyangoma Mwesingwa (for a minor) v Cecilia Maliganya, Complaint No. PDPC/CMP/002/2025. 19 Aug 2025.
A seller of baby products reposted a photo of a newborn girl on her business Instagram page with an advertising caption. The post was shared more than 1,100 times. The mother and a relative asked her to delete it. She did not reply, then told the mother to sue her. The photo was still online when the mother gave evidence. The Commission held that a child's photo is sensitive personal data, that commercial use without parental consent was unlawful, and that the refusal to delete broke the right to erasure. It fined the seller, ordered damages, and ordered her to delete all photos of the child from every platform within 14 days. It was its first ruling on children's data.
What this does not show. The ruling does not describe harm to the child beyond the wide spread of the image, and the photo was first posted by someone else. It does not say whether the seller deleted the photos after the order.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Direcção dos Serviços de Protecção de Dados Pessoais (DSPDP), Macau, Annual Report 2024, summaries of investigations completed in 2024, case 4. 2024 (case completed in 2024, published in the 2024 annual report).
A domestic helper posted three videos and photos of her employer's two children on a Facebook account that anyone could view. She took them while she worked for the family. One showed a child ill in hospital, with the screen above the bed showing the child's name. The DSPDP found she had no lawful basis, that the posts held health data, and that they affected the children's safety. It fined her and added a warning. The videos were still online after that decision took effect, so it ordered her to delete and destroy them within 15 days. She did not obey, and the DSPDP sent the case to the criminal police.
What this does not show. The source does not say whether the videos were finally removed, how many people saw them, or what the police did. It does not name the people involved.
Cost: personal. At risk: children; health and the body. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
'AHL' and TICA Default Tenancy Control Pty Ltd (Privacy) [2024] AICmr 26, Australian Information Commissioner. 9 Feb 2024.
In 2011 a real estate agent listed a tenant on TICA's default tenancy database. Queensland law limits such information to 3 years, and TICA removed the listing from that database in 2014. But TICA kept the same information in its paid Virtual Manager database. In May 2018 the tenant applied for a new rental. The system emailed the first agent, who told the new agent that the tenant had left the old property damaged and with rent owing. The new agent then refused the application because of a poor rental reference. The Commissioner found TICA breached APP 11.2 by keeping the information for about 7 years, and ordered it destroyed.
What this does not show. The Commissioner could not conclude that the application would have succeeded without the breach, because the new agent had other concerns. The finding covers one complainant.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; systems and access; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: second source.
Amazon.com, Alexa voice assistant (US Department of Justice for the Federal Trade Commission). 19 Jul 2023.
The government alleged that Amazon kept children's Alexa voice recordings with no end date by default. It also alleged that when parents and users asked for their voice recordings, transcripts and location data to be deleted, Amazon sometimes did not delete all of it and did not tell them. A federal court entered a settlement order.
What this does not show. A settlement of the government's allegations, without admission. The release does not say whether the ordered deletions were completed.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
WW International, formerly Weight Watchers, and Kurbo (US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice). 3 Mar 2022.
Kurbo is a weight-loss app that was marketed for children as young as eight. The regulator alleged that the companies collected personal information from children under 13 without their parents' consent. It also alleged that they kept the information with no end date and deleted it only when a parent asked. A federal court approved the settlement on 3 March 2022. The order makes the companies delete the information collected unlawfully from children under 13 and "destroy any algorithms derived from the data".
What this does not show. A settlement of the regulator's allegations. The regulator's release does not say whether the algorithms were destroyed.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; science and ai; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: court order.
UAB Prime Leasing, operator of CityBee (State Data Protection Inspectorate of Lithuania, decision of 29 Nov 2021). Feb 2021 (decision 29 Nov 2021).
In February 2021 the data of 110,302 CityBee users appeared in CSV files on a hacking forum. The Lithuanian regulator found it came from an unprotected database backup file created on 27 February 2018. The file held names, personal ID numbers, driving licence numbers and part card details in plain text. The company said it did not know the file existed. With no evidence that it was closed earlier, the regulator held the breach ran from 2018 to 16 February 2021, and fined the company.
What this does not show. The fine was for failing to secure the data. The decision does not say the backup should have been deleted.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Google Inc. (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, case 25579/16.1T8LSB.L2.S1). 9 Jul 2021.
From March 2012 a man asked the search engine to remove results that linked his name to blog posts accusing him of a sexual assault. The appeal court found that the posts were false. The search engine declined most of his requests. The appeal court ordered it to remove or hide the results, and to stop indexing pages that linked his name to three named words. On 9 July 2021 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the order. It held that he had the right to have the data erased.
What this does not show. The order binds the search engine, not the people who wrote the posts. Some results had been blocked in European versions of the search before the case ended.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
DMR A/S, Dansk Miljoeraadgivning (Danish Data Protection Agency decision, as reported). 18 May 2020.
A former employee of the engineering consultancy asked it in September 2019 to remove videos of him from its website and online channels, and withdrew his consent. The company told him that he had been cut out of the films. The Danish authority found that he still appeared in the company's films on YouTube and on its website three months after that, and it issued serious criticism for not deleting the material without undue delay.
What this does not show. Read in news reports of the decision by Dansk Erhverv and SecurityWorldMarket, not in the authority's own text.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: SecurityWorldMarket report.
Avid Life Media (Ashley Madison). 2016-08-24.
It kept deactivated and inactive profiles indefinitely. The paid full delete did not remove all data. Photos from deleted accounts were kept by error.
What this does not show. The regulators took an undertaking. They set no penalty.
Cost: personal. At risk: livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read Oct 2026.
Snapchat Inc. 2014-05-08.
The app marketed its photo and video messages as disappearing when a timer ran out. The US Federal Trade Commission said that video files were stored outside the app's protected area on the phone, where a recipient could copy them with simple tools. Other apps could log in and save messages, bypassing the timer and deletion. A security researcher had warned the company in June 2012.
What this does not show. The regulator's blog post does not give the order's terms. The case was settled.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
13 people-search sites; 7 paid removal services. 8 Aug 2024.
Testing ran May to September 2023 with 32 volunteers. Across 28 enrolled participants, the team found 332 listings; only 117 (35%) were gone after four months. Manual opt-outs removed 70% within a week. The report says data "sometimes gets removed but then reappears weeks or months later". It did not test reappearance.
What this does not show. Do not cite a reappearance rate: the study did not recheck profiles once deleted. Small sample; US people-search sites only; non-government research.
Cost: personal. At risk: life and safety; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: First-hand research, read 23 Oct 2026.
Illuminate Education (US Federal Trade Commission complaint and final order). 5 Jun 2026.
Illuminate Education runs cloud software for schools. The US Federal Trade Commission says it set no limits on how long it kept student data and did not delete data when its contracts required it. A hacker was in its network from 27 December 2021 to 8 January 2022 and took data on more than 10.1 million students. The data taken included 2018 to 2019 records from an Illinois district that never fully used the product, and records from about 2011 to 2013 from a former New York district client. It included disability, special education and discipline information. The final order of June 2026 requires the company to delete data it does not need.
What this does not show. These are the regulator's allegations, settled by a consent order; the company did not admit them.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: FTC complaint.
Osaka University and its contractor NEC (university notice). 21 Oct 2026.
The university says that its contractor shared files with personal data on cloud storage with a partner firm the university did not know about. The contractor also kept files that it should have deleted when the work ended. A third party downloaded the files. The university counts 77,851 people affected: graduates, students and staff. It warned them to look out for phishing emails.
What this does not show. The notice does not say how many of the records were in the files that should have been deleted. No misuse was confirmed when the notice was published.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: kept by someone else.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
PowerSchool Canada ULC and an Alberta school division (abbreviated LRSD in the report). 17 Nov 2025.
The report covers a PowerSchool breach affecting over 700,000 people in Alberta. One school division asked in July 2022 for its instance to be removed and its data purged. PowerSchool confirmed decommissioning, but the division could still access the instance in 2024. Data of its students, staff and parents was caught in the breach. The Commissioner found the data was not deleted or disposed of.
What this does not show. No fine. The report does not name the division in full; whether the data has since been deleted remains outstanding.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 24 Oct 2026.
Safety Investigation Authority (Onnettomuustutkintakeskus), investigation P2024-01, on the City of Helsinki Education Division (KASKO). 17 Jun 2025.
In spring 2024 an attacker entered the City of Helsinki Education Division through a poorly maintained VPN server and copied about two terabytes from a shared network drive, an estimated 750,000 documents. The drive had been in use for 15 to 20 years and held more than four million files. The investigators found that its contents were not checked and old files were not deleted, although the Information Management Act says data must be destroyed when its retention period ends. Working files meant to be temporary stayed on the drive. The files included decisions on children's special support, medical certificates, passport copies and parents' income data. People with a safety non-disclosure order were among those affected.
What this does not show. The report does not say which files were past their retention period. It does not show misuse of the stolen data or harm to a named person.
Cost: personal, national, professional. At risk: children; health and the body; life and safety; democracy and public trust; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
Minokamo City (junior high school computer room) and an unnamed PC disposal contractor. 8 Mar 2017 (article); city announcement 23 Feb 2017.
In November 2016 a man told the city he had bought a hard disk at an online auction. It held names of a teacher and students, about 750 people. The disk came from a school computer the city had sent for disposal. The contractor breached its contract by skipping data erasure and physical destruction. The city recovered the disk.
What this does not show. A news report. The article does not say whether a destruction certificate was issued or name the contractor. Personal data case.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: News report, read 23 Oct 2026.
Bow Valley College; Electronic Recycling Association (collector). 20 Aug 2013.
The college handed 21 decommissioned servers to a recycling association. It believed the data would be wiped. An individual later bought one of the servers and told the Commissioner on 19 Sep 2012. It held data on about 183,900 students and 3,500 employees. The college had no signed contract and no written assurance of wiping or physical destruction. It agreed to an independent audit of new controls.
What this does not show. Personal data case. Only the web summary was read; the full PDF report was not opened.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: left on hardware or paper.
Source: Official source, read 23 Oct 2026.
Edmodo, LLC. 22 May 2023 (proposed stipulated order).
The education app collected children's personal data without verifiable parental consent and used it for advertising. It kept the data with no time limit until at least 2020. The order requires a retention schedule with deletion times. It also requires the company to delete models or algorithms built with children's data collected without consent.
What this does not show. The source read is the regulator's press release on the proposed order. The company had stopped operating by about September 2022.
A penalty or a settlement for this event is counted on The Cost of Non-Deletion.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: children; reputation and brand. How the data survived: never deleted.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
An education technology provider, not named (Information Commissioner's Office, "Edtech examined"). 24 Jun 2026.
The regulator audited 28 education technology providers in 2024 and 2025. One provider's contracts said that it would delete or anonymise children's information, as the school chose. In practice it anonymised the data in every case. It split the data and the identifiers into two databases and kept the reference key, so the children could be identified again. The regulator found that the firm "had pseudonymised, not anonymised, the output". The firm kept this data with no end date. The regulator required an urgent review, and the firm then anonymised the stored data. Across the audits, about 70% of providers set no clear storage period or kept children's information longer than they could justify.
What this does not show. The audits were by consent and no provider is named. The case study does not say that anyone identified a child from this data.
Cost: personal. At risk: children. How the data survived: deleted in name only.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026.
These 3 events are kept apart from the 414 above. Nobody here failed to delete data they had to delete. An attacker took a copy, and the owner could not show where the copies went, whether they survive, or whether they will be used again.
Ministry of Health, Kingdom of Tonga (joint advisory of the Australian Cyber Security Centre, CERT Tonga and New Zealand NCSC). 15 Jun 2025.
On 15 June 2025 ransomware shut down core services of Tonga's national health network. The INC Ransom group claimed the attack on its leak site on 26 June 2025, and the advisory names the person who ran the servers used to take the data. The ministry said a small sample of confidential patient data had been published, that no records were deleted or changed, and that more patient information could be published later.
What this does not show. The ministry's own statement is read through a news report. Nobody has said how much was copied.
Cost: personal, professional. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: stolen and still out there.
Source: Official source, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: the ministry's statement, as reported.
Government of Palau, Ministry of Finance and the Digital Residency Program. Mar 2024 (extortion Sep 2025).
A ransomware attack in March 2024 took roughly 25,000 government files from the Ministry of Finance and another ministry. In September 2025 people claiming to be from the DragonForce group tried to extort the provider of Palau's Digital Residency Program with old files from that attack. The government said no new data had been accessed and that the attempt used only the old documents.
What this does not show. A news report of the government statement. It does not say what the old files held.
Cost: national, personal, professional. At risk: democracy and public trust; livelihood and private life; reputation and brand. How the data survived: stolen and still out there.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Public Radio Guam.
Psychotherapy Center Vastaamo Oy, Finland (Länsi-Uusimaa District Court, judgment of 30 Apr 2024). Nov 2018 (extortion 2020; judgment 30 Apr 2024).
In 2018 a hacker downloaded the database of some 33,000 Vastaamo clients. In 2020, after the centre refused to pay, he began publishing patient information and sent patients demands for 200 or 500 euros. The district court convicted him in April 2024 of an aggravated data breach, 20,745 counts of aggravated attempted blackmail and 9,231 counts of spreading private information.
What this does not show. News reports of the judgment; the judgment itself was not read. The man denied the attack throughout.
Cost: personal. At risk: health and the body; livelihood and private life. How the data survived: stolen and still out there.
Source: News report, read 18 Nov 2026. Also: Dark Reading on the counts.
Every event fits one of the five. Open one to see its events.
39 times on this page the data came back after it was removed. A feed sent it again. A backup restored it. A person uploaded it again. AI adds new ways back: a model learns it again, and an agent writes it into its own memory again.
of the facts deleted from an AI agent's memory could be recovered again within five routine sessions. Most had been written back into its memory.
A pilot study, 2026. Source, read 31 Oct 2026.
Nobody has to report it.
The harm arrives late.
The loss is someone else's.
Some of it is secret.
A fine can be counted. Those are on the other page: The Cost of Non-Deletion.
In each of these fields a rule already says destroy it, return it or keep it gone. Where a rule names a proof, it is a certificate or a record that the organisation makes itself.
| What it covers | The rule | What it asks |
|---|---|---|
| Personal data when its purpose endsPortugal | Lei 58/2019, article 21(4) | When the purpose that led to the processing ends, the controller must destroy the personal data or make it anonymous. Read 18 Nov 2026. |
| Classified material held by contractorsUnited States | 32 CFR 117.15 | Contractors destroy classified material under disposition instructions (32 CFR 2001.47). They destroy duplicates promptly. They return or destroy bid material within 180 days. Read Oct 2026. |
| Classified documents after a contract endsUnited Kingdom | Industry Security Notice 2023/15 | At contract end, classified documents must be destroyed, returned or removed unless the Contracting Authority authorises retention. Orphaned retentions must be referred to COO DSR. Read Oct 2026. |
| Protected information held by defence suppliersJapan | Ministry of Defense information security standard, sections 6.6 and 6.7 | Information Security Standard for procurement (annex, r07; revision applies from 1 Jul 2025), sections 6.6 and 6.7. They cover disposal of documents, media and systems. Return or destroy at contract end on MOD instruction. Read Oct 2026. |
| Storage mediaUnited States | NIST SP 800-88 Revision 2 | NIST's media sanitisation guideline replaces Revision 1 of December 2014. It defines three methods: clear, purge and destroy. Purge must make recovery infeasible even with laboratory methods. Read 24 Oct 2026. |
| Government storage mediaCanada | ITSP.40.006 | ITSP.40.006 v2 sets media sanitisation rules for Government of Canada departments. It says sanitisation of media must be verified. If verification cannot be done, departments should use another method that can be verified. Read 31 Oct 2026. |
| Credit filesUnited States | Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681i | If a reinvestigation finds disputed information inaccurate, incomplete or unverifiable, a consumer reporting agency must promptly delete or modify it. Deleted information may not be put back unless the furnisher certifies it is complete and accurate. Agencies must keep reasonable procedures to prevent deleted information from reappearing in a consumer's file or reports. Read 24 Oct 2026. |
| Personal informationSouth Africa | Protection of Personal Information Act, section 14 | Section 14(4) requires destruction, deletion or de-identification as soon as reasonably practicable once retention is no longer authorised. Section 14(5) requires it be done so the record cannot be reconstructed in intelligible form. Section 14(6) lists when restriction replaces deletion. Read Oct 2026. |
| The memory of AI agentsSpain | Data protection authority (AEPD), guidance on agentic AI, version 1.2 | Agent memory must be minimal, with strict retention periods. Systems must support all GDPR rights, including erasure, by design. Deleting a person's data is cited as a serious, possibly irreversible agent action. Read 22 Oct 2026. |
Updated 18 November 2026. This page is research. It is not legal advice.
A source shows three things. The data should have been gone: a rule, an order, a contract or a promise said so, or its use had ended. It was still there, or it came back. And something other than a fine was put at risk.
Personal: the event put a person's life, liberty, living or health, or a child, at risk. Professional: it put an organisation's know-how, its science and AI or its systems at risk, or a person's post or professional standing. National: it put national security, allies or public trust at risk. One event can carry more than one cost, so the three counts add up to more than 414.
An event carries "Reputation and brand" when a named company or public body was tied to the failure in public: by a ruling, by an inquiry or audit finding, or because the data reached other people under its name. It counts as a professional cost. It does not measure the damage to the name.
The globe colours each country by its count of events: the stronger the red, the more events. 31 events have no single country, so they are in the list and not on the globe. A high count shows where records are public and where we have read most. It does not rank countries.
174 come from the evidence map behind The Cost of Non-Deletion, where each was read at its source. 240 were added from new research. Each entry shows the date we read its source.
266 rest on an official source: a court, an auditor, a regulator, a parliament or the body's own statement. 61 rest on research where the authors examined the devices or systems themselves. 87 rest on a news report or a law-firm note, and each one says so.
Harm recorded: the source records a harm that happened. Data reached others: it reached a person who should not have had it. Ruled on, fined or settled: a court, a regulator or an oversight body acted. Found by audit, test or inquiry: it was found before misuse. Official warning and reported incident mean what they say.
A plain hack. A plain theft. Data that was destroyed when it had to be kept. Cases about serving or former heads of state or government.
No event says that kept data caused a harm, unless the source says so in words. Each event carries a line on what its source does not show. Read that line before you quote the event.
This page can hold errors. If an event is wrong, or a source has changed, write to glen@together-alone.com and we will correct it.